DOE-RL DE-AC06-96RL13200
Modification M056

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
OBJECTIVE MEASURE EXPECTATION INCREASED NEGATIVE
CFO 1 : Integrated financial systems maintain the Hanford Site financially in control.

0% at Objective Level

CFO 1.1 : N/A

0% at Measure Level

CFO 1.1.1: No funds ceilings cited on the FDH contract are exceeded in FY 1998.

No incentive fee amount will be earned by the Contractor for meeting the Performance Expectation; the Performance Expectation is minimum expected performance.

-2% at Expectation Level for each occurrence

N/A -100 percent of the incentive fee available for this PA will be assessed against the Contractor for each control point where costs plus commitments exceeds total budget authority for that control point. A control point violation involves costs reported to RL in excess of control points that are not corrected.
CFO 2: The PHMC is managerially and financially in control.

0% at Objective Level

CFO 2.1: N/A

0% at Measure Level

CFO 2.1.1: By April 30, 1998, the Contractor shall review its performance measurement and cost charging practices and procedures for calculating BCWS, BCWP, and ACWP, make necessary revisions as required, and submit a written report to RL by April 30, 1998, verifying that the performance measurement and cost charging data is accurate and the necessary controls are in place.

No incentive fee amount will be earned by the Contractor for meeting the Performance Expectation; the Performance Expectation is minimum expected performance.

0% at Expectation Level

N/A If the Contractor fails to meet these criteria, the affected PAs will be treated as Management and Total Scope Performance Incentives (Mega Incentive).
CFO 3: The Contractor is cost competitive.

0.0% at Objective Level

CFO 3.1: Provide only the necessary indirect-funded services at competitive costs.

0.0% at Measure Level

CFO 3.1.1 : The FY 1998 Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) shall be less than or equal to 100% of the baseline.

40 percent of the incentive fee for this PA can be earned by the Contractor for meeting the Performance Expectation.

4.5% at Expectation Level

The Contractor can earn one of the following additional incentive fee amounts if the stated performance condition is met:

-70% of the incentive fee for this PA can be earned by the Contractor if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities is less than or equal to 95% of the baseline;

-80% of the incentive fee for this PA can be earned by the Contractor if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities is less than or equal to 94% of the baseline; or

-90% of the incentive fee for this PA can be earned by the Contractor if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities is less than or equal to 93% of the baseline; or

-100% of the incentive fee for this PA can be earned by the Contractor if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities is less than or equal to 92% of the baseline.

No incentive fee amount can be earned by the Contractor if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities are greater than or equal to the baseline.

The Contractor will be assessed one of the following negative incentive fee amounts if the stated performance condition is met:

--40% of the incentive fee for this PA will be assessed against the Contractor if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities is greater than or equal to 101% of the baseline;

--70% of the incentive fee for this PA will be assessed against the Contractor if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities is greater than or equal to 102% of the baseline;

--80% of the incentive fee for this PA will be assessed against the Contractor

      The Contractor can only earn incentive fee at the 70%,80%, 90% or 100% levels for the Stretch Performance Level. if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities is greater than or equal to 104% of the baseline;

--90% of the incentive fee for this PA will be assessed against the Contractor if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities is greater than or equal to 106% of the baseline; or

--100% of the incentive fee for this PA will be assessed against the Contractor if the FY 1998 ACWP for originated costs on Contractor indirect-funded activities is greater than or equal to 108% of the baseline.

In addition, the Contractor will be assessed 0.4% of total available FY 1998 incentive fee pool each time:

- the Contractor fails to disclose any material FY 1998 AWP baseline change;

- a reduction in workscope is implemented by the Contractor and not approved by RL using the formal change control process; or

- customers that are affected by the workscope Change Request are not made aware of the proposed change in advance of the change.

        In addition, the Contractor will be assessed 1.2% of total available FY 1998 incentive fee pool for each accounting practice changed without following the RL Accounting Practice Change Policy.
CFO 4: Integrated, traceable, and consistent data.

0% at Objective Level

CFO 4.1: Data contained in the Multi-Year Work Plans (MYWP); Integrated Site Baseline (ISB); Accelerated Cleanup Plan (including Project Baseline Summary (PBS) [Parts A and C], Operations/Field Office Baseline Summary and Site Baseline Summary); Integrated Priority List (IPL); and the Hanford Strategic Plan (HSP) shall be integrated, traceable, and consistent.

0% at Measure Level

CFO 4.1.1 : The Contractor shall demonstrate:

Element 1: 90% Data Traceability by budget submittal date (when Formulation Budget due to HQ - Mid-April);

Element 2: 80% Data Consistency by budget submittal date (when Formulation Budget due to HQ - Mid-April);

Element 3: 95% Data Traceability by MYWP submittal date (when Execution Year MYWP due to RL - Late August); and

Element 4: 90% Data Consistency by MYWP submittal date (when Execution Year MYWP due to RL - Late August)

15 percent of the incentive fee available for this PA can be earned by the Contractor for meeting Elements 1 and 2 of the

Performance Expectation.

25 percent of the incentive fee available for this PA can be earned by the Contractor for meeting Elements 3 and 4 of the Performance Expectation.

3% at Expectation Level

60 percent of the incentive fee available for this PA can be earned by the Contractor for completion of Elements 5 and 6:

Element 5: 95% Data Traceability by budget submittal date (when Formulation Budget due to HQ - Mid-April)

Element 6: 95% Data Consistency by budget submittal date (when Formulation Budget due to HQ - Mid-April)

-20 percent of the incentive fee available for this PA will be assessed against the Contractor for each of the following two conditions, for a total maximum negative incentive fee of -40 percent:

- achievement of 70% or less Data Traceability or Data Consistency by budget submittal date (mid-April); or

- achievement of 85% or less Data Traceability, or 75% or less Consistency by MYWP submittal date (August).

CFO 5: Acquisition Excellence

0% at Objective Level

CFO 5.1: The Contractor shall achieve all socioeconomic and fixed-price subcontracting goals

0% at Measure Level

CFO 5.1.1 : By the end of FY 1998, the Contractor shall:

Element 1 (3 requirements): achieve all small business, small disadvantaged business, and women-owned business goals for the combined performance of all members of the PHMC team (Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc.; B&W Hanford Company; DE&S Hanford, Inc.; Lockheed Martin Hanford Corporation; Numatec Hanford Corporation; Waste Management Services of Hanford, Inc.; and DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc.) that are established in the RL approved FY 1998 Fluor Daniel Hanford Socioeconomic Subcontracting Plan; and

Element 2 (1 requirement): achieve a minimum level of 90 percent fixed-price subcontracting for the combined performance of all members of the PHMC team.

No incentive fee amount will be earned by the Contractor for meeting the Performance Expectation; the Performance Expectation is minimum expected performance.

-1% at Expectation Level

N/A -75 percent of the incentive fee available for this PA will be assessed against the Contractor for failure to meet Element 1 of the Performance Expectation.

-25 percent of the incentive fee available for this PA will be assessed against the Contractor for failure to meet Element 2 of the Performance Expectation.

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Document Number: DE-AC06-96RL13200
Mod: M056