

Awareness is the foundation of counterintelligence

The Tri-Cities and Hanford Site are wonderfully diversified, with many people from many different countries enriching our professional and personal lives. The environment in which we work, live, and play puts us in frequent contact with people from other countries. This is a good thing.

It's such a good thing that we routinely and consistently travel to other countries and invite people from other countries to come to the Hanford Site to share ideas and, in many cases, to become scientific collaborators. The Department of Energy not only believes in the concept of "the global community," but truly lives it. Our personal, social and collective growth and survival as a scientific community depend on our interactions with people who are not U.S. citizens.

However, many foreign countries, including those we call our allies, exert an opposing effort to gain access to knowledge that has an effect on U.S. national and economic security. Additional concerns, particularly with DOE's list of "sensitive" countries, are proliferation and terrorism.

Hanford Site employees are potential targets of foreign intelligence and terrorists — simply because we work at a DOE site. We have access to information, or to the people who have information, that other people and other countries want. We may be potential targets if others simply *think* that we have access.

We can be potential targets when we travel abroad, when we bring foreign visitors into our work areas, and even when we socialize. We need to tune our antennae so that, when the conversation is directed toward the parts of the job that we can't talk about, those antennae start to twitch. That's what counterintelligence awareness is all about. Knowing where to draw the line is part of our jobs and it's part of working in such a special place with such special people

People routinely tell counterintelligence officers that they've traveled extensively to "sensitive" foreign countries and had frequent contact with scientists and others from those countries, and that they have never had a problem. That may be so, but according to a General Accounting Office report published in June 2000, scientists from four national laboratories reported at least 75 incidents in which DOE personnel were targeted by a foreign intelligence service in efforts to obtain sensitive information and proprietary knowledge.

Espionage happens. What can we do to protect ourselves?

The foundation of the counterintelligence program is awareness. Your counterintelligence office provides pre-travel briefings and post-travel debriefings to site employees who travel to countries on the DOE list of sensitive countries. Pre-travel briefings give you "heads-up" information relevant to your travel destination. Post-travel debriefings, on the other hand, are your opportunity to provide a heads-up to Hanford Site travelers who will follow your flight path.

Both briefings and debriefings are concerned with methods that foreign intelligence services use. They also concern counter-terrorism and other general information that may help you to protect yourself. Your counterintelligence office also provides briefings to site employees who host foreign national visitors and assignees.

We also understand many of the pressures that foreign nationals working here on visits and assignments may encounter. We're available to help everyone who feels he or she has been targeted for elicitation of sensitive information.. ■

