FINAL MEETING SUMMARY

HANFORD ADVISORY BOARD
TANK WASTE COMMITTEE
April 10, 2013
Richland, WA

Topics in this Meeting Summary

This is only a summary of issues and actions in this meeting. It may not fully represent the ideas discussed or opinions given. Examination of this document cannot equal or replace attendance and public participation.

Opening

Dirk Dunning, Tank Waste Committee (TWC) chair, welcomed the committee and introductions were made. Dirk announced that he was reelected to serve as TWC chair and Bob Suyama was elected to serve as vice-chair.

The committee approved the February meeting summary, which was a joint meeting between TWC and the Health, Safety and Environmental Protection Committee (HSEP). No changes had been received on the draft that was distributed to the two committees.

Hillary Johnson, EnviroIssues, noted that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced the President's budget rollout has been delayed to 1:00 p.m. As a result, DOE will be unable to provide budget information during the Budgets and Contracts Committee (BCC) meeting on Thursday. The BCC meeting will be a joint meeting that all Hanford Advisory Board (HAB or Board) members are encouraged to attend.

Integrated Project Team Update on Double-Shell Tank AY-102[*]

Introduction

Dirk introduced the double-shell tank (DST) AY-102 topic, which is a joint topic with the Public Involvement Committee (PIC). He said the leak has increased in size, but it does not appear to be active. There are questions about the integrity of similar DSTs. AY-102 was the first DST to be constructed so many of the issues discovered when constructing this first tank were resolved during construction of the subsequent DSTs. TWC would like to understand the capability of the secondary tank and how closely the integrity is being examined. The secondary containment tank is only meant to contain any waste leaking from the primary containment for seven days when materials would be expected to be removed.

Agency presentation

Jeremy Johnson, DOE – Office of River Protection (DOE-ORP) provided a status update on DST AY-102 (Attachment 2). During his presentation, Jeremy noted the following points:

- DOE found material on the floor of AY-102 during an inspection the previous year. This material appears to be coming from underneath the tank. It is running along refractory slots in several locations and settling on the floor of the annulus.
- A leak assessment was performed after visual signs of the leak were found. This report is available on the Hanford website.
- DOE identified several conditions that likely lead to the leak. There was a layer of solids deposited in AY-102 in the late 1970's that were susceptible to corrosion. AY-102 was relatively cool from that point through the late 1990's when additional material was added that increased temperature in the tank. These two factors coupled with difficulties during construction likely resulted in the leak.
- DOE conducts continual monitoring for liquid levels both in the primary tank and the annulus using several mechanisms. There are leak detectors in the annulus coupled with continuous air monitoring and leak detection pits.
- Weekly video inspections are conducted to determine if there are any changes in the material or evidence of further leaking. There do appear to be some slow changes.
- An Integrated Project Team (IPT) was established to make recommendations on addressing material. The IPT recommended retrieving the tank, maximizing DST tank space, and for DOE to consider adding additional tank space. These recommendations are currently under consideration

[*] Please see Attachment 1 – Transcribed Flip Chart Notes for key points/follow up actions recorded during the committee discussion.

by a steering committee that consists of DOE-ORP and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology).

- Six additional DSTs were examined. No anomalies were found inside the annulus of any of these tanks through visual inspections. A construction analysis review is currently underway by a team of engineers to more closely analyze results of the inspections.

Regulator perspective

Jeff Lyon, Ecology, said he has been participating in the IPT on behalf of Ecology. He is distressed by the amount of time it has taken for DOE to respond to the leak. Jeff said he still has not heard DOE's decision on when they are going to remove waste from AY-102. He also does not know what the status is of the IPT and if there will be any further meetings or not. Ecology is concerned about available DST space. Jeff does appreciate that DOE is inspecting and monitoring the DSTs and the methods used to identify leaks. The leak in AY-102 was identified long before any leak detection system was triggered. Cameras are integral to the leak detection system.

Committee discussion

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments. Questions, comments, and responses were provided by HAB members unless noted otherwise.

