

# Safety Culture IPT Snap shots

## Health Safety Security Report

### Positive Observations

- Interviewees clearly understand the mechanisms available to identify safety concerns, e.g., supervisors, managers, ECP, Human Resources (HR), Government Accountability Office, and Hotline.
- Most interviewees identified that they did not perceive any inhibitors to reporting concerns within their organization.
- The statement that management does not tolerate retaliation of any kind for raising concerns was agreed to by a majority of survey respondents, approximately 75%. This was especially true of respondents in the General Engineering, Project Control Specialist, Program Manager, and Administrative Work Groups.

### Areas in Need of Attention

- Among survey respondents, only about 70% agreed with the statement that everyone in the organization is responsible for identifying problems. While overall this represents a higher percentage of people agreeing than disagreeing, it is lower than is typically seen in other organizations and still indicates that approximately 30% of the population did not agree with this statement. Respondents in the Program Manager, Nuclear Safety and Physical Scientist and General Engineering Work Groups believed this to a greater extent than respondents in the other work groups. Survey respondents in the Supervisory Group believed that everyone is responsible for identifying problems to a greater extent than respondents in the Non-Supervisory and Contractors Groups did.
- Overall, only 30% of all survey respondents feel that they can openly challenge decisions made by management. Respondents in the Contract Specialist/Budget and Finance, Project Control Specialist, General Engineering and Administrative Work Groups feel most negatively about being able to challenge decisions. Non-Supervisory Personnel and Contractors either do not believe or are uncertain about openly challenging management decisions. Among Supervisory

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Personnel slightly more than 70% agreed with the statement related to the ability to openly challenge management decisions.

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## Excel Excerpt from HSS Report

