

FINAL MEETING SUMMARY

**HANFORD ADVISORY BOARD
HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMITTEE**

January 12, 2012

Richland, WA

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This is only a summary of issues and actions in this meeting. It may not represent the fullness of ideas discussed or opinions given, and should not be used as a substitute for actual public involvement or public comment on any particular topic unless specifically identified as such.

Welcome & Introductions

Keith Smith, Health Safety and Environmental Protection Committee (HSEP) chair, welcomed everyone and introductions were made. Keith reviewed the meeting agenda.

Paula Call, United States Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL), introduced Tiffany Nguyen, DOE-RL, who recently joined DOE’s communications and public involvement team. She will be working closely with the Hanford Advisory Board (Board or HAB).

Waste Treatment Plant Safety Culture Advice (joint topic with the Tank Waste Committee)

Jessica Ruehrwein, EnviroIssues, explained that the handouts received are not draft advice (Attachments 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5). These handouts include a summary of all committee work to date and provides information for the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) Safety Culture Advice discussion. Jessica reminded the committee that not all the information has been reviewed by HSEP or the Tank Waste Committee (TWC).

Issue Manager perspectives

Keith said Susan Leckband, Board chair, offered to draft brief preliminary advice on the topic. There are many other elements regarding safety culture and how the Board should approach the issue with DOE. Keith said some Board members believe it is crucial to offer some sort of advice immediately on the safety culture issue since DOE-Headquarters (DOE-HQ) is taking a stance on safety culture right now. He said there is an opportunity to nudge DOE in the right direction. Keith mentioned Secretary Chu's letter addressing the Implementation Plan for safety culture.

Dirk Dunning, TWC chair, said the safety issue began approximately four or five months ago. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) made a number of recommendations dealing with technical issues at the vitrification plant. There was also an issue in 2011 regarding individuals who had some difficulties and concerns over safety culture. The Board stayed away from these individual cases, as it should have.

The DNFSB is concerned with issues such as whether the vitrification plant will work. Safety issues are much more difficult. Dirk said that as societies, we do not learn lessons from past mistakes. He said the term "safety culture" created a problem. "Safety culture" actually refers to disaster procedures, which have not been implemented well anywhere. Dirk said it is particularly important to learn lessons from past mistakes for the design of WTP in order to protect workers, the public and the environment. WTP also needs to operate in an efficient, cost-effective and robust manner.

Dirk said one problem people run into when trying to implement safety culture is to identify a safety basis that works well. Part of implementation under DOE regulations is to use Integrated Safety Management Systems (ISMS). Safety is not specifically addressed in the Implementation Plan; the language is nebulous.

Dirk said the Board made a few attempts at advice on the topic and came to some broad disagreements. He said the discussion today would provide some idea about what DOE at the local office and HQ know about the Implementation Plan for recommendation 2011-1. Secondly, the Board is interested in what will occur with the Implementation Plan over the next year and a half. There will be more detail available over the coming months that will offer additional

material for more detailed Board advice. Dirk said the disagreements between HSEP and TWC have centered on ISMS and whether that should be a focus of possible advice.

Agency perspectives

Pamela McCann, DOE-Office of River Protection (ORP), said DOE-ORP understands the Board is interested in how they will implement the safety plan. DOE-ORP has provided some initial responses to questions received earlier. The agency is committed to openness and transparency as they move forward with the plan.

Dan McDonald, Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology), said he is confused about the primary issue of concern for possible advice to DOE. He said it will be difficult for the regulatory agencies and DOE to frame what is wanted or expected of them and what the appropriate response should be. Dan said everyone wants a WTP that will work and will operate safely. He asked what the Board feels is the root cause of the problem and what is the root solution. Dan said if the issue is generic safety culture principles, those should be better infused in the advice. If the Board is asking DOE to fix a hazards analysis and ISMS controls, that is another piece of advice.

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

C: HSEP agreed with all the draft advice points, even though they did not like all of them, and suggested using ISMS to frame the issue. HSEP was concerned that any mention of ISMS would have vetoed the entire advice. Why is there such a strong objection to using ISMS in the advice?