Q. When is DOE going to pump the remaining waste in AY-102?

> *R. [DOE] The IPT recommended sluicing and emptying the tank. That decision is with the steering committee and they should determine how to implement recommendations in the next few weeks. Once the decision has been made, DOE will outline how to initiate pumping and where material should be moved.*

Q. Is DOE still planning to add additional space to the DSTs? Filling tanks decreases space available for additional waste.

> *R. [DOE] The regulations require maintaining emergency space in tanks and DOE is evaluating if additional space is needed.*

Q. [Ecology] Where is the decision process? It sounds like DOE is relying on the IPT to make recommendations, but they have not met since February and members are unsure about the team's current status. DOE should have agility to deal with leaking tanks in case the interstitial space is suddenly filled with leaking material. There are also concerns about the evaporator campaign, which is scheduled to start in August.

> *R. [DOE] There is space now and equipment available to remove all the liquid from AY-102. DOE does rely on the evaporator for supporting retrieval efforts and for maintaining available space.*

C. The entire process is dependent on the evaporator operating efficiently.

> *R. [Ecology] There are approximately three million gallons of waste in the tank. DOE maintains emergency DST space and holds additional space for retrieval. DOE is prepared to pump all liquids from AY-102 into another space if there is an emergency and it needs to be removed immediately. That would alleviate the problem but not eliminate it. DOE is required to always maintain approximately 1.1 million gallons of space in case of an emergency. The IPT identified that the evaporator needs to be run a number of times, which has not been the case previously. There have been a number of upgrades to the evaporator and it should be able to sustain increased use. The leak is very small right now and it has not even reached the leak detection pit. The worry is that it could get worse and DOE will be compelled to react instead of being able to plan to react.*

Q. Is two years a realistic estimate for retrieval time of tank waste in AY-102?

> *R. [DOE] That is not an unrealistic estimate. There is a substantial amount of design procurement and, construction for the actual retrieval in any tank.*

Q. [Ecology] Is the IPT still functioning as a group or has it been discontinued? There is still interest from Ecology in being a part of the effort.

> *R. [DOE] There should be a product from the steering committee in the next few weeks that will allow DOE to begin implementing recommendations and a path forward for the IPT itself. The steering committee appears to agree with IPT recommendations so the question will be how to proceed.*

C. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the DSTs are required to be fully inspectable. Inspections should be able to determine where a leak is occurring, but it is not possible to fully inspect the bottom of the DSTs at the Hanford Site. The tanks were designed before the regulations.

> *R. [DOE] The secondary liner can be visually inspected. Beyond that, DOE relies on the leak detection pit for identifying leaks.*

C. [Ecology] Will the tests of simulate be affected by sequestration? Is there a way for Ecology or the Board to recommend that testing is a key action for DOE?

> *R. [DOE] Preliminary work has been conducted at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Testing is part of the IPT process and some of that work will be completed this year. The testing has not occurred at this point but PNNL is ready. The testing would be to determine if the material that is currently in contact with the annulus is compromising the secondary tank. The impacts from sequestration have not been identified or initiated yet.*

C. DOE's emergency pumping guide states that if there a leak, the tank should be immediately pumped. It might not be possible to pump tanks for a long period of time so there is some concern about the ability to quickly pump materials if an emergency situation does arise.

R. [DOE] DOE is currently evaluating and reviewing the pumping guide. The guide currently states that materials should be pumped to below the level of the identified leak; it does not fully evaluate a situation like AY-102 where the leak is occurring at the bottom of the tank. DOE does not believe AY-102 is an emergency situation so the equipment is in place if it is determined that the tank needs to be pumped right away but DOE is not removing material at this point.

C. Removing solids through sluicing could worsen the leak or allow material to move outside the annulus.

R. [DOE] One factor complicating removal of material for AY-102 is that there needs to be some level of liquid maintained above the solids in the tank for nuclear safety reasons. DOE did consider how different retrieval technologies might impact or increase the leak.

C. Is it correct to say that either the liquids and solids can be retrieved from AY-102 or the material can be retrieved from C Farm because both require use of the evaporator? Is there space in the DST system to hold all this material?

R. [DOE] Use of the evaporator is required for both AY-102 retrieval and for C Farm operations.

C. What is the contingency plan if several tanks fail? DOE would need to have enough space to hold materials and consider factors such as the chemical composition of the waste to ensure undesirable reactions do not occur.

