DOE/EA-1319
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	Environmental Assessment Disposition of Surplus Hanford Site Uranium, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington
	U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office Richland, Washington
	June 2000

GLOSSARY

Acronyms and Initialisms

Definition of Terms

as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). An approach to radiation protection to control or manage exposures (both individual and collective to the workforce and general public) as low as social, technical, economic, practical, and public policy considerations permit.

Background radiation. That level of radioactivity from naturally occurring sources; principally radiation from cosmogenic and primordial radionuclides.

Decay, radioactive. A spontaneous nuclear transformation of one nuclide into a different nuclide or into a different energy state of the same nuclide by emission of particles and/or photons.

Depleted uranium. Uranium having less than 0.711 as the percentage by weight of uranium-235 (i.e., assay less than natural uranium).

Enrichment. The isotopic content, by weight, of uranium-235 in the total mass of uranium.

Fissile. Material capable of undergoing fission by slow neutrons.

Latent cancer fatality. The excess cancer fatalities in a population due to exposure to a carcinogen.

Low-enriched uranium. Uranium having between 0.711 weight percent and 20 weight percent of uranium-235.

Low Specific Activity (LSA). A shipping category designation based on U.S. Department of Transportation requirements specified in 49 CFR 173-403. LSA material is a U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office class 7 (radioactive material) comprised of limited specific activity radioactive materials. Specific activity limits for the LSA material category are specified in three different subcategories (i.e., LSA I, LSA II, or LSA III), which are explicitly related to the quantity of material involved.

Maximally exposed individual. A hypothetical member of the public who, by virtue of location and living habits, could receive the highest possible exposure to radiation or to hazardous materials as a result of routine operations or accidental events.

Natural uranium. Uranium in its pre-enriched state, as found in nature, having a uranium 235 concentration of approximately 0.7 percent.

Normal uranium. Uranium having approximately 0.7 as the percentage by weight of uranium-235 as occurring in nature, but created by a synthetic process.

Package. For radioactive materials, the packaging together with its radioactive contents as presented for transport. The specific requirements are found in 49 CFR 173, "Shippers-General Requirements for Shipments and Packaging".

Packaging. For radioactive materials, the assembly of components necessary to ensure compliance with the packaging requirements. Packaging could consist of one or more receptacles, sorbent materials, spacing structures, thermal insulation, radiation shielding, and devices for cooling or sorbing mechanical shocks. The conveyance, tie-down system, and auxiliary equipment sometimes could be designated as part of the packaging. The specific requirements are found in 49 CFR 173, "Shippers-General Requirements for Shipments and Packaging".

Person-rem. The unit of collective dose to a population based on the number of exposed individuals multiplied by the radiation dose to each individual.

rem. The conventional unit of equivalent dose.

Risk. The product of the probability of occurrence of an accident and the consequences of an accident.

Total effective dose equivalent. The sum of the effective dose equivalent (for external exposures) and the committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposures). A measure of radiation dose related to risk of long-term health effects (i.e., latent cancers and genetic effects) following exposure to ionizing radiation.

Source: CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, Robert C. Weast, Ph.D., 70th Ed., 1989-1990, CRC Press, Inc., Boca Raton, Florida.

