

FINAL MEETING SUMMARY

HANFORD ADVISORY BOARD

HEALTH SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMITTEE MEETING

February 14, 2012

Richland, WA

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This is only a summary of issues and actions in this meeting. It may not represent the fullness of ideas discussed or opinions given, and should not be used as a substitute for actual public involvement or public comment on any particular topic unless specifically identified as such.

Welcome & Introductions

Keith Smith, Health, Safety and Environmental Protection Committee (HSEP) chair, welcomed everybody and introductions were made. The committee adopted the January meeting summary.

Revisit DOE/ORP RAD Safety Issues

Issue Manager perspective

Tom Carpenter, Issue Manger (IM) for radiation absorbed dose (RAD) safety issues, said HSEP has talked about this issue in the past. A review of safety operations began in 2008 especially focused on tank farm radiation operations that resulted in numerous findings and concerns about radiation control work planning, operational conduct, emergency management operations, safety systems, etc. Tom said the report contains a lot of information on how corrective action programs (CAPs), problem evaluation requests (PERs), and self-reporting procedures were not effective. There are also systematic concerns about how the organization was set up within Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) to examine

work planning and conduct of operations within these areas. A lot of the concerns originated from the workers themselves and these concerns caught the attention of the Department of Energy (DOE), who subsequently conducted an investigation. WRPS established a CAP to address the issues identified that DOE reviewed and initially found insufficient. WRPS has since revised the CAP and it has been accepted by DOE.

Tom said he followed-up on what has happened since the CAP was accepted. One issue he heard is that the people who developed the report are no longer working at the Hanford Site. These were the people workers could approach with their concerns. Tom asked if DOE still has people in the field to talk with the workers and address any concerns. There is an alleged chilling effect resulting from some terminations, which the Hanford Advisory Board (board) cannot address. This chilling effect may result in concerns being suppressed or incidents not being reported.

Agency perspective

Brandon Williams, United States Department of Energy-Office of River Protection (DOE-ORP), said there are seven qualified Facility Representatives (Fac Reps) currently on the site and another person going through the qualification process. The primary job of these people is to examine operations and be in the field. Brandon said he is constantly approached by employees with their concerns. DOE does have eyes and ears in the field. The people who used to act as DOE's eyes and ears in the field were let go for budgetary reasons. Brandon provided a presentation on radiation control in the tank farms (Attachment 1). He laid out the timeline for DOE-ORP's assessment of the WRPS radiation program. Brandon pointed out the emergency readiness program as an area he was particularly concerned about. He described the Independent Endpoint Assessment and CAP Effectiveness Review. Brandon concluded his presentation by describing the current status of DOE-ORP's efforts in this area.

Brian Harkins, DOE-ORP, followed up on the presentation by explaining that DOE had conducted the Radiation Control (Rad Con) Program assessment after a number of concerns were raised against the program. DOE concluded that the Rad Con program was not performing adequately and developed an assessment plan. The assessment included two focus areas. The first area was radiation practices. DOE observed implementation of radiation practices in the field was not as good as they expected. The second major focus area was emergency preparedness, especially around training. Brian said the same individuals were participating in drills repeatedly while others were never given that opportunity. He added that there has been improvement in both radiation practices and emergency preparedness. These are continual improvements that they will continue working on.

Brian said DOE does closure verification on Level 2 and Level 1 findings. The usual procedure is for the person conducting the verification to correct deficiencies and make a determination of the actions to adequately address the issue, which is documented in a surveillance report. Six months to a year after closure verification, DOE will assemble an assessment team to determine if the issue has been adequately addressed and if the corrective actions have been effective.

Brian acknowledged that two years ago radiation technicians (rad techs) did not interject themselves in the process routinely. Rad techs are expected to be comfortable stepping in whenever they notice a problem with Rad Con. He said budget reductions forced DOE to cut some of the individuals who had been out in the field observing safety, but DOE does have oversight in the field and always try to have people available to give DOE feedback. There are quarterly meetings to talk through concerns by subject area. People can talk about the progress of their programs, including areas they are confident with and areas that need improvement. Brian said DOE has scheduled an assessment of contractor management next month and will be looking at the PER process. He said DOE is encouraging workers to share their concerns about the chilling effect and evaluating the avenues available for workers to elevate their concerns through the programs available.