R. [DOE] DOE has approximately three million gallons of space available. The requirement is to maintain 1.1 million gallons or enough to pump an entire tank. DOE does not have emergency space for multiple tank failures.

C. There have always been specifications on the types of waste that can be placed in the tanks. If some material placed in the tanks caused corrosion, the implication would be that the waste did not meet specifications. What is DOE doing to determine the composition of the material that is causing corrosion?

R. [DOE] DOE has a sample of the material that is in contact with the annulus and secondary liner. It does not appear this material is corrosive and is not compromising the bottom of the secondary tank.

R. [WRPS] The material placed in the tanks has always meet specifications; the specifications have changed over time as more knowledge is gained about threats to the tanks. Major changes were made in 1984 to what material could be placed in the tanks.

R. [Ecology] The tanks have been shown to be out of specifications three times in the past. Those specifications may or may not have changed over time. Tanks are so radiologically active that

they have their own ongoing convective mixing and chemical reactions, leading to the material composition becoming out of specification. The last core sample was taken in 2005 so the current mix of material today is unknown. There are concerns about what contents of the other DSTs are. Ecology has a request in to Tom Fletcher, DOE, to show a table of when each tank was last sampled and whether it was in or out of specifications at that time.

C. There is not a core sample truck at the Hanford Site; they have all been put out of service. There is a core sample platform that is supposed to be coming to the tank farms, but it is questionable when that will become operational.

Q. One major concern is how to make the evaporator a more reliable and functional part of the system. Why isn't the evaporator capable of running almost full time if it is needed?

R. [DOE] DOE has done a substantial amount of work in the last few years to help with these concerns and is working to increase the operability of the evaporator so it will be able to be run almost continually. The issue is that the waste can only be concentrated so much.

R. [Ecology] The evaporator is batch run and does not handle continuous feed. There is some down time required for preparation, feed, and cleanup. Another issue with the evaporator involves staffing. Crews are shared between retrievals and transfers. There are impacts from layoffs resulting from sequestration.

TWC decided that the Board may want to offer advice on this topic at the June Board meeting. The Issue Managers (IMs) for this topic are Dirk, Vince Panesko, Becky Holland, David Bernhard, and Shelley Cimon. TWC will also keep a placeholder in the May meeting agenda for any potential updates DOE might be able to share.

Update on Single-Shell Tank (SST) T-111 and SSTs with Decreasing Levels[*]

Agency presentation

Jeremy Johnson, DOE-ORP, provided an update on SST T-111 and other SSTs with decreasing levels. Jeremy noted the following points in his presentation:

- The SSTs have been in the news recently for declining surface levels, including T-111. DOE retrieved liquids from the SSTs from the 1970's through 2004.
- DOE is monitoring the tanks in addition to working to prevent intrusions. Monitoring involves a variety of instruments in the tanks that can detect if water is coming in or material is moving out.

[*] Please see Attachment 1 – Transcribed Flip Chart Notes for key points/follow up actions recorded during the committee discussion.

- T-111 was first identified as an assumed leaker in 1979. In 1994 it was identified as a re-leaker and at that time the remaining liquid was removed. T-111 showed increasing levels of material, a possible sign of intrusion, before levels began to decrease at an estimated loss of 150 to 300 gallons of liquid over a year.
- DOE evaluated all 149 tanks for evidence of decreasing material. Eighty-three tanks showed decreasing trends over a decade while 66 tanks showed increasing trends.
- Twenty tanks were identified as needing further evaluation because the decrease could not be easily explained by tank conditions, evaporation, interim stabilization or other factors. Six tanks have been identified as high priorities for further evaluation. Visual inspections are scheduled for these tanks.
- DOE is working to improve the monitoring program so that data trends can be identified sooner as well as accelerating retrieval of waste from tanks that are believed to contain Transuranic (TRU) waste.