SCIENTIFIC NOTATION CONVERSION CHART

CONTENTS

GLOSSARY

METRIC CONVERSION CHART

SCIENTIFIC NOTATION CONVERSION CHART

1.0 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION

2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 CANDIDATE URANIUM MATERIALS PROPOSED FOR TRANSPORT

2.2 REMAINING HANFORD SITE URANIUM MATERIALS

2.3 RELATED DOCUMENTATION

2.3.1 Transportation

2.3.2 Waste Management

3.0 ALTERNATIVES INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION

3.1 PROPOSED ACTION

3.2 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION

3.2.1 No-Action Alternative

3.2.2 Alternative Interim Offsite Storage Locations for Saleable Hanford Site Uranium

3.2.3 Disposal of Entire Hanford Site Surplus Uranium Inventory

3.2.4 Alternative Transportation Modes

4.0 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

4.1 HANFORD SITE

4.2 PORTSMOUTH SITE

4.3 TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

5.1 PROPOSED ACTION: IMPACTS FROM ROUTINE OPERATIONS

5.1.1 Uranium Materials Packaging and Loading at Hanford Site Locations, and Offloading/Storage at the Portsmouth Site

5.1.2 Transportation

5.1.3 Potential Interim Onsite Consolidated Storage of Unirradiated Fuel

5.1.4 Potential Disposition of Uranium Materials as Waste

5.2 PROPOSED ACTION: IMPACTS FROM ACCIDENTS

5.2.1 Packaging of Uranium Materials on the Hanford Site

5.2.2 Transportation

5.2.3 Storage of Uranium Materials at the Portsmouth Site

5.2.4 Continued Storage of Uranium Materials on the Hanford Site

5.2.5 Potential Disposition of Uranium Materials as Waste

5.3 PROPOSED ACTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

5.4 PROPOSED ACTION: CUMULATIVE IMPACT

6.0 PERMITS AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

6.1 FACILITY COMPLIANCE

6.2 TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

7.0 AGENCIES CONSULTED

8.0 REFERENCES

APPENDIX

FIGURES

Figure 1. Typical Uranium Billet.

Figure 2. T-Hoppers.

Figure 3. Fuel Assemblies in Storage.

Figure 4. Hanford Site.

Figure 5. 300 Area Uranium Facilities.

Figure 6. 200 West Area.

Figure 7. 200 East Area.

Figure 8. Proposed Overland Truck Route from Hanford Site to Portsmouth, Ohio.

Figure 9. Proposed Rail Route from Hanford Site to Portsmouth, Ohio.

Figure 10. Potential Uranium Storage Locations at Portsmouth Site.

TABLES

Table 1. Excess Unirradiated Uranium Summary.

Table 2. Radiological Impacts of Incident-Free Transportation.

Table 3. Potential Transportation Radiological Accident Risks.

Table 4. Potential Toxicological Consequences from an Accident.

1.0 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has surplus uranium, in various forms, on the Hanford Site near Richland, Washington. Uranium has been used in the past on the Hanford Site in support of nuclear production operations. Current missions are to safely clean up and manage the legacy wastes on the Hanford Site, and to develop and deploy science and technology (DOE/RL-96-92). DOE has identified 1,866 metric tons of uranium (MTU) as surplus on the Hanford Site. As of late calendar year 1999, the predominant amount of approximately 1,700 MTU [1,866 MTU minus 140 MTU (including 135 MTU of contaminated fuel and 5 MTU of miscellaneous scrap)] was considered to have a positive market value and, as such, an asset to DOE. Acquisition interest in the 1,700 MTU of material previously was expressed by both foreign-owned and domestic commercial organizations.

The remaining Hanford Site uranium (the aforementioned 140 MTU) has been evaluated, by independent experts, as not economically feasible for required pre-treatment and subsequent sale. This material is being managed appropriately pending a final disposition determination. The 135 MTU of contaminated fuel is contaminated radiologically with low levels of surface beta/gamma contamination (150 to 5,000 disintegrations per minute). The 5 MTU of miscellaneous scrap is in forms and purities not considered economically recoverable. Table 1 shows the current inventory of surplus uranium on the Hanford Site. The current storage configurations are in good condition, and there is no immediate need for upgrade.

In January 2000, a uranium market analysis workshop was held. Brokers, customers, and processors of uranium were invited, and presented with information regarding quantities and specifications for all Hanford Site surplus uranium. It was determined that there is no reasonably foreseeable demand for the remaining unirradiated fuel (approximately 825 MTU). Therefore, the inventory of uranium considered to have a readily-identifiable positive market value has been reduced from the aforementioned 1,700 MTU to approximately 900 MTU.