R: The objection is not to using ISMS. The concern is about what happens on the ground when someone raises a concern and possible reprisal. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has a good system for how to handle the chilling effect. Safety conscious work environments are the NRC touchstone; this appears in their regulatory framework. The NRC approach is better than DOE's approach. ISMS does not go far enough and should be more like the framework for nuclear safety at NRC. Whenever a worker raises a concern, the NRC investigates within days to determine whether or not the concern has merit. NRC has a variety of tools if there is evidence of a reprisal including: reinstatement of the individual, termination of those who suppress the concern, civil and criminal fines, permanent removal from the system for those who were involved in the reprisal, and license suspensions.

The Implementation Plan at DOE involves a lot of training and communication with the workforce, but there is no real action. ISMS is well intended and DOE's response to safety

concerns is appreciated, but ISMS does not meet all the goals. There does not need to be a widespread safety culture issue; if just a few people in the right place are afraid to raise a concern it can lead to disaster. ISMS does deserve Board advice because it is a broken program, but it is not the only program that is broken. There are workers who come forward saying they have suffered reprisal and DOE does not act. These workers must go through the Department of Labor (DOL), which is very difficult. 95% of DOL labor disputes are settled. In these cases, DOE would never know if there actually was reprisal and the process could take years. DOE's response is insufficient and ISMS will not make the responses sufficient. There is no external enforcement system and it is up to the leadership at DOE to ensure the system works.

C: Changing safety culture involves changing the mindset of everyone across the Hanford Site to work together as part of a team. The Board can focus on resolving the technical issues at WTP, but in five years we do not want to still have a broken relationship with the workforce and management.

C: As long as there is solid leadership, regardless of the types of regulations, ISMS will be successful. NRC has failed in some cases and does not have a perfect system. Someone must believe the concern is important in order for anyone to take action. Principles of behavior are important for both management and the worker.

C: ISMS would work if it had bigger teeth. The Board should not advise DOE on what those teeth could look like. Secretary Chu issued a letter stating safety culture must be incorporated in ISMS. TWC felt responsible for stating what that should mean. WTP provided a good example for offering this type of advice.

C: The question is how to measure a program to ensure it will be effective and how leadership can be measured.

C: ISMS is broken in 4 ways: it is too complicated, workers have a different understanding of ISMS than the management, it relies on individual employee principles of behavior, and ISMS is being applied to demolition projects when it should also be applied to construction projects. The pumps at WTP will not work for 40 years as they are supposed to. The pumps will need to be replaced every few years, which will require workers to be exposed to radiation.

C: Cost and schedule are the drivers at the Hanford Site. Projects driven by deadlines often put safety concerns in the background, such as what occurred with the Challenger Space Shuttle. These same drivers are being applied to WTP, specifically the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) deadlines. DOE and the contractors all want to meet those deadlines. Workers are raising concerns that DOE and the contractors will be locked into a design that cannot be undone without great expense or causing further damage.

C: Whenever a contractor fires someone, it demonstrates a failure on both parts. The workers hear about ISMS and other programs constantly, but they are not seeing the big picture. Nothing will change if DOE follows the same approach.

C: The notion that safety is always first does not exist at the Hanford Site. DOE and contractors should take on more leadership roles in that area. A high level manager at Bechtel said he did not know why workers were afraid to call for a stop work when they should. There is no conduit for senior management to know when problems are occurring. Keith said in his experience, when ISMS is implemented properly it can provide that conduit. DOE promised that ISMS would be the force of law when it was implemented and it has not been adequately explained why that has not been the case.

C: The Board cannot control the implementation of anything. Some people on the Board do not believe ISMS will be implemented successfully. The Board is concerned with how safety issues and culture affect the operability of WTP. Tank farm safety issues are also a concern. Safety is a concern site-wide and the concerns around WTP are a way to frame these concerns in a way people can understand.

C: The purpose of the Board is to offer advice. Even if the advice does not change anything, advice is based on an honest appraisal of the situation and is still worthwhile. DOE has agreed with Board advice in many cases.