HSS Report Issue	Location in HSS Report	Attribut
Issues with the planning and coordination of work identified by many interviewees across ORP included: DOE made the choice to do design concurrent with build and that brought a lot of risk and problems to the project. The non-alignment across the project in a lot of areas is the best insight into the safety culture of the WTP project. Coordination and communication between ORP and PL has created some difficulties, e.g., need for air monitoring supplied by a different contractor at the site that reports through the Richland Operations Office (RO) was not easy to negotiate. Work planning and coordination is hindered by the geographical dispersion of the groups. Coordination is an identified issue across the DOE Hanford facilities and the resolution was a commitment to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). Resources and planning in licensing on the BNL side were inadequate to determine what was needed to put into the documented safety analysis and final resolution requires a \$50 million contract change that is currently under review by ORP.	s-16	3
Among survey respondents Coordination of Work is perceived to be somewhat varied across ORP but generally not positive. In particular, respondents in the Administrative Work Group were the most positive about the Coordination of Work scoring significantly higher than most of the other Organizational Groups. The General Engineering Group had the lowest scores on this scale.	s-16	3
Data from the Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale for Coordination of Work indicated a lot of uncertainty across ORP with regard to this behavior, validating the survey data. Approximately 55% of the BAFS respondents on this measure believe that when work plans are implemented most departments and individuals know their roles and responsibilities. However, they also believe that departments work individually and usually do not have the acceptance or support of other departments, nor are all the involved parties included in the planning.	s-16	2
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Some interviewees described some procedures as not user friendly, cumbersome, and verbose and likely cannot be used effectively. They perceive that the gap with the standards is then because of the complexity of the procedure the intent of the standard is not being implemented correctly.	s-16	3
Among survey respondents, only about 70% agreed with the statement that everyone in the organization is responsible for identifying problems. While overall this represents a higher percentage of people agreeing than disagreeing, it is lower than is typically seen in other organizations and still indicates that approximately 30% of the population did not agree with this statement. Respondents in the Program Manager, Nuclear Safety and Physical Scientist and General Engineering Work Groups believed this to a greater extent than respondents in the other work groups. Survey respondents in the Supervisory Group believed that everyone is responsible for identifying problems to a greater extent than respondents in the Non-Supervisory and Contractors Groups did.	s-20	1
Overall, only 30% of all survey respondents feel that they can openly challenge decisions made by management. Respondents in the Contract Specialist/Budget and Finance, Project Control Specialist, General Engineering and Administrative Work Groups feel most negatively about being able to challenge decisions. Non-Supervisory Personnel and Contractors either do not believe or are uncertain about openly challenging management decisions. Among Supervisory Personnel slightly more than 70% agreed with the statement related to the ability to openly challenge management decisions.	s-20,21	2
Approximately 50% of survey respondents agreed with the statement that they feel that they can approach the management team with concerns. Respondents in the Nuclear Safety and Physical Scientist, Contract Specialist/Budget and Finance, and Project Control Specialist Groups believed this to a lesser degree than respondents in the other work groups. Among Supervisory Personnel slightly more than 70% believed that management could be approached with concerns.	s-21	2
Only slightly more than 50% of survey respondents agreed with the statement related to management wants concerns reported, and approximately 58% believe that constructive criticism is encouraged. Work group differences were largely in the same direction described for the other responses.	s-21	2
Some organizational work groups had consistently more disagreements with several survey statements related to SCWE than other groups. In particular, the Nuclear Safety and Physical Scientist and Contract Specialist/Budget and Finance Work Groups tended to either disagree or score lower than other work groups on the majority of the statements related to SCWE.	s-21	1
Several interviewees identified examples in communication that may impact safety performance. Some manager behaviors are so confident that they may be overpowering less assertive individuals in the scientist and engineering groups inhibiting their bringing problems forward. Better communication is needed around the how and why of management decisions. Communication from BNL is inadequate, e.g., BNL process changes were not communicated directly. BNL is not perceived to be forthcoming with their information. Perception exists that DOE-WTP Project Management has become BNL advocate even in light of recurring mistakes. ORP still needs to provide a broader perspective of the project to some of its groups.	s-23	2
The Administrative, Program Manager, and Other Work Groups had the more positive organizational cultural profiles. The Nuclear Safety and Physical Scientist and Contract Specialist/Budget and Finance Work Groups had the more negative organizational cultural profiles. Contractors and Supervisory survey respondents tended to have the most positive organizational cultural profiles, while Non-Supervisory respondents had the most negative.	s-25	2
Results obtained on the Communication-Accuracy Scale from the electronic survey indicated that ORP survey respondents did not have very positive perceptions of the accuracy of information that they receive from other organizational levels (superiors, subordinates, and peers).	s-25	2
The Administrative, Program Manager, and Other Work Groups had the more positive organizational cultural profiles. The Nuclear Safety and Physical Scientist and Contract Specialist/Budget and Finance Work Groups had the more negative organizational cultural profiles. Contractors and Supervisory survey respondents tended to have the most positive organizational cultural profiles, while Non-Supervisory respondents had the most negative. Statistically significant differences were obtained on the Communication Accuracy Scale between several of the ORP Organizational Work Groups. In particular, the Nuclear Safety and Physical Scientist, Contract Specialist/Budget and Finance and General Engineering Groups had the most negative perceptions about this behavior.	s-25	2
DOE-WTP and ORP support organizations are working together as members of integrated project teams to provide oversight of the WTP project and are working together to develop and maintain the integrated assessment schedule. Interviews and performance observations during this HSS review indicate the need to continue efforts to improve communications. During interviews, some individuals conveyed that they were not engaged in the WTP project since their support was not welcomed by the ORP WTP Project Team and that there was little communication with the WTP.	s-37	2
Most ORP staff members who were interviewed by the Independent Oversight team said that communications between the DOE-WTP organization and supporting ORP organizations had improved but were not yet fully effective. ORP managers said that the new liaison positions have been helpful in 40 facilitating communications between these organizations, but a few ORP staff members commented that they had never met the DOE-WTP liaison individual assigned to their organization and that they had not noticed improvement in communication. Some interviewees commented that an attitude of "us versus them" existed between WTP project and support organizations and that these organizations were not getting working together effectively as a team.	s-39,40	2
Data from the Behavioral Rating Scale on Communication indicated that approximately 60% of the ORP interviewee respondents who completed that scale had positive perceptions about the exchange of information, both formal and informal, between the different departments or units in the project, including the top-down and bottom-up communication networks. Respondents in the General Engineering Group had the poorest perception of communication.	s-23	2
A significant number of crafts personnel indicated that schedule pressures and other factors (e.g., inadequate planning, frequently shifting priorities, poor communications, inadequate work packages) have resulted in instances where safety rules, procedures, and practices were not followed. The crafts recognize that procedures and work packages must be followed verbatim, but believe that supervisors do not always support that requirement in work judged to have a high priority. For example, following procedures verbatim could take too long and cause delays for other crafts. Due to production pressures, some foremen make compromises or ask the crafts to decide for themselves (and take the risk of violating procedures). BNL, DOE-WTP, and ORP management should evaluate these concerns to determine their validity and extent. In addition to the safety risks to workers, compromising procedures and rules could impact the quality of construction and installation of safety grade SSCs. Crafts personnel described a few instances where safety grade structures or components (e.g., electrical cable trays) may not have been installed correctly because of schedule pressures, poor planning, or inadequate work packages (e.g., needed parts not available). BNL, DOE-WTP, and ORP management should evaluate work practices, QA processes, and communication and understanding of expectations to ensure that safety and quality are not compromised by schedule pressures or insufficient management expectations, controls, and oversight.	s-31	3