DOE needs to (1) relocate potentially saleable Hanford Site surplus unirradiated uranium (UU) to the DOE’s Portsmouth Site near Portsmouth, Ohio, for future beneficial use and (2) provide onsite management of Hanford Site surplus uranium that is not considered readily saleable. The management of excess uranium on the Hanford Site supports a Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1999) Milestone MX-92-06-T01 related to “complete commercial disposition and/or the acquisition of new facilities, modification of existing facilities, and/or modification of planned facilities necessary for storage, treatment/processing, and disposal/disposition of all Hanford Site UU,” and U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) deactivation and mortgage reduction goals.

This proposed relocation action would be conducted as an interim action pending completion of a NEPA review clarifying the definition and role of the Uranium Management Center for future management of DOE’s uranium inventory. The NEPA review would examine the packaging, transportation, receipt, and storage of these uranium materials with potential for beneficial reuse, including possible sale and disposition. Although the Portsmouth Site has been selected for the temporary storage of similar material, one or more sites would be evaluated for the longer term storage of useable uranium material. DOE’s Oak Ridge Operations has begun the requisite steps necessary to prepare the aforementioned NEPA review, in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (P.L. 91-90, 42 USC 4321 et seq.) and the DOE NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR 1021).

Physical relocation of the uranium inventory on the Hanford Site within the DOE Complex does not constitute a proliferation issue. In the event that the NEPA review would result in selection of a different location than Portsmouth for the Uranium Management Center, the Hanford Site uranium would be transported to the site of the Uranium Management Center with other surplus uranium stored at the Portsmouth Site. Potential environmental consequences associated with the associated transfers would be included in the NEPA review.

The proposed onsite management actions (as necessary) would be conducted as an interim action pending completion of DOE/EIS-0286, Hanford Site Solid (Radioactive & Hazardous) Waste Program EIS. The EIS (draft expected to be issued in fiscal year 2000) evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with ongoing activities of the Hanford Site Solid Waste Program, the implementation of programmatic decisions resulting from the Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0200), and reasonably foreseeable treatment, storage, and disposal facilities/activities.

Table 1. Excess Hanford Site Unirradiated Uranium Summary.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Uranium materials, in various forms and enrichments, were fabricated into fuel for use in the Hanford Site production reactors and were byproducts from reprocessing plants. Enrichment is based on the isotopic uranium-235 content¹. Uranium on the Hanford Site includes normal uranium, depleted uranium, and low-enriched uranium. A brief description of the materials follows (refer to Table 1 for Hanford Site surplus uranium inventory).

Ongoing evaluations to date have enabled DOE to clearly identify surplus Hanford Site uranium materials that readily are saleable. Those materials are discussed in Section 2.1. As stated previously (Section 1.0), in January 2000 a determination was made that there is no reasonably foreseeable demand for the unirradiated fuel (approximately 960 MTU). Therefore, these materials are included in Section 2.2.

2.1 CANDIDATE URANIUM MATERIALS PROPOSED FOR TRANSPORT

Uranium Metal Billets. Metal billets are metallic forms of uranium that have been formed mechanically into hollow cylindrical shapes. Two sizes of billets, 'inner' and 'outer', were fabricated. The difference in the sizes is associated with the diameter of the billets. The 'inner' billets (Figure 1) have a nominal diameter of 14 centimeters (5.5 inches). The 'outer' billets have a larger diameter (nominally about 18 centimeters (7 inches) and have more mass; an inner billet weighs 125 kilograms (approximately 275 pounds), and an outer billet weighs 190 kilograms (approximately 420 pounds). The uranium billets presently stored on the Hanford Site are surplus materials because of the discontinued DOE defense reactor operations.

The surplus uranium billets currently are stored in wooden shipping containers in secured facilities in the 300 Area on the Hanford Site. The current 235 MTU metal billet inventory consists of 1,257 billets stored in 320 boxes: 1,255 billets (318 boxes) at an enrichment level (based on uranium-235 content) of 1.25 weight-percent; and 2 billets (2 boxes) at a 0.2 weight-percent enrichment level ('depleted' uranium). Also, there are 3 billets (1 box) of 0.95 weight-percent, and 2 billets (1 box) of normal uranium. The facilities are monitored routinely and protected in accordance with DOE safeguards requirements. The dose rate on contact of a typical uranium billet is approximately 8 millirem per hour. The dose rate on contact of a wooden shipping container containing 4 billets is approximately 4 millirem per hour.