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

C: Concrete examples are helpful to better illustrate the points.

R: One example is from the concern about the same individuals repeatedly participating in drills. DOE specified that certain teams would be excluded from drills that had already participated multiple times. The drill simulated a blown high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter in SY Farm. The responding team struggled, partially because of the way the drill was prepared. Workers did not react to what DOE expected them to react to because of confusion on what an open/closed window meant so they did not respond in a way that was protective of themselves. The team participating in the drill had not been given an opportunity to participate previously, which set them up for failure. People should be given the chance to practice what is expected of them in reality instead of reading through the expectations on paper.

C: An example of an employee raising a concern and how that gets routed through the system would be helpful. The drill example appears to be an issue DOE found, which is very significant.

C: Some people have raised the concern that there are not enough Fac Reps in the field.

R: The number of Fac Reps depends on the division. DOE has standards for determining the required number of people in the Fac Rep program. That number is determined by the hazard category and the types of activities.

Q: Does the workforce have any input on the number of Fac Reps? The process DOE uses to determine the appropriate number might not be adequate. Workers have said that there are not enough Fac Reps or that it is hard to reach the Fac Reps that are available.

R: The workforce does not have input. It would be difficult to ask workers in the field how many Fac Reps they would like because you would essentially be asking them how many people they would like out in the field regulating them.

Q: The 2008 audit was completed four years ago. Should there be another independent audit with fresh eyes?

R: The issues began to be identified beginning in the 2008 audit. These issues have since gone through the processes for closure verification. The assessment was conducted in 2010, when a lot of issues started to be noted. The assessment was broader than the audit. DOE is returning to the closure process for the 2010 assessment.

Q: How are the Fac Reps trained?

R: Fac Reps receive very focused and specific training in order to qualify. There are additional trainings based on two areas: continual training and training for any changes in procedures. Fac Reps receive a significant amount of training and that training is continual.

C: Will Rad Con have a larger number of event responder drills?

R: Rad Con has increased the number of drills. Drills often involve the fire department, which operates under different rules. Drills are difficult to conduct since there is so much activity. DOE would like to have all event responders involved in drills and would like to move drills outside of Rad Con to involve everyone. Everyone who would be in the field should practice the roles they would play in the event of a real emergency.

C: How is DOE ensuring they capture concerns from Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council (HAMTC) safety representatives?

R: It is important that HAMTC's safety role is not affected by DOE's activities. DOE is not actively looking for negative information on the contractors and does not want to create a back channel. DOE opens meetings by saying they want employees to use the systems available to them. There are other processes aside from PER. DOE holds meetings so employees can have their concerns voiced directly.

C: There has been some feedback from employees that contractors are following the letter of the rule, but not necessary the spirit. For example, some trainers use acronyms that are not widely understood for people just coming onto the Hanford Site.

C: Contractors are incorporating every type of training they can onto the computer. Employees often go through the training as quickly as possible so they do not receive the necessary knowledge.

C: DOE has stated that when they run a practice drill they do not want to affect other work. That is setting people up for failure because it does not reflect an actual emergency situation. Drills that are more realistic will have more impact than drills that include limitations on how the participants can behave.

C: There are still concerns about the key source of information, which people are not speaking up about their concerns. Sometimes workers are not speaking to anyone or sometimes they may be speaking to each other. Back channels may be necessary for workers who do not feel they can go to their management with concerns. Contractors may not be reporting on themselves sufficiently. There were 12 findings in the

assessment, which is a lot. DOE has initiated a rigorous CAP. All the pressure seems to have lessened around last March/April when key people left DOE. All the channels for reporting safety concerns seem to have disappeared. Employee interviews will be very important for understanding what is really occurring on the Hanford Site.

Program Evaluation Reporting System (PERs)

Issue Manager perspective

Tom, IM for the PER topic, said the number of PERs filed by health physician technicians (HPTs) seems to have decreased in the previous year. He said he does not know whether this is true or not, but it is what he has heard. Tom said DOE has issued some findings on the PER program and others have offered opinions as well. The PER program is important because the contractor and DOE rely upon the PER program to understand problems in the tank farms. There is some concern that the significance level for PERs is often downgraded to a level that would require little action. Also, employees are not receiving feedback on PERs they file, even when checking the box indicating they would like to stay informed. Tom said he heard about these concerns at a public comment session and he believes it is important for HSEP to keep an eye on the issues.