## ***Safety Culture IPT Snap shots***

### **HSS Issue / Problem Statement**

17. Overall, only 30% of all survey respondents feel that they can openly challenge decisions made by management. Respondents in the Contract Specialist/Budget and Finance, Project Control Specialist, General Engineering and Administrative Work Groups feel most negatively about being able to challenge decisions. Non-Supervisory Personnel and Contractors either do not believe or are uncertain about openly challenging management decisions. Among Supervisory Personnel slightly more than 70% agreed with the statement related to the ability to openly challenge management decisions.

**PS 1: Sometimes personnel fail to listen and effectively engage in crucial proactive conversations to ensure meaning, intent and viewpoints are understood.**

**PS 2: Open and proactive communications and coordination on controversial technical issues are not typical personnel behaviors. (Geographical dispersion, organizational issues)**

**PS 3: Employees do not always trust decisions made by ORP Management.**

18. Approximately 50% of survey respondents agreed with the statement that they feel that they can approach the management team with concerns. Respondents in the Nuclear Safety and Physical Scientist, Contract Specialist/Budget and Finance, and Project Control Specialist Groups believed this to a lesser degree than respondents in the other work groups. Among Supervisory Personnel slightly more than 70% believed that management could be approached with concerns.

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19. Only slightly more than 50% of survey respondents agreed with the statement related to management wants concerns reported, and approximately 58% believe that constructive criticism is encouraged. Work group differences were largely in the same direction described for the other responses.

**PS 1: Sometimes personnel fail to listen and effectively engage in crucial proactive conversations to ensure meaning, intent and viewpoints are understood.**

**PS 2: Open and proactive communications and coordination on controversial technical issues are not typical personnel behaviors. (Geographical dispersion, organizational issues)**

## **Safety Culture IPT Snap shots**

### **Problem Statement**

#### **Problem Statement(s) – Teamwork and mutual respect (Employee Worker Engagement)**

**PS 1: Sometimes personnel fail to listen and effectively engage in proactive conversations to ensure meaning, intent and viewpoints are understood.**

**PS 2: Open and proactive communications and coordination on controversial technical issues are not typical personnel behaviors. (Geographical dispersion, organizational issues)**

**PS 3: Employees do not always trust decisions made by ORP Management.**

**PS 4: ORP has not fostered teamwork between the WTP project team and other ORP organizations.**

### **Improvement Action**

TBD

### **ISSUES from HSS Report**

1. DOE-WTP and BNI recently decided to proceed with certain activities, such as welding heads on vessels. Some staff and external organizations have cited this decision as an indicator that management places priority on schedule over safety.

**PS 1: Sometimes employees fail to listen and effectively engage in crucial conversations to ensure meaning, intent and viewpoints are understood.**

2. However, DOE-WTP and BNI management did not effectively communicate to stakeholders the rationale for this decision, nor did management communicate the fact that the action was reversible if ongoing analysis concluded that the design needed to be modified.