Figure 1. Typical Uranium Billet.

Uranium Trioxide (UO₃). Low-enriched UO₃ powder (approximately 670 MTU) is stored in 147 T-hoppers (Figure 2) at the Uranium Oxide Plant in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site. A small quantity [less than 200 kilograms (440 pounds)] of low-enriched UO₃ powder is a residual heel in 40 'empty' T-hoppers (T-hoppers are truncated cylindrical vessels that can hold up to 5.4 MTU of powder).

Uranium Dioxide (UO₂). The Hanford Site UO₂ inventory on the Hanford Site consists of 2,181 kilograms (approximately 4,800 pounds) of depleted uranium and 1,266 kilograms (2,800 pounds) of normal UO₂ pellets, powder, and fuel pins containing UO₂ pellets. All of these materials except the fuel pins are stored in metal cans or drums. The material is undergoing evaluation regarding potential economic value.

Additionally, there is UO₂ in the 200 and 300 Areas of the Hanford Site that is predominantly 2.35 weight percent uranium-235. These materials include 870 kilograms (approximately 1,900 pounds) of UO₂ powder within aluminum fuel tubes and 130 kilograms (approximately 290 pounds) of miscellaneous pellets, powder, and scrap materials. Some of the aluminum fuel tubes are packaged in 415-liter (110-gallon) U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 6M containers, but most of the tubes are in 320-liter (85-gallon) criticality safe 'storage' containers that are not certified for transport. These materials might require repackaging or overpacking for shipment as appropriate.

Figure 2. T-Hoppers.

2.2 REMAINING HANFORD SITE URANIUM MATERIALS

Presently, ongoing evaluations have not identified a positive market value for some uranium materials on the Hanford Site. As a management contingency, DOE would consider onsite disposition of these materials as low-level waste. A brief description of these materials follows.

Unirradiated Fuel Assemblies. The Hanford Site unirradiated fuel inventory (a total of approximately 960 MTU) contains various types of assemblies; each type is characterized by the uranium-235 enrichment of the inner and outer fuel element and the fuel length. Fuel assemblies vary in length from 66 centimeters (26 inches) to 38 centimeters (15 inches). The average fuel assembly weighs 20 kilograms (approximately 44 pounds).

The finished fuel assemblies are stored in 1,394 wooden boxes in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site (Figure 3). Of these boxes, 1,143 boxes contain unirradiated, uncontaminated finished fuel assemblies. There are 251 boxes that contain finished fuel assemblies that were loaded into N Reactor, but never irradiated. These assemblies, radiologically contaminated with low levels of surface beta/gamma contamination (150 to 5,000 disintegrations per minute), were removed from the reactor, cleaned, packaged, and stored (double-wrapped in plastic). Unfinished fuel elements are stored in 339 wooden boxes.

Marketability of the unirradiated fuel actively is being pursued. DOE is considering consolidated interim storage of the material onsite, pending final disposition (i.e., transport offsite for future use or onsite burial as low-level waste). It would be expected that an existing or a new facility(s) could be modified or constructed (respectively) in the 200 Areas to accommodate centralized storage on the Hanford Site. Potential locations to date include the Central Waste Complex (200 West Area), T Plant Complex (200 West Area), or the Canister Storage Building (200 East Area).

UO₃ Powder. There are approximately 2 MTU of UO₃ powder stored in drums in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site being considered for disposition as waste. This includes about 0.6 MTU of depleted uranium and 1.5 MTU of low-enriched uranium. This material is chemically similar to the UO₃ in the T-hoppers.

UO₂ Powder. There are approximately 3 MTU of UO₂ powder stored in metal containers on the Hanford Site. This material was described previously (Section 2.1), and is included here in the event that no economic value is identified.

Miscellaneous Uranium Materials. There are some miscellaneous uranium materials being evaluated for disposition as waste. This includes approximately 0.3 MTU of depleted uranium billets and about 0.5 MTU of miscellaneous residual scrap metal pieces from earlier fuel fabrication activities.