C: The Board may want to watch the topic over the coming months and offer advice in June. There will be many more actions from Secretary Chu and the DNFSB the Board can review. The Board can hold a roundtable discussion at the February Board meeting.

R: There has been positive feedback from all agencies whenever the Board has held a sounding board. The agencies are able to hear the breadth and depth of discussions that they usually miss as advice is winnowed back from conversations.

C: The Implementation Plan seems to be primarily focused on emergency prevention and training personnel. Most prevention programs are imperfect, although these programs do improve the situation. There should also be a cure, which seems to be lacking in the implementation program. The committees might want to consider including a reference to the NRC program if it works better than what DOE is doing.

C: Different pieces of advice can be offered through different committees. HSEP could offer advice on fixing ISMS for safety across the entire Hanford Site. The conflict with this advice is a result of developing the advice through email conversations instead of through committee discussion.

C: The committees will have difficulty resolving the problem with WTP because DOE and the contractors have the same goals – they do not want the schedule interfered with. There are contractual arrangements and construction goals. WTP has been struggling for years so there is more incentive than ever to ensure WTP is completed on time. The stop work question is very expensive. An outside enforcement agency may be the solution since DOE and the contractors are not going to enforce themselves.

C: It would be useful for Steve Pfaff, DOE-ORP, to present information on the status of DOE-ORP since they are developing different programs. The sounding board could take place after the presentation. It would also be useful to have a presentation from the Issue Managers (IMs) so the Board hears some of the other concerns and points brought up during committee discussions. Steve's presentation could include a concrete example of what happens when someone raises a concern.

C: ISMS can be very powerful when executed properly. The committee could generate a white paper tutorial on what ISMS is along with a training session for the full Board. People could share their own experiences and offer their own advice points.

R: DOE believes the entire Hanford Site knows about ISMS. Everyone does know what it is and it should be an effective program. The problem is in the implementation. These are behavioral questions around why people revert to behaviors that can result in problems. Workers know the buzz words, but do not know what the programs are really about. Workers are more concerned about following program guidelines when someone is there to evaluate them. People focus on their own safety and the safety of their co-workers, not ISMS.

C: There was a congressional hearing in 2000 on whether management encouraged people to come forward with concerns. DOE-HQ issued a lengthy press release on how they will resolve the problem, but did not follow through on the reform. ISMS could be another passing trend resulting from the need for DOE to respond to the current congressional hearings. There needs to be regulations that are enforceable, preferably by an external entity. The Board could advise DOE to formalize the process.

C: There could be a vehicle to add regulatory teeth through contracts. Penalty clauses could be added that impose fines for different issues. The question is how to incentivize safety.

C: The overall picture is about accountability. It is difficult for individuals to take responsibility for their actions at an everyday level instead of blaming someone else and assuming problems will be fixed later.

C: HSEP and TWC should determine the question they would like the Board members to answer during the sounding board. Everyone will get two to three minutes to answer. These framing questions should be concise. It is important to also say that the Board wants WTP to be successful. Everything the Board is doing is to support an efficient and safe WTP. There is no alternate plan for how to deal with tank waste.

R: The framing question could be as simple as saying TWC and HSEP have been discussing the safety and reliability concerns around WTP. We want Board members to have space to share their own concerns on how to make WTP work.

The question could be: "What do you, as a Board member, feel needs to happen to construct and operate the WTP successfully and safely."

C: Each Board member could be asked to provide their assessment of the Corrective Action Plan (CAP). There are three significant flaws in Secretary Chu's letter. One way to frame the sounding board discussion could involve asking Board members to read the letter and hear other people's views. Mike said many of the Board members would not read the paper and simply speak from the heart.

C: Steve's presentation should be around 15 minutes. The IM framing will introduce the presentation by stating why we are here and what the presentation will be about. The IM introduction should be less than five minutes. After the presentation, Susan L. will pose the question framing. The question will also be in the agenda.

C: There might be value in videotaping the sounding board and making it public. Workers might be empowered to see that there is a group of concerned citizens who really want the WTP to work and want workers to raise concerns. Board meetings have been videotaped in the past, but people should be notified if there will be a camera at the meeting.