Agency presentation

John McDonald, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), described improvements to the Problem Evaluation Request (PER) program made in 2012 (Attachment 2). He noted the importance of workers being involved in the process.

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

Q: How many people handle the PERs that are received and how large is the backlog?

R: There are 13 people in the group that handle PERs. The PERs themselves are assigned out to management on the appropriate team. The backlog of actions is about 780. The average age of a PER is 150 days. In the previous year there were around 2,400 PERs written; 20-30% of those are quickly fixed or trended. DOE receives roughly 10 PERs each day, although that number does vary. Additionally, some PERs may generate two or three actions. When a PER is received, the manager will complete it and then send it back to the PER review group. All PERs receive some level of review where the issue will be examined and then management's response will be evaluated. The review group will also ensure that there has been some communication with the person who originated the PER.

Q: Are PERs tracked by job classification?

R: PERs are not tracked by job classification, although that data could be obtained.

Q: There has been a significant drop in PERs filed by HPTs over the last several months. Is there a reason behind this?

R: DOE has some idea about what the root cause may be, but we cannot discuss it. There probably is some chilling effect, but there are also other reasons.

Q: Are the contractors addressing whether there is a decrease in PERs by HPTs or anyone else and what the significance of that might be?

R: There are high expectations for what should occur in the PER process. It is unique so the process may never work perfectly. People can write whatever they want in a PER. There are some instances, such as an overexposure or significant injury that automatically receive a PER. There are less PERs so far this year than there were last year, presumably because there was a lot of activity last year, especially field activity and various assessments. The significant lay-offs in the fall probably affected the number of PERs received since there are generally less people working at the Hanford Site.

Q: Is DOE aware of any situation where a safety concern was not captured in a PER?

R: If DOE becomes aware of any safety issue that was not already a PER, they would write one.

C: Some workers are saying they are reluctant to write PERs because management does not want them to. Is DOE addressing this concern?

R: The PER process is better than it was a few years ago, but there are frustrations. Worker involvement is very important and if DOE is aware of any concerns, they will deal with them in the best way possible. Sometimes an issue is brought forward that DOE thought had been resolved. Whenever DOE hears about an issue, they write it up as a PER.

C: Another concern relates to the significance rating for PERs.

R: There is a screening team for PERs. It was not possible to assign an action on a tough category PER in certain cases. PERs were being downgraded and actions were initiated through other processes, but these PERs were being lost. The solution for this was to change the software. DOE still encourages the use of the PER program. Brian said he has not seen management not support use of the PER program. DOE expects the contractors to have a process for raising issues.

Q: What is the consequence if someone does not follow the expectations?

R: The consequences would depend on the context. If an employee was told not to write a PER that would be blatantly going against procedures and would lead to consequences. Honest mistakes would not lead to disciplinary actions. That would lead to another chilling effect if employees were disciplined for not writing PERs. There is oversight to meet the regulatory requirements and contractors

must also ensure they are meeting the contractor requirements. DOE-Headquarters (DOE-HQ) has oversight in addition to the PER process.

C: If workers are currently responding to a chilling effect in not wanting to bring up concerns and they are also not being disciplined or held accountable for not bringing up these same concerns, it would make sense to offer some incentive for employees to report concerns. DOE could tell employees they will be disciplined for not bringing up concerns, creating a reverse chilling effect where employees are afraid to not voice concerns.

R: That would be counter to what DOE is attempting to do. This type of initiative would not be enforceable.

C: Managers should be disciplined for not bringing forward their concerns. If it is their responsibility, they should be held accountable.

C: Employees could be offered rewards or some type of incentive for writing PERs. It does not take very much to encourage people.

R: DOE is restricted in the types of incentives we can offer employees.

Employee Concerns Program Safety Discussion

Issue Manager perspective

Tom, IM for the employee concerns program safety issue, said he developed some framing questions for the discussion (Attachment 3). The employee concerns program at DOE-ORP merged with the program at DOE-Richland Operations Office (RL), which has led to rough patches according to some. Tom said he has examined some of these issues and understands certain policies and procedures are in place that allow DOE to return to the contractor for investigations. There are concerns about confidentiality. There are also concerns about whether there is an opportunity for the person who identified the concern to be a part of the investigation and offer feedback on the results. Concerns are brought to the attention of DOE, who then forwards it back to the contractor and if DOE agrees with the contractor's findings, DOE finishes the process by issuing a closure letter.