It would be expected that, in the event that no marketable value is identified, these materials would be appropriately packaged and transported from current storage locations to the 200 Areas on the Hanford Site for disposal as low-level waste. Additional details for potential management of these materials as waste are provided in Appendix A.

Figure 3. Fuel Assemblies in Storage.

2.3 RELATED DOCUMENTATION

Similar activities have been addressed previously as discussed in the following sections.

2.3.1 Transportation

The proposed action is similar to activities conducted earlier (without significant environmental impacts) on the Hanford Site. Recent shipments of Hanford Site excess materials to the United Kingdom (i.e., uranium billets and low-specific activity nitric acid) have been the subject of environmental assessments (EAs). The EAs, each of which resulted in a Finding Of No Significant Impact, are incorporated by reference in this document:

• Environmental Assessment for the Shipment of Low Enriched Uranium Billets to the United Kingdom from the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/EA-0787, August 1992).
• Environmental Assessment, Disposition and Transportation of Surplus Radioactive Low Specific Activity Nitric Acid, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/EA-1005, May 1995).
• Environmental Assessment, Transfer of Normal and Low-Enriched Uranium Billets to the United Kingdom, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/EA-1123, November 1995).

In 1992 and 1996, a total of 1,040 metric tons (approximately 2,300,000 pounds) of uranium billets were shipped from the 300 Area to the United Kingdom. The potential impacts associated with the shipments were analyzed (DOE /EA-0787 and DOE/EA-1123). The shipments were conducted without incident. The proposed action would pose similar potential hazards.

The proposed action involves the analysis of interstate transfer of billets and powder, while the 1992 and 1996 campaigns involved international shipments of billets. The 1992 and 1996 campaigns used truck transportation from the Hanford Site to Seattle, Washington. At that point, billets were transferred to ocean vessels that transported the material through the Panama Canal to Germany and to the United Kingdom.

Additionally, DOE recently has evaluated a similar action for the transfer of approximately 3,800 MTU of uranium materials currently stored at the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP) Site to various Oak Ridge Operations managed sites. Identified Oak Ridge Operations managed sites included the Portsmouth Site. The following EA was prepared concerning this site: DOE/EA-1299, Environmental Assessment for the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Receipt and Storage of Uranium Materials from the Fernald Environmental Management Project Site, (March 1999). A Finding Of No Significant Impact was issued on April 13, 1999. This EA also is incorporated by reference.

DOE has proposed the preparation of a NEPA review to address potential impacts associated with consolidation of potentially reusable uranium materials at a DOE Uranium Management Center. The NEPA review would examine the packaging, transportation, receipt, and storage of these uranium materials with potential for beneficial reuse, including possible sale and disposition. Although the Portsmouth Site has been selected for the temporary storage of similar material, one or more sites would be evaluated for the longer term storage of useable uranium material. The NEPA review preparation is expected to be initiated in calendar year 2000.

2.3.2 Waste Management

Radioactive waste materials are managed routinely on the Hanford Site. For example, in calendar year 1998, 1,470,000 kilograms (approximately 3,240,000 pounds) of radioactive waste were generated on the Hanford Site (PNNL-12088). Hanford Site waste disposal operations are being addressed in the draft Hanford Site Solid (Radioactive & Hazardous) Waste Program EIS (DOE/EIS-0268 Draft), which is currently in preparation.

3.0 ALTERNATIVES INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION

The proposed action and the alternatives are discussed in the following sections.

3.1 PROPOSED ACTION

Transportation of Hanford Site Uranium Materials

The DOE is proposing to transport approximately 900 MTU (approximately 2,000,000 pounds) of uranium materials currently stored on the Hanford Site to the Portsmouth Site for consolidated storage. These materials are considered potentially saleable by DOE. The shipments of the uranium materials would be categorized appropriately, per DOT specifications, for radioactive materials. Transport of the uranium materials could be conducted by overland truck and/or rail, specifically as follows.