C: The sounding board would require 60-90 minutes. It could be on the agenda for Thursday. The IMs will draft an email that includes the Implementation Plan document and other information for Board members to consider before the February sounding board.

Beryllium Statistics and The Corrective Action Plan

Agency presentation

Pete Garcia, DOE-RL, said it has been several months since DOE last provided an update on beryllium and the Corrective Action Plan (CAP). Pete offered updates on current CAP activities and described the alternative approaches for product development (Attachment 6). He reviewed the CAP Performance Report for the Beryllium Program.

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

Q: How is Phase 3 defined as opposed to Phase 1?

R: The complexity of the product. More people are needed to develop a bigger product. There are two full reviews: the first review at 60% complete occurs when the product is mostly developed, but there are still opportunities for modification. The second review is when the product is 90% complete. Major products are all developed under Approach 1.

C: Have you found new hotspots or does the enhanced characterization show areas already identified? Has this brought any insights for the execution of the characterization process?

R: We occasionally detect a hotspot in the building. The expectation is to remediate the area and resample to determine the extent of contamination. There is a process in place for dealing with hotspots and that process is being strengthened through the CAP.

Q: Do you use a dry wipe?

R: Yes. Everywhere a bulk sample is collected, we also collect a wipe.

Q: Does DOE-HQ think this effort is transferable to other sites or is it site-specific?

R: It is transferable. The program being developed here will be used as a template for other sites, which is the intention of DOE-Office of Environmental Management (EM). A great deal of effort has gone into the program. Papers have been given at several symposiums.

Q: Are there training sessions and if so, how often?

R: Workers go through the normal training process. There will be additional training updates to fill any gaps with new products. Records are kept to ensure everyone receives the training.

Q: What does 90% consensus mean?

R: The product is 90% complete. The only changes that would occur might be editorial, such as if a procedure that supports the product needs to be put in a Hanford Site standard format. Any major issues would be apparent before the product goes before the entire committee. There might be some new issues that could become apparent when implementation begins. In

that case, the team would revisit the issue and make modifications as appropriate. Substantive issues go to the full group for consensus.

Agency presentation

Karen Phillips, DOE-ORP, is the Occupational Medical Director at CSC Hanford Occupational Health Services. She presented statistics on beryllium disease at the Hanford Site (Attachment 7). Her presentation provided the numbers of beryllium sensitized, chronic beryllium disease (CBD) diagnosed, and sarcoidosis diagnosed workers. Many people who are diagnosed with sarcoidosis develop CBD. The cause of sarcoidosis is somewhat unclear, although we do believe there are a higher number of cases at the Hanford Site than what is found in the general population. There are 84 active employees at the Hanford Site that are beryllium sensitized without a diagnosis of CBD.

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

C: Obtaining exposure data is much better than it used to be. There are a lot of databases with information that do not all agree. All that data has been consolidated so it is easier to keep track.

C: It would be useful to see a ratio of how many individuals are diagnosed versus how many took the blood test.

R: That information is available. More blood tests are being given.

C: One problem is that the test is voluntary. People need to be convinced to get tested.

R: There are currently over a thousand people participating in the voluntary program, which is more than ever. It is important to determine how many people have joined the program and how many left.

Q: How many workers are in the beryllium program?

R: 3,081 workers. About 46% of all employees are in the program, both voluntary and involuntary.

C: The interpretation of the third slide is unclear. Of those numbers, how many people had blood tests previously?

R: Slide 5 contains the histories of newly sensitized beryllium patients. More information should become available through the epidemiological studies. The criteria for being sensitized have changed. Three borderline results are considered beryllium sensitization. People who are now listed as sensitized might not have been considered sensitized before.

Q: Is the Hanford Site more conservative than other sites when classifying three borderline results as being sensitized or is this country-wise?

R: The rule is accepted by most of the DOE complex. It is becoming more consistent. The tests are imperfect and there is continuing research on better testing procedures.

Q: Do workers understand the test is not perfect?

R: Workers are given a great deal of information before undergoing the test. It is an extensive process with many questions. Anyone undergoing the test receives a booklet explaining the procedure before the first blood test.