Agency presentation

Stanley Branch, DOE-RL/ORP, is the employee concerns program manager. He said DOE takes one of four actions whenever a concern comes into the office. Employees should be able to raise concerns without fear of reprisal or retaliation. DOE requires contractors to adhere to the enhanced Contractor Requirements Document (CRD). If a concern is brought forward that poses eminent danger, DOE will resolve it within 24 hours. Serious concerns are resolved within 48 hours. Serious concerns are those that pose an extreme likelihood of someone being injured. All other types of concerns are investigated within about 20 working days, although contractors may be given more time.

Stanley said that employee/employer issues are returned to the contractors. DOE does not tell a contractor who to fire or hire. DOE also does not get involved in Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) issues. Stanley said that DOE wants to resolve issues at the lowest level possible, which is why contractors are given the opportunity to resolve issues at their level before DOE becomes involved. Once DOE transfers an issue back to the contractor, DOE has completed their part and the contractor is expected to complete the process in a manner consistent with DOE's expectations as stated in the Contractor Requirements Document (CRD). Stanley said DOE does expect a response from the contractor and will maintain closure authority over that concern. Contractors must ensure their investigations are appropriate to address and resolve the issue. Typically, responses are thorough and complete so DOE can sign off on closure. DOE will become involved in the investigation if the employee does not believe they received a fair and objective evaluation. Employee requests for anonymity are honored, although many employees choose to be involved. Stanley said DOE addresses the issue and not the person bringing forward the issue, which is consistent with DOE orders.

Stanley said once a resolution is reached or the response returns to DOE, they write a closure letter. Employees receive a "thank you" letter for bringing forward a concern and then a closure letter with follow-up items. Contractors may also meet with the employee to go through the close-out. Employees do have the opportunity to provide feedback or comments on the investigation. Stanley passed out several charts documenting the number of concerns brought forward (Attachment 4).

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

C: The key discriminator between a good employee is not the process; it is the people working on the site and whether they care about the employees or not. DOE should hire someone who cares and then teach them the process. When someone brings a concern to the attention of DOE, it is often a last resort. DOE's process is to return that concern to the manager who would not examine it initially.

R: DOE tries to hire diverse types of people with an investigative background and communication skills. Employees are trained in mitigation, fact-finding, and people skills. Communication is key to understanding what an employee is saying.

Q: Are employees consulted before a concern they brought forward is transferred back to their management?

R: There is a disclosure form employees sign. This form gives employees the option of remaining anonymous and if they consent to allow the contractor to investigate. Employees are given a choice.

Q: Are employees able to ensure their concern is captured correctly?

R: There is a space on the website that allows employees to fill out their own concerns. About 99.9% of issues are captured pretty accurately. Even if the concern is not captured perfectly accurately, often the results will be the same.

C: Having an advocate that will help employees go through the concern process can be incredibly valuable. The person is very important for understanding an issue.

R: DOE is neutral in the process and cannot act as an advocate for the employee or for management.

Q: What happens when an employee brings forward an allegation about harassment or retaliation for reporting a concern? There may be instances where DOE says an employee was fired because they were five minutes late, while the employee alleges they were fired for voicing a concern. Would DOE investigate these types of claims?

R: Each issue is addressed on its own merit. If employees are alleging retaliation, DOE has to act fairly and objectively to make a decision. DOE would compare the reasons given by the contractor for an employee being fired vs. other employees and whether others were fired for the same reasons.

Q: What percentage of employee concerns program safety cases are substantiated?

R: Probably around 20-30% of cases are substantiated.

Q: Do the charts (Attachment 4) reflect the number of concerns as a percentage of employees? The contractors all have differing numbers of employees so it would be interesting to compare the percentages of employees raising concerns across all contractors.

R: Since the number of employees for each contractor fluctuates substantially, it is hard to make that kind of comparison.

Q: Is there a way to track the weight of concerns? A few larger concerns might be more important to note than 30 small concerns.