• Approximately 75 shipments, via overland truck transport, to the Portsmouth Site would be required for the uranium billets. A shipping container of the uranium billets would have a dose rate of less than 0.5 millirem per hour at 1 meter (3 feet).

• Approximately 50 to 75 shipments, via overland truck transport, to the Portsmouth Site would be required for the UO₃ powder (2 to 4 T-hoppers per truck, depending on weight restrictions). Rail transport of this material also is considered a possibility. A total of approximately 5 shipments via rail would be required (10 T-hoppers per railcar; three railcars per shipment). The T-hoppers would have a dose rate of less than 20 millirem per hour at 1 meter (3 feet).

Before any material shipments from the Hanford Site to the Portsmouth Site, DOE Oak Ridge Operations would prepare a material management plan. This plan would be coordinated with the State of Ohio. This plan would include information on storage, marketing, disposal, and short-/long-term funding requirements. This plan would be a 'living document', and would be issued as a standalone document separate from the EA.

A typical sequence of activities for any necessary packaging and transportation includes several steps. For example, initially the billets, currently stored in wooden shipping containers, would be transferred from the existing storage facilities in the 300 Area (3712 Building and 303-G Building) to a nearby facility for appropriate repackaging. This could be similar to the action described in DOE/EA-1123. For that campaign, facilities considered included the 3712 Building [a facility in the 300 Area less than 1,000 meters (3,330 feet) away]. Relative locations of the 300 Area facilities are shown in Figures 4 and 5. (Note: the relative locations of the UO₃ storage area and the 2718-E Building are shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively.)

Figure 4. Hanford Site.

Figure 5. 300 Area Uranium Facilities.

Figure 6. 200 West Area.

Figure 7. 200 East Area.

Should repackaging be required, minor modifications at the specific location might be necessary. Modifications could include some form of temporary heating for operator comfort, as necessary, during the campaign. Temporary portable hoisting and rigging equipment would be provided, including A-frame(s) and chain hoist(s), as well as any special handling tools. It is expected that the necessary equipment, most of which is of commercial design, is presently on the Hanford Site. Some handling equipment that was used during earlier uranium transportation campaigns (DOE/EA-0787 and DOE/EA-1123) could be modified to interface with the current characteristics of the uranium materials inventory [e.g., billets outer- and inside-diameter dimensions and weight, fuel length, and A-frame/chain hoist(s)].

The materials would be transferred, as necessary, to appropriate DOT containers. It is expected that uranium billets might be shipped in their current configuration (i.e., wooden shipping containers), or might be repackaged to the extent required by DOT regulations.

The appropriate shipping containers (including T-hoppers) would be secured on a truck trailer (and/or railcar) and radiologically measured by trained personnel using prescribed equipment and methods before release. The methods include provisions for carrier compliance with federal and state regulations for transport of radioactive materials. The methods would ensure compliance with standards, specifications, and regulations, including DOT guidelines. Carrier security demands would be met. A licensed commercial carrier would be retained.

The proposed route for the transport of the uranium materials from the Hanford Site to the Portsmouth Site is shown in Figures 8 and 9 (overland truck and rail routes respectively). The transport of the uranium materials would fall under DOT regulations for radioactive materials and would be under the control of DOE. It might be necessary to amend the transportation route of the uranium materials to secure an alternate route to address logistical or other reasonable concerns. Such circumstances, which could affect the selected route, including road closures, detours, and unanticipated inclement weather, are not expected to result in increased risk to the worker or public during transportation of the uranium materials, relative to normal transportation risk. Final mode/route selection would be based on cost, schedule, and operational considerations.

Figure 8. Proposed Overland Truck Route from Hanford Site to Portsmouth, Ohio.

Figure 9. Proposed Rail Route from Hanford Site to Portsmouth, Ohio.