Q: What proportion of people who are sensitized develop CBD?

R: There is no definite answer. 40-60% of those who were sensitized in the past developed CBD. This might not be the case now because people are now removed from potential exposure sources to reduce the chance of developing CBD. At the Hanford Site, the proportion has been approximately one in five developing CBD.

Q: Were those who developed CBD previously sensitized?

R: Once someone is diagnosed with CBD they probably have already been sensitized.

Q: Is there any tracking of current CBD patients to determine if their condition is worsening? It would be comforting to have some statistics on what the prognosis is for people who develop the disease.

R: Typically, a third of those with CBD remain in the same condition, a third improve, and a third regress. Treatment may improve symptoms. There is no way to identify those whose condition will worsen in the future. Not enough people have the disease for those kinds of statistics. There are only 33 cases at the Hanford Site. While that is not statistically significant, these cases could provide some information.

C: There are a number of people who became too sick to work at the Hanford Site. Approximately seven people progressed to the point where they physically could not work anymore.

Q: Is smoking related to CBD?

R: One study found that smoking might actually be protective in the case of CBD. Asbestos is exacerbated by smoking so it is surprising to find the study on beryllium that shows the opposite results. It is still advisable to stop smoking because of risks from lung disease and negative affects to the heart.

Q: There are new beryllium cases being identified. Is there a confidence level that workers will not continue to be exposed to beryllium?

R: We are working to develop a program that is very protective. This is not to say new cases will not appear because of the latency period. We hope to see a decline as the program is implemented.

C: There seems to be some genetic predisposition to being sensitized.

R: That was discussed in detail at a recent conference. The studies have not answered all the questions yet. There are certain genetic markers that seem to predispose some people to sensitization.

C: One of the Board's previous pieces of advice recommended more research on the genetic component of beryllium sensitivity, but the workers union was very concerned about genetic testing. The Unions are worried that genetic tests could be used against an individual to prevent them from doing certain jobs.

C: Beryllium was produced at the Hanford Site and we are now cleaning it up. Beryllium on the site needs to be found in order to protect workers. Engineering controls can be put in place where beryllium is known to occur. If we do not know where the beryllium is, we cannot protect workers. Characterization assessments can locate beryllium and protect workers.

DOE Integrated Safety Management Guidance on Attributes of Safety Culture

Agency presentation

Ed Parsons, DOE-RL, offered a presentation on the status of DOE-RL safety culture. He described the concerns outlined in the DNFSB letter and their recommendations. Ed said DOE embraces a strong safety culture through stated policies. There are a variety of safety culture focus areas with associated attributes. These attributes include: leadership, employee/worker engagement, and organizational learning. As part of the next steps, DOE-RL will be issuing a survey on safety culture. The results should be available Spring 2012.

Issue Manager perspective

Mike said he was a senior site manager for Westinghouse at the Hanford Site. They were engaged in a total quality program as a precursor to ISMS. Mike said his division was very successful. Initially, they issued a survey to the entire site and received hundreds of comments on how to improve safety. Half of those concerns were process-based and the other half regarded behavioral issues. The program was developed over eight years, beginning with principles of behavior.

Mike said he conducted values workshops with 2,200 people on management principles of behavior. The same answers came out of every session (Attachments 9 &10). They issued another survey to determine if the workshops yielded the right values. Everyone agreed that the values were right and that they were following those values, but stated that the people around them did not follow the values. These survey results show a failure to introspect. Those values were used for a 360 assessment to understand how employees up through management are performing on those values. All managers have safety issues that could not be separated. Managers were given a year and were retrained, but were ultimately removed. Managers that failed the integrity test were immediately removed. Mike said they also examined the sphere of influence, which was a valuable concept at Westinghouse. When senior management demonstrates good safety practice, it makes a huge difference for employees.

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

Q: Will you be asking people if they trust those programs and use them?

R: Yes. There are many programs and people know about them. We are not trying to skew the process. Workers can tell DOE about the safety culture and behavior as they perceive it.