Regulator perspective

Jeff Lyon, Ecology, provided a presentation on the six SST tanks of concern (Attachment 4). During his presentation, Jeff noted the following points:

- The six tanks of current concern are suspected of being TRU but are not formally recognized as TRU until DOE completes the classification process. These tanks were initially declared to be assumed leakers from 1977 to 1984 and all were Interim Stabilized by 1995.
- All SSTs have had as much pumpable liquid removed as practicable (the liquid that can leak through liners and reach soils).
- Jeff reviewed the inventory of technetium-99 and nitrate, which are the mobile part of the radioactive contaminant. The tanks are comparatively not a large source of these contaminants.
- There are a variety of monitoring techniques in place to evaluate potential leaks. One way to monitor SST interstitial liquid levels is through a Liquid Observation Well (LOW).
- Jeff reviewed monitoring data from T-111 and the other tanks of concern. The monitoring data shows much variation at different scales and there are potential changes relating to seasonal temperature changes.

Committee discussion

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Q. Are there additional tanks leaking?

R. [DOE] The decreasing levels could be explained by a number of things, such as evaporation or waste settling. These decreases triggered DOE to conduct more evaluations to determine what is occurring in the SSTs.

Q. The T-111 monitoring data (slide 18) shows constant increases in tank materials. Is this a result of hydrogen generation? DOE has not calculated the amount of hydrogen generation.

R. [DOE] DOE experts examined that question and determined the increase was likely not a result of gas generation. DOE is also looking at possible seasonal variation that might lead to thermal expansion.

Q. When will the SST evaluations be completed?

R. [DOE] The goal is to complete visual inspections of the five additional high priority tanks by the end of May. There is no specific date for when the remaining 14 tanks will be completed.

Q. Can DOE further explain the increasing and decreasing trends for tank waste?

R. [DOE] There are enough data points obtained from interim stabilization that no tank will show a straight line. Of the 149 tanks, 83 of them showed a negative trend simply because it is not possible to draw a straight line through data points. There are only 20 tanks that DOE feels need to be further examined because the trend cannot be easily explained.

C. The criteria DOE is using to decide which tanks to further examine is confusing. How would DOE know if all 83 of those tanks with decreasing levels were leaking?

R. [DOE] There is no set criteria for determining if tanks declining at a certain rate are leaking. It is highly improbably that all 83 or the 20 requiring further evaluation are leaking. The data simply indicates that DOE should take a closer look at some of these tanks.

Q. Ecology seems to be saying that they cannot say the tanks contain TRU material until DOE proves whether material is TRU or not. What is the process for proving material to be TRU?

R. [Ecology] DOE has to complete their process in order to declare material TRU. The TRU distinction is based on how material was processed at the Hanford Site. DOE completes a process history to determine potential TRU material then there is a determination phase that is politically influenced. DOE will deal with the classification as the agency moves through the cleanup process. Additional sampling of the tank waste would be required. TRU waste is different because of the process used to create it.

Q. Will more sampling be required during the TRU classification process?

R. [DOE] DOE would prefer not to go through the process of repackaging and removing waste if it does not have a place to go. The regulatory requirements for sending waste to New Mexico need to be resolved. New Mexico currently has restrictions that it will not accept any waste from

the tanks, with the tanks listed by name. DOE is working to remove this exclusion so tank waste can be moved to New Mexico if it is determined to be TRU. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) currently does not accept TRU tank waste.

C. Waste definitions should be modified to reflect consequences of waste as opposed to the processes that created it. The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) divides waste into high level waste and low activity waste. The two components with the greatest environmental concern are included on the low side of the waste stream. RAP should consider drafting a letter for Board approval that recommends reconsidering the waste classification criteria. A national academy should study this issue.

Q. Has anyone evaluated the environmental consequences of the leaks? They appear to be fairly small, especially in comparison to what is already in the ground at the Hanford Site. DOE should consider the cost effectiveness of their efforts to examine potentially leaking tanks.

C. The chemical behavior of aluminum could account for some of the changes in tank waste levels. Aluminum undergoes reactions that create water.

The committee requested additional updates from DOE as monitoring continues and more information on what actions DOE would take if a serious leak was detected. The next update from DOE will be tentatively scheduled for the August TWC meeting. The IMs for this topic are David and Dirk.