**PS 1: Sometimes personnel fail to listen and effectively engage in crucial conversations to ensure meaning, intent and viewpoints are understood.**

**PS 2: Open communications on controversial technical issues are not the norm.**

**PS 3: Employees do not always trust decisions made by ORP Management.**

3. The organizational separation of the DOE-WTP organization from the rest of the ORP organization has created difficulties in the communication, coordination, and cohesiveness of the implementation of DOE standards and oversight of BNI. Questions concerning how DOE-WTP is managing the project, what impact their decisions are having on the project, which is in control of the project, and ultimately who will deliver the project remain unanswered for many of ORP's employees and stakeholders.

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### **Improvement Actions**

#### **Problem Statement(s) – Teamwork and mutual respect (Employee Worker Engagement)**

PS 1: Sometimes personnel fail to listen and effectively engage in proactive conversations to ensure meaning, intent and viewpoints are understood.

PS 2: Open and proactive communications and coordination on controversial technical issues are not typical personnel behaviors. (Geographical dispersion, organizational issues)

PS 3: Employees do not always trust decisions made by ORP Management.

PS 4: ORP has not fostered teamwork between the WTP project team and other ORP organizations.

#### **Improvement Action**

E2-IA1: Provide training on how to engage in active listening. (e.g. crucial conversation)

E2-IA2: Communicate time sensitive or controversial project information to the staff. (Scott gram)

E2-IA3: Perform a gap analysis of where teaming has not been effective. identify opportunities for improved teamwork and plan teambuilding activities.

E2-IA4: Develop and implement an ORP management development program that contains communication, organizational trust, and behavioral elements (e.g. 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, Change Management, Conflict Resolution)

E2-IA5: Develop and implement an employee development program that contains communication, organizational trust, and behavioral elements.

E2-IA6: Implement monthly potluck luncheon with the entire office to provide relationship building opportunities (each division will rotate responsibility for food items).

E2-IA7: Implement the "ladder of accountability" training across ORP.

#### **ISSUES from H55 Report**

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### DNFSB Response (Implementation Plan)

4. Establish and implement a program for ORP to effectively handle issues and establish an ORP Issues Manager. Program elements must include feedback mechanisms, transparency, traceability, benchmarking, performance monitoring, trending, and a set of metrics that communicate issue resolution to employees. Incorporate issues management into a formal prioritized activity within ORP senior managerial duties.  
(L5-IA7, E3-IA7, O1-IA2, O2-IA2, O2-IA4, O2-IA7)
5. Develop an ORP management development program which focuses on improving management's modeling of safety culture attributes.
  - Suggested Training Courses, include but are not limited to:
    - 7 Habits of Highly Effective People
    - Change Management
    - Conflict Resolution
    - Managing interpersonal relationships
    - Myers-Briggs type indicator
    - INPO Nuclear Executive Leadership Training
  - Establish and implement a supervisory and management IPP element to encourage a vigorous questioning attitude towards safety, and foster constructive dialogues and discussions on safety matters.
  - Develop a management presence program:
    - Establish a goal and track participation for management presence with employees placing eyes on the work, asking questions, coaching, mentoring, and reinforcing standards and positive behaviors.
    - Establish quantifiable, auditable methods to track performance and compliance.
    - Develop formal training for management

(L3-IA1, L3-IA2, L4-IA4, L4-IA5, L5-IA5, L4-IA5, E1-IA3, E2-IA4, O1-IA3, O1-IA4, O5-IA4)
6. Develop and implement an employee development program that contains communication, organizational trust, and behavioral elements that underpin safety culture.
  - Communication tools and training opportunities include, but are not limited to:
    - Illustrate issue resolution programs and processes available to employees.
    - Provide training on the lessons learned program including divisional points of contact and how the program can be beneficial during the course of daily work.
    - Provide training on how to engage in active listening. (e.g. Crucial Conversations)
  - Adopt "Ladder of Accountability" as an organizational value training tool.  
(E1-IA4, E2-IA1, E2-IA5, E2-IA7, O1-IA7, O2-IA5, O4-IA)
7. Establish and implement (e.g. coaching, mentoring, IPP) set of management and staff expectations for safety culture attributes as defined in DOE G 450.4-1C.
  - Develop and communicate organizational values that include safety culture values.