R: DOE does consider the severity of issues and whether they are substantiated. Safety concerns carry additional weight than a management or human resources issue.

C: There are occasions where the contractors might object to DOE investigating a concern, which can create tension when attempting to get information for auditing purposes.

R: Typically, investigators from DOE do not have issues with the contractors when conducting an investigation. Contractors understand that they are expected to cooperate.

Q: How would a concern about a female employee being touched by her supervisor be classified?

R: Typically, that type of concern would be considered sexual harassment or EEO. These types of concerns are transferred to another DOE department. Attachments 5-8 depict the types of concerns received by DOE-RL and DOE-ORP as well as summaries of the results of the investigation.

Health, Safety and Security Report (HSS) (joint topic w/TWC)

Issue Manager perspective

Dirk Dunning, Tank Waste Committee (TWC) chair, said the Board held long sets of discussions over the last several months on safety culture issues. Both HSEP and TWC have been very involved. Dirk said there was a round table discussion about the issues at the Board meeting the previous week.

Agency presentation

Glenn Podonsky, DOE Chief Health, Safety and Security (HSS) Officer, said his team finished their review and inspection on December 21, 2011. They briefed the management at DOE-ORP as well as the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor then finalized the report, including all the comments received. Glenn said the report went public on January 13, 2012 and he would offer a debrief of the major findings for the Board.

Glenn said the investigation was designed to uncover the ground truth and determine exactly what was occurring at the Hanford Site. There is a difference between the latest inspection and the inspection completed a year and a half ago. This most recent investigation considered human behaviors and how safety was either encouraged or not encouraged. Behavioral scientists with extensive experience trained the teams going out in the field to conduct surveys on how to interpret what an individual was saying beyond the words they use. DOE also conducted focus groups of five to ten people. These were peer groups without any management present so there would be no fear of retaliation or of losing their job.

Glenn said DOE issued 190 surveys and 140 were completed, which is approximately 74% and enough to have quantifiable information. These surveys were from actual people; not just the inspector's interpretation. Generally, workers did not think safety was a high priority. Management did not appear to be interested in safety issues, so workers did not raise concerns.

Glenn added that he has acted in an oversight role at DOE for 28 years. He sees unification of the top leadership within DOE to make safety a high priority. They are embracing the report and the recommendations. The recommendations are written as a roadmap that someone can follow, although it is not the only approach. Safety culture is an issue that needs to be taken seriously and the concerns about safety culture need to be addressed. Constituents need to be convinced that DOE can manage itself so people can get home safely and complete the job properly. If you take care of people, people will take care of the job. Otherwise, there will be cost overruns and people will get injured.

Bill Miller, DOE-HSS, provided a briefing on the findings of the assessment of nuclear safety culture and management of nuclear safety concerns at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) (Attachment 9). Bill said there were 37 structured focus groups and 25 individual interviews in addition to observations of actual field work and safety culture surveys issued by DOE-ORP and Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI). The results of the DOE-ORP survey indicated that people were not afraid to raise concerns, but they did not believe management would act on that concern. Bill said this was very different from earlier results and likely resulted somewhat from turnover in senior management. The survey results from BNI indicated that fear of retaliation was most prevalent for construction craft workers. Bill said the pressure to meet milestones is leading to a great deal of safety concerns. There are still problems with all steps of the PER process from issues not being documented properly and categorized incorrectly to corrective actions that do not adequately resolve the concern. BNI is working to improve the PER program and safety culture in general.

Glenn concluded the presentation by saying that safety must be on the forefront of everyone's mind while constructing the facility. DOE wants a questioning safety culture; safety is just as important as the project itself. He said this is as true at the Hanford Site as it is for any other large project within DOE.

Agency perspectives

Matt Mowry, DOE-HQ, said he was speaking for Dave Huizenga who was unable to attend the meeting. Matt said Dave talks about safety everyday and he accepts all the recommendations in the HSS report. He said implementing corrective actions is the next step. These corrective actions will not fix all the safety culture concerns at the site, but all the elements critical to facilitating a strong safety culture are moving forward. DOE is improving the PER program and the other tools necessary for building a strong safety culture. Matt said that the values and behaviors modeled by leaders and internalized by members make safety an overriding priority. Safety is not based on platitudes or CAPs; it is based on attitudes. Matt added that the HSS report is outstanding and anyone interested should read it.