After lunch, Stacey Charbonneau, DOE-ORP, returned to clarify some points made during the discussion about decreasing liquid levels in the tanks. She said the decreasing levels represent changes in the waste levels over the previous 10-15 years after interim stabilization. No tanks will maintain the same level of waste over that time period; 83 tanks showed decreasing levels and 66 tanks showed increasing levels. She said the majority of those changes are nominal from easily explained factors. DOE is taking a closer look at 20 tanks that might have higher temperatures and greater evaporation than other tanks or have inconsistencies between waste levels taken from different instruments. These fourteen of the 20 tanks are not considered high priority for further evaluation. There are six high priority tanks that do not have easily explainable decreases in liquid levels. DOE is currently monitoring the tanks through video and examining the process history. There are still questions as to what exactly is occurring within the tanks. DOE also cautioned the committee that social media can make it very easy for misinformation to be spread to the public. If there are any questions about information presented by DOE, the Board should call DOE for clarification.

Briefing on the Schedule for System Plan 7[*]

Agency presentation

[*] Please see Attachment 1 – Transcribed Flip Chart Notes for key points/follow up actions recorded during the committee discussion.

DaBrisha Smith, DOE-ORP, provided a general overview of the system planning process and schedule (Attachment 5). During her presentation, DaBrisha noted the following points:

- System plans are used to design, analyze and define future operations and possible outcomes. The River Protection Project (RPP) System Plan is a summary level document that provides scenario evaluations to assist in determining the impacts of changing any combination of factors.
- According to TPA Milestone M-062-40, scenarios should be selected by DOE and Ecology that will be analyzed in the System Plan. System Plans are scheduled to be issued every three years beginning on October 31, 2011.
- System Plan 7 framing will begin in late July or early August 2013. The scenarios are scheduled to be selected in October 2013. Those assumptions should be approved by February 2014 in order to issue System Plan 7 by October 31, 2014.
- Board Advice #238 requests that the Board be able to provide input on the scenarios under consideration for revision 7 no later than September 2013. The Board also requested that DOE provide the set of assumptions used in System Plan 6 to help the Board frame future advice.

Committee discussion

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Q. Is the February 2014 date for approval of assumptions within Tri-Party Agency (TPA) expectations?

> *R. [DOE] The schedule for System Plan 7 is based on past scheduling.*

Q. [Ecology] Will DOE be providing a document that frames scenarios for the TWC in July or early August? It will be very difficult for the Board to offer informed advice on the scenarios in September if the information is not available until August.

> *R. [DOE] DOE will be working with Ecology about what scenarios will be run. The scenarios will not be developed until late July or early August. DOE would like to discuss the draft scenarios with the TWC in September.*

C. In order to develop advice for the September Board meeting, the IMs will need to begin thinking through the important issues in June or July. It would be helpful to have the agencies provide a presentation during the August committee meeting to outline their thinking on scenario development. The Board will likely not have an opportunity to provide advice on the scenarios. TWC would like to receive information on the scenarios as early as possible from DOE so they can reasonably consider what is being proposed.

C. Supplemental treatment should be consistent with the system plan. If supplemental treatment is handled outside the system plan, the system plan might not reflect what is occurring with supplemental treatment and the two reports could contradict each other.

> *R. [DOE] DOE and Ecology have been negotiating to change the one-time Supplemental Treatment Report milestone date. Decisions on supplemental treatment could be made substantially later than the issuance of System Plan 7.*

C. [Ecology] There are a number of technology issues that have slowed down construction of WTP and required a re-baselining effort that is currently underway. The Board should keep in mind that any scenario needs to be relevant to what can be accomplished over the next several years and take a larger view of the system plan. DOE should ensure that any scenarios being considered are relevant to what is currently occurring at the Hanford Site, including funding issues and technological adequacy.

C. [DOE] System Plan 6 has been available for quite a while. TWC could evaluate the assumptions from System Plan 6 and offer advice based on those since DOE will be using those assumptions as a basis for moving forward.

The IMs for System Plan 7 are Meme Samkow, Dirk Dunning, Dick Smith and Al Boldt. They will work through July to develop important points and prepare for a committee discussion during the August TWC meeting. It will be helpful to have information from the agencies at that time, but if information is not available the Board can offer tentative advice in September based on what information is known and potentially offer additional advice in November. Hillary will distribute an electronic link to System Plan 6 assumptions.