C: The DNFSB issued their letter in June. The Secretary's response at that time was that DOE will answer the letter, but the agency does not agree with the assessments. There has been some contention around that as well as Bechtel's independent survey issued last month concluding there was no problem. Does DOE think there is a problem?

R: We can't answer that question right now because we are not speaking the same language. Everybody has their own viewpoint and everyone is correct because each person has their own perception of the way things should be. The DNFSB identified some problems and

there is very complex documentation. Right now we do know there is an issue and must move forward to address it.

C: DOE must accept that there is a safety culture problem in order to begin to address it.

R: DOE does know there are problems with safety and are working to fix those problems.

C: There is a ten percent chilling effect, which should be acceptable. That would mean 90% of the people do not feel there is a problem. It would be impossible have to 100% agree. Do the concerns about leadership apply to union steward managers? If someone does not think their job is safe, they can approach their union steward. Workers can speak with others or go to management. DOE had ombudsmen 25 years ago for people who were afraid to go forward.

R: There are two processes. One is the employee concerns program. Employees can also write letters or call to voice their concerns. DOE does not handle labor management issues by law. The NRC was upset enough about ten percent of people being afraid to voice concerns that they shut down a facility for a year and a half. Around four percent discontent is considered acceptable. There are qualitative concerns in addition to concerns about the number of people.

C: Are there any rewards that recognize workers who raise concerns?

R: Monetary rewards might be an option, even if there is disagreement on the issue.

C: When there was an ISMS survey for tank farms a few years ago an easily identifiable issue came forward. By the time safety programs moved from the management level down through the workforce, ISMS became the flavor of the day. This was the perception because it was treated as a difficulty by management.

C: Workers can make a choice about how to take action if they believe they have suffered a reprisal. If workers follow the formal route, it will take time in order to be fair to both sides. There is also the option to go through the employee concerns program.

R: Many workers claim the programs do not work for them. The employee concerns program is broken. Statistics show the employee concerns program substantiates one percent of concerns, meaning 99% of concerns are found to be wrong. DOE is asking the people being accused to investigate themselves. If someone claims they suffered from reprisal, people will hear about it on the news so there must be a reaction from DOE. If these claims are not investigated in a timely manner they will languish and that is what people know about.

C: The organization is an entity with motivations. Contractors are in the business for profit. If you can influence profit, you can influence the motivation. DOE can do this during two phases:

during contract assessment/renewal and during performance assessment. There should be some vehicle to assign fees or other punishments for bad behaviors. The question is how to structure the penalty side.

C: Safety at the Hanford Site is very good compared to almost all other industrial sites. There has not been an increase in accidents and injuries compared to 20 years ago.

C: Other long-term sites will have contracts that can last anywhere from 20 to 50 years. Why are contracts at the Hanford Site re-bid so often?

C: Workers always have the option to leave their job if they do not believe it is safe.

R: There are individuals who leave. The result is a workforce afraid to raise concerns.

C: Safety culture is only one piece of ISMS. There are scheduled reviews. The Health Service System (HSS) will look at performance. That provides a lot of insight into where DOE should put their energy. There has been a tremendous amount of activity in addressing these concerns and providing safety culture on the performance side as well as on the contractor site.

Status Report on RFP for Medical Support Contractor

Issue Manager perspectives

Keith said he reviewed the request for proposals (RFPs) for medical support contractors thoroughly and it appears DOE listened to the Board. The minimum staffing requirement is 29 employees, which the original contract cost estimates would not come close to covering. DOE has addressed that. It is still a fixed price contract for two years with an option for up to six years. The cost is slightly over \$4 million each year with annual increases. The RFP looks solid. The proof will come when the contract is awarded and how the Board's advice is used in terms of management selection.

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

C: The 200 West Health Care Center (Center) will be closed on Sundays. There are people working on the Hanford Site around the clock seven days a week. Dozens of people work on Sundays and when there are major project deadlines there might be many more people on the site. Workers are not sure where they should go if they need medical care when the Center is

closed. Paramedics are available if there is a serious situation, but it is unclear what workers should do for injuries that are not life-threatening.

R: HSEP should follow-up.