Once at the Portsmouth Site, the containers of uranium materials would be offloaded and stored at an appropriate location. The current proposed location is X-744-G (Figure 10, which was reproduced from DOE/EA-1299). The Hanford Site uranium materials would be stored in a transportation-ready configuration, not precluding future determination(s). These activities would be similar to, and consistent with, actions described in DOE/EA-1299. Any necessary modifications to the Portsmouth facilities would be expected to be minor; e.g., resurfacing asphalt pads, erecting tent covering/enclosure, painting, utility modifications, and radiation monitors. No transport containers would be returned to the Hanford Site for reuse.

After removal of the entire inventory of uranium materials from the existing storage facilities on the Hanford Site, electrical services to those facilities would be reduced to minimize maintenance costs while maintaining appropriate safety margins. End-point criteria would be developed supporting surveillance and maintenance activities. The facilities would remain locked until decommissioned or transferred to a new owner. The temporary equipment would be decontaminated, if necessary, and reused or excessed as appropriate.

Figure 10. Potential Uranium Storage Locations at Portsmouth Site.

Hanford Site Uranium Materials – Interim Storage Pending Disposition. Approximately 825 MTU of unirradiated fuel would be transported from the present location to the Hanford Site 200 Areas for consolidated storage. As discussed in Section 1.0, presently there is no reasonably foreseeable demand for the remaining unirradiated fuel (approximately 825 MTU). The removal of the unirradiated fuel from the 300 Area on the Hanford Site supports a Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1999) Milestone MX-92-06-T01 related to “complete commercial disposition and/or the acquisition of new facilities, modification of existing facilities, and/or modification of planned facilities necessary for storage, treatment/processing, and disposal/disposition of all Hanford Site UU,” and U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) deactivation and mortgage reduction goals.

Candidate storage locations would include modified (as appropriate) existing facilities: the Central Waste Complex in the 200 West Area, the 2101-M warehouse in the 200 West Area, the Canister Storage Building in the 200 East Area, and the 616 Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Storage Facility (between 200 East and 200 West Areas).² A new interim storage structure also could be installed. It would be expected that this new facility would be in the immediate vicinity of one the aforementioned candidate existing facilities, within or contiguous to an already developed area (where site utilities and roads are available), thus minimizing potential impacts to ground surface disturbance.

Activities would be typical of those associated with the siting, construction, and operation of small-scale support buildings and support structures (including prefabricated buildings). Any necessary modifications to an existing Hanford Site facility would be expected to be minor (e.g., resurfacing asphalt pads, erecting tent covering/enclosure, painting, utility modifications, and radiation monitors). These types of activities are conducted routinely on the Hanford Site.

It is expected that operations associated with packaging (as necessary), loading, and unloading the unirradiated fuel would be similar to those previously described for the uranium billets. Onsite transportation would be conducted using existing Hanford Site transportation methods.

Hanford Site Uranium Materials – Candidates for Waste Disposal. Uranium materials that might be designated as waste would be appropriately packaged and transported from the present location to the 200 Areas Low-Level Burial Grounds for disposal. As stated in Section 1.0, candidate materials for waste disposal include the aforementioned 140 MTU (135 MTU of contaminated fuel and 5 MTU of miscellaneous scrap). It is expected that potential modifications to existing facilities would be consistent with the ongoing disposal mission at the burial grounds. Appendix A provides additional details regarding the potential disposition of these uranium materials as waste.

3.2 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION

Alternatives to the proposed action are as follows.

3.2.1 No-Action Alternative

Under the No-Action Alternative, the Hanford Site uranium materials would remain in the existing, onsite storage configurations. This alternative does not address the actual disposition of the material, and would result in continued surveillance and maintenance with the attendant costs for safeguards, security, and utility assessments.

3.2.2 Alternative Interim Offsite Storage Locations for Saleable Hanford Site Uranium

At the present time, no alternative locations other than the Portsmouth Site for interim offsite storage of the Hanford Site uranium materials have been identified. The proposed action is consistent with the recent DOE decision to transfer FEMP uranium materials to the Portsmouth Site (DOE/EA-1299). The Portsmouth Site offers unique capabilities for uranium storage, including infrastructure.