Committee Discussion on Priorities for 2014/2015 Budget[*]

Introduction

Hillary said the BCC meeting tomorrow will address several pieces of advice. There will not be any specific budget information available from DOE because of the delay in the President's budget announcement. Yesterday, RAP discussed priorities from a higher level and examined potential criteria that could be used to identify high priority actions.

Liz Mattson gave some examples of the criteria developed during the RAP meeting, such as addressing mobile contaminants before immobile and not spending cleanup dollars on work that is not actually cleanup. Instead of creating a prioritized list that could lead to some items being viewed as unimportant, the Board is creating decision-making criteria that would lead to prioritization decisions.

[*] Please see Attachment 1 – Transcribed Flip Chart Notes for key points/follow up actions recorded during the committee discussion.

Committee discussion

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C. It is important for DOE to have glass by 2019 in order to show progress to Congress and the public. LAW should not be delayed in order to keep one aspect of the schedule and deliver on promises. The criteria could be to choose projects that will deliver results and are technically feasible.

C. Higher risks projects should be prioritized; not "optics."

C. DOE should question choosing to invest in projects that are not guaranteed to be successful when those projects divert resources from projects that are sure to be successful. It is also important to avoid distractions from the real cleanup work.

Q. Is the Board advocating that DOE select projects that reduce general risk or is there a specific kind of risk? The Board should define risk.

C. DOE should prioritize projects that reduce mortgage costs.

C. As risks are being prioritized, risks to workers on the Hanford Site should also be considered. Workers should not be put at risk if a cleanup project does not pose an immediate risk to the environment or human health. Workers should be able to focus on the projects with "the most bang for the buck."

C. Another point to consider is the impacts of potential SST leaks. The discussion this morning centered on the assumption that whatever is occurring with the SSTs now will continue that way into the future. What are the consequences if this material continues leaking into the environment or if leaks increase in size? Materials will be added to the environment that cannot be recovered. This type of trade-off should be considered somewhere in the prioritization criteria.

C. Projects that reduce risk and can be shown to the public are good as opposed to additional studies that do not yield real results. For example, there are continual studies on technologies that are not appropriate for the Hanford Site.

> *R. [DOE] Old technologies cannot be relied on to address new problems. It is important to investigate innovative technologies that might prove effective at the Hanford Site.*
>
> *R. The Board has stated support for new technology development in the past. There should be a better tradeoff between developing new technologies and moving away from technologies that do not offer viable solutions. There should be good criteria to ensure studies are not "beating a dead horse."*

C. [Ecology] According to the System Plan, the last waste will be retrieved sometime between 2040 and 2050. It is important to consider actions that can be taken now to make the most impact, knowing some tanks will not be retrieved for another 20 years.

C. [Ecology] Interim barriers were mentioned because they prevent leaks from entering the groundwater. Retrieving tank waste and closing the tank farm would complete much of the work. It is important to maintain the 2050 timeline. Most or all of the tanks will likely be leaking by that time. If the Board believes there is a high risk for all the tanks to be leaking, the Board should insist on the tanks being emptied on schedule. The conversation from today is confusing. T-111 and some of the other tanks pose less of a risk, especially if they are all going to be drained. The TRU distinction process is a distraction.

C. The Board needs to think about what can be accomplished with the reality of a reduced budget and how to prioritize the options. There should be a preference for near term improvement rather than improvements that might not be evident until thousands of years into the future.

C. The budget reduction will not impact the minimum safe amount because that money is part of a DOE order to maintain the safety of the entire Hanford Site cleanup project. The effects of sequestration will be magnified because there are some areas where the budget cannot be reduced.

C: Resource utilization is important to consider. Money and effort can be wasted in transferring resources from one area to another.

C. This type of juggling involves gaining the greatest impact from scarce resources as possible. The entire process seems algorithmic. There are many dynamic factors that would require a high level of analysis in order to determine a prioritization scheme. DOE could potentially develop a system for prioritizing all potential projects and perhaps interact more with the Board and other agencies in developing and using this system.