Dan McDonald, Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology), said he appreciates the statements about values being central to safety culture. He said the definition of safety culture should be known by all and there should be consensus on what that definition is. The mechanics of safety are more difficult without a thorough understanding of the definition. Dan said he is still concerned about how some of the local issues will be dealt with in a tangible way. He said there is a continuum of safety where the work at the Hanford Site affects the health of Washington State.

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

C: DOE-HSS has kept their promise to conduct a thorough and independent review. They have also kept their promise to return to the Board and report on the findings. The Board appreciates everyone who came

to speak about the HSS report today and the excellent report itself. The Board wants the WTP to be built and operate safely and successfully. There is no other option for putting the tank waste into a stable form.

C: After working at the Hanford Site for many years and then returning after a break of several years, nothing seemed to change. Safety had not been institutionalized. There are several people on the Board who believe Integrated Safety Management (ISM) is a framework that can be used to institutionalize safety culture and re-invigorate the system. There has not been a safety program with the force of the law so there has not been enough pressure to make the culture change. When managers leave or contractors change, people go back to the old habits. Management should understand the importance of their behavior and how their attitudes filter through to the trenches. Ask the workers what safety culture should look like; they know.

R: This is probably the strongest report DOE has ever produced in terms of safety. There are also some very credible people who have recently joined DOE. These are people who are not politicians that will leave; they are career DOE. There is integrity and a commitment to workers, which is being seen for the first time below the political level. The contractor must believe DOE is serious about safety culture over the long-term. Enough people are watching from outside of DOE that it is critical for DOE's future to handle these concerns correctly. The report will not solve every problem, but it will be a legacy for the agency. DOE-HSS will continue to follow the progress and independently assess what is occurring. Congress is now following the Hanford Site more closely since safety has come to the forefront. DOE will not receive funding for the Hanford cleanup if the department is not trusted to manage that money. There are many players in place that will keep safety concerns in focus. The Board is another venue for pressuring DOE to make sure the job is completed correctly.

C: The report does not include the phrase “chilled work environment,” although the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) did use that phrase. Does DOE-HSS believe there is a chilled work environment and if there is, how can the situation be resolved? How can DOE protect workers who bring up a concern and then believe they have been retaliated against?

R: While DOE-HSS did not use the term “chilled work environment” in the report, we do state that there is a reluctance to raise concerns. The language in the report basically does describe a chilled work environment, but that phrase is not clearly defined so we did not use it in the report.

C: Principles of behavior are the most important element for safety culture. People can identify important principles of behavior, but there can be a failure to introspect. People believe that they are doing the right thing, even if they are not. A 360 degree assessment for the management team can be very effective. The bottom performers may need to be removed if they do not change their behaviors even after thorough training.

C: There is a failure when project management and specifications do not consider the future world. Even when it may be obvious some element of the design will probably not operate properly, people are only considering the specifications that are in front of them. Integrated Safety Management (ISM) should be

able to identify these types of issues so that employees do not need to come forward with these types of concerns.

C: DOE has made similar commitments before with equal assurances from the top levels of the department. The problem was that people in the middle did not buy-in. It is hard to dictate personal motivation so someone that already has the motivation can implement change.

C: The Board believes firmly in continuous feedback loops. Management should have to explain what happened and ensure a problem does not repeat itself once an employee brings that problem forward.

C: Another effective safety system was developed based on the navy black box program. In this program employees were free from any retribution if an event occurred. The cause of the event would be identified and everyone was considered innocent unless there was malice. This path was separate from the normal management structure. Often the entire basis for safety culture is disaster prevention without considering the importance of daily safety procedures.

C: If you accept that some employees have been reluctant to raise concerns for years, how will these concerns that have never been brought forward be identified and addressed?

R: The entire safety culture should encourage concerns to be raised. DOE-HSS has every confidence that the new people at DOE will allow workers to voice their concerns. People need to have trust and believe that they can bring forward any concerns. It is important not to lose the humanity aspect of safety.

C: There could be a simple solution such as sending a memo to the entire workforce stating there has been a recognized safety culture problem and any issues that people were reluctant to bring forward before should be voiced now.