C: The source selection board for RFP should be careful about procurement rules. It is important to hire employees with the right credentials, which is hard to write into an RFP.

C: Does the RFP have stipulations for staffing requirements?

R: The RFP mentions areas that are staffed, but it does not stipulate specifics in terms of staffing. The absolute minimum number of staff is included as well as the need to staff satellite facilities. Details are usually finalized after the contractor is selected through negotiations.

HSEP decided there are no immediate follow-up items on the RFP. The committee might be interested in an update once the contract is awarded.

Committee Business

HSEP reviewed the six month work plan (Attachment 11). The chemical vapors topic is not timely for February as there is no new information and people have not been hearing anything negative. Ray Corey, DOE-RL, might have some site-wide statistics on uniform training in the next few months. A wider topic that might be of interest to the committee is the metrics used for performance since the Hanford Site is relatively safe.

Another topic might be on any systems that are in place to incentivize not reporting concerns. There is evidence that people are under-reporting or hiding incidents. Sometimes incidents are reported after deadlines in order to allow workers to receive bonuses. HSEP could examine how to put more teeth in safety programs through the way contracts are structured. It is difficult for the Board to influence contractors.

Another potential topic of interest for HSEP is when DOE-ORP laid off the field workers conducting surveillance for radiation compliance. These workers had documented a great deal of noncompliance. Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) developed a corrective action program that was initially rejected and then accepted. What is DOE doing to replace the surveillance work? There are major concerns about safety in the tank farms. HSEP is interested in understanding how concerns move up the chain of command so DOE becomes aware of concerns from contract workers. A briefing on this would be very helpful, perhaps with a focus on one area. The Employee Concerns Program (ECP) has been generating a lot of complaints.

The policy issue for the Board might be that there is safety or environmental concerns arising from lay-offs.

Facility representatives (Fac Reps) are present for high-risk jobs, but that is not necessarily where a lot of the problems are. There are many issues with moderate and low risk activities that need to be worked out. HSEP might be interested in better understanding how the Fac Reps work and how they are deployed. HSEP is very concerned that DOE is unaware of certain safety concerns because there is not enough monitoring or a lack of communication.

HSEP will further discuss these potential topics and update the meetings topics table during the February committee call. There does not appear to be anything time sensitive that would require a February meeting.

Attachments

Attachment 1: WTP Safety Culture Advice Joint Topic (HSEP/TWC)

Attachment 2: Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) Safety Culture

Attachment 3: Blue: Pre-release of DOE Implementation Plan

Attachment 4: Advice: Safety at the WTP

Attachment 5: Safety Culture at the WTP White Paper: Potential Attachment for Advice on Waste Treatment Plant Safety Culture

Attachment 6: Update on the Hanford Site Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program

Attachment 7: Beryllium Disease Statistics at Hanford

Attachment 8: Status of DOE/Richland Operations Office Safety Culture

Attachment 9: Safety Culture Focus Areas and Associated Attributes

Attachment 10: Our Values – Attributes of a Total Quality Culture That We Believe Are Important

Attachment 11: Health Safety & Environmental Protection Committee 6 Month Work Plan

Attendees

HAB Members and Alternates

Tom Carpenter	John Howieson	Vince Panesko
Sam Dechter	Steve Hudson (phone)	Maynard Plahuta
Dirk Dunning	Mike Korenko	Dick Smith (phone)
Laura Hanses	Susan Leckband	Keith Smith
Rebecca Holland	Liz Mattson	Margery Swint

Others

Tom Fletcher, DOE-ORP	Erika Holmes, Ecology	Todd Nelson, Bechtel
Pamela McCann, DOE-ORP	Dan McDonald, Ecology	Mark Fisher, CHPRC
Paula Call, DOE-RL (phone)		Karen Phillips, CSC
Tiffany Nguyen, DOE-RL		LB Sandy Rock, CSC
Ed Parsons, DOE-RL		Nicole Addington, EnviroIssues
		Susan Hayman, EnviroIssues
		Jessica Ruehrwein, EnviroIssues
		Mike Stoner, HAMTC
		Sharon Braswell, MSA
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		Scott Brim, Public
		John Britton, WRPS