C. There is also an infrastructure process for the Hanford Site budget. The facilities need to be in place to accommodate the work being done. For instance, it is not practical to have one change trailer for 100 workers at a project site.

Becky Holland and Liz Mattson will represent TWC at the BCC meeting Thursday.

Committee Business[*]

Mid-year review

TWC reviewed each of the items that had been identified as a TWC priority for FY 2013 (Attachment 6). The committee determined the various actions that have been taken on each topic, including if advice has

[*] Please see Attachment 1 – Transcribed Flip Chart Notes for key points/follow up actions recorded during the committee discussion.

been written, presentations, discussions, if the IMs are tracking the issue or if other actions have been taken. TWC noted when no actions have been taken and any plans in the coming months. The IMs for each topic were also identified. TWC has been making progress in addressing most of their priorities and are also responding to several emerging issues.

3 month work plan

TWC next examined their work plan for the next three months (Attachment 7). Hillary noted that the initial May topics were identified knowing there were too many items. The committee deferred several topics to future months. TWC will request a half-day meeting in May to discuss potential advice for DST AY-102 and possibly impacts to work due to budget outcomes. The committee will also consider having the meeting via conference call and GoToMeeting instead of in-person. The committee will focus their conversation about AY-102 on advice development. A presentation is not planned, but the committee will keep a placeholder on the agenda just in case more information is available from DOE. The goal will be to achieve consensus advice to be brought forward during the June Board meeting.

It was proposed that TWC consider waste redefinition advice. No objections were made and this will be discussed when time is available (anticipated for June). It will be important for TWC to hold a discussion about what the advice should say before moving forward with a draft, although a draft can help inform discussion and can expedite the process. Jeff and Dick will bring forward some points for discussion. TWC will not ask for a presentation.

TWC expressed interest in keeping a placeholder for discussion on the budget when that information becomes available. DOE anticipates having more information about the budget roll out process by the following week.

TWC will continue to follow progress of System Plan 7 over the next several months with a goal to present advice at the September Board meeting. Committee members are asked to read through the assumptions of System Plan 6 to help with advice development

The committee expressed interest in buoyant displacement gas release events (BDGRE). HSEP is also interested in this topic and will likely include it on their June agenda. HSEP may develop some framing questions to provide DOE for a potential June presentation.

Attachments

Attachment 1: Transcribed Flipchart Notes
Attachment 2: Update on Double-Shell Tank AY-102
Attachment 3: Update on Single-Shell Tank T-111 and Single-Shell Tanks with Decreasing Levels
Attachment 4: Ecology Briefing on 6 Hanford Tanks of Current Concern
Attachment 5: System Plan Revision 7 General Overview
Attachment 6: Hanford Advisory Board 2013 Program of Work Priorities (TWC Excerpt)
Attachment 7: Tank Waste Committee – 3 Month Work Plan

Attendees

Board members and alternates

David Bernhard	Norma Jean Germond	Vince Panesko
Allyn Boldt	Laura Hanses	Mark Reavis
Tom Carpenter (phone)	Rebecca Holland	Wade Riggsbee (phone)
Shelley Cimon	John Howieson	Meme Samkow (phone)
Sam Dechter	Steve Hudson	Dick Smith
Dirk Dunning	Liz Mattson	Bob Suyama

Others

Jeremy Johnson, DOE-ORP	Jim Alzheimer, Ecology	Alex Nazaralli, CTUIR
James Lynch, DOE-ORP	Dieter Bohrmann, Ecology	Nicole Addington, EnviroIssues
Steve Pfaff, DOE-ORP	Michelle Hendrickson, Ecology	Hillary Johnson, EnviroIssues
DaBrisha Smith, DOE-ORP	Jeff Lyon, Ecology	Sharon Braswell, MSA
Kim Ballinger, DOE-RL	Dan McDonald, Ecology	Karyn Schual, Public
Tifany Nguyen, DOE-RL	Beth Rochette, Ecology	Kayle Boomer, WRPS
	Nancy Uzienblo, Ecology	John Britton, WRPS (phone)
	Ginger Wireman, Ecology	
	Kristi Wuld, Ecology	