R: The Secretary and Deputy Secretary sent a memo to all field managers stating retaliation is not tolerated and describing the roles and responsibilities for safety culture. There have been similar memos from others.

DOE has high expectations for DOE to manage the contactors and ensure they follow-through on commitments. This is more serious than what can be stated in a memo. Even when there is a lot of action and a lot of progress, the commitment can decrease from when the initiatives are fresh. Commitment must be continuous.

C: The HSS report is based on BNI and Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) as well as all their subcontractors. There is also the DOE-RL side. How can you assure the safety culture between DOE-ORP and DOE-RL is truly cross-cutting? Mission Support Alliance (MSA) supports all the organizations and contractors.

R: There are recommendations about developing training, self-assessments, and taking advantage of lessons learned. There is definitely a symbiotic relationship between DOE-ORP and DOE-

RL. DOE-RL will be analyzing our own safety culture and compare that with the implementation plan in the next year. The safety culture and concerns will likely be different. DOE-RL will be evaluating how that translates from culture differences between the offices. Once there is a set of data for both offices, we can compare and implement a strong safety culture across the entire Hanford Site.

C: These concerns about safety culture are the same as they were 20 years ago. Part of the problem is that the milestones are incentivized. Contractors cannot bid for any profit so the milestones become the incentive.

C: The craft workers know what they need to do; they just need direction. Communication is crucial. When ISM was introduced workers understood what it was, but it did not mean anything once it reached workers in the field. The message changes after it has filtered through all levels of management. Workers know there is a commitment from the top at DOE-HQ, but middle management does not fully embrace safety culture.

Committee Business

Jessica Ruehrwein, EnviroIssues, said HSEP has a call scheduled for February 21 at 9 am. The committee will go through the March topics table in more depth on that call.

Mike Korenko, HSEP vice-chair, suggested discussing the committee's path forward at the next HSEP meeting in a strategic session. He said they should think through what issues would be coming forward in the next two years to make sure no topics would be missed. Tom agreed and noted that HSEP had not been able to discuss the morning's topics. He said having more time built into the schedule to talk through information presented is very important.

Tom said there is new information about plutonium particle size from WTP studies that HSEP might be interested in hearing more about. A number of workers have been raising issues. The question for HSEP would be what the significance is and what workers are being expected to do. It would be helpful to have a list of potential issues at WTP.

The committee decided to follow-up on all the morning's discussion topics during the meeting in March.

Attachments

Attachment 1: Radiation control in tank farms discussion with HAB

Attachment 2: 2012 Problem Evaluation Request (PER) Improvements

Attachment 3: Questions and information about the employee concerns program

Attachment 4: Case totals of employee concerns by contractor in FY 2009-2011

Attachment 5: Categories of employee concerns for DOE-ORP from FY 2008-2011

Attachment 6: Categories of employee concerns for DOE-RL from FY 2008-2011

Attachment 7: DOE-ORP summary of employee concern program results

Attachment 8: DOE-RL summary of employee concern program results

Attachment 9: DOE-Office of Enforcement and Oversight: Assessment of the nuclear safety culture and management of nuclear safety concerns at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plan – January 2012

Attendees

HAB Members & Alternates

Tom Carpenter	Harold Heacock	Liz Mattson
Sam Dechter	Rebecca Holland	Keith Smith
Dirk Dunning	Mike Korenko	
Laura Hanses	Susan Leckband (phone)	

Others

Bonnie Lazor, DOE	Dan McDonald, Ecology	LB Sandy Rock, CSC HDHS
Bill Miller, DOE		Nicole Addington, EnviroIssues
Matt Mowry, DOE		Jessica Ruehrwein, EnviroIssues
Glenn Podonsky, DOE		Barb Wise, MSA
Brian Harkins, DOE-ORP		Shannon Cram, Public
Dan Knight, DOE-ORP		Angela Day, Public (phone)
Ron Koll, DOE-ORP		Craig Hall, Public
Pamela McCann, DOE-ORP		Tom Peterson, Public
Steve Pfaff, DOE-ORP		John McDonald, WRPS
Pat Swann, DOE-ORP		
Brandon Williams, DOE-ORP		
Stan Branch, DOE-RL/ORP		
Tiffany Nguyen, DOE-RL		