3.2.3 Disposal of Entire Hanford Site Surplus Uranium Inventory

Presently, some value has been identified for some of the surplus Hanford Site uranium inventory. Disposal of the entire inventory would not recognize any potential benefits from sale or reuse of the materials, and would require large incremental funding allocations.

3.2.4 Alternative Transportation Modes

Other modes of transportation, such as air transport or barge, were considered. The potential hazards and risks associated with such transport would be similar to those experienced with overland transport. The mode preferred by DOE is overland transport of the surplus material. The following discussion of alternative modes is provided for completeness.

Air transportation of the uranium materials would be possible, although it would be more expensive than other forms of transportation. Radiation doses to persons not involved in the transportation essentially would be zero under normal conditions. As stated in the National Transportation Statistics, Annual Report for 1992 (DOTVNTSC-RSPA92-1), the probability of an air accident is about 20 times less than the probability of a truck accident, on a per-mile basis. Therefore, the risk from an air crash is low.

Barge transport of the uranium materials is considered impractical. Defueled submarine reactor compartments are transported routinely by barge via the Columbia River to the Hanford Site for disposal. However, barge transportation is generally slow. No barge route has been identified which would not require transportation by truck and/or multiple loading and unloading of the containers between the involved origins and destination.

4.0 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

The affected environment includes the potential transportation routes (generally interstate highways and rail routes), in addition to the Hanford Site and the Portsmouth Site. The general environmental description of the routes was considered in the route-specific aggregate data used to analyze transportation impacts. Details regarding the Hanford Site can be found in the Hanford Site 1998 Environmental Report (PNNL-12088) and Hanford Site National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Characterization (PNNL-6415). Details regarding the Portsmouth Site can be found in DOE/EA-1299.

4.1 HANFORD SITE

Surplus uranium materials are located in the 200 West Area, 200 East Area, and the 300 Area of the Hanford Site, which is in the southeastern portion of Washington State. Involved portions of the 300 Area are approximately 1 kilometer (0.6 mile) west of the Columbia River, the nearest natural watercourse. The nearest population center is the adjoining City of Richland, to the south. The City of Richland has a population of 32,315, while the population within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the 200 Areas is approximately 375,860.

The Hanford Site has a semiarid climate with 15 to 18 centimeters (6 to 7 inches) of annual precipitation, and infrequent periods of high winds of up to 128-kilometers (80-miles) per hour. Tornadoes are extremely rare; no destructive tornadoes have occurred in the region surrounding the Hanford Site. The probability of a tornado hitting any given waste management unit on the Hanford Site is estimated at 1 chance in 100,000 during any given year. The region is categorized as one of low to moderate seismicity.

The surplus uranium storage locations are not located within a wetland or in a 100- or 500-year floodplain. Threatened and endangered plants and animals identified on the Hanford Site, as listed by the federal government (50 CFR 17) and Washington State (Washington Natural Heritage Program 1997) are not found in the vicinity of the uranium storage areas, and are discussed in PNNL-6415. No plants or mammals on the federal list of threatened and endangered wildlife and plants (50 CFR 17) are known to occur on the Hanford Site. There are, however, three species of birds (Aleutian Canada goose, bald eagle, and peregrine falcon) and two species of fish (steelhead and spring-run chinook salmon) on the federal list of threatened and endangered species. Several species of both plants and animals are under consideration for formal listing by the federal government and Washington State. Details are provided in PNNL-6415, and are incorporated by reference in this EA.

Cultural resources in the area of the surplus uranium storage locations have been considered. The 300 Area on the Hanford Site and the location of the uranium fuel fabrication plants that manufactured fuel rods to be irradiated in the Hanford Site reactors provided the first essential step in the plutonium production process. In the 300 Area, 158 buildings/structures have been inventoried on historic property inventory forms. Of that number, 47 buildings/structures have been determined eligible for the National Register as contributing properties within the Historic District recommended for mitigation. Included in that list are the 303-A Building, the 333 Building, and the 3716 Building Assessments of the contents of the 333 Building resulted in identification/tagging of artifacts such as safety signs/posters, a control panel, protective worker clothes, and a sample uranium fuel element. No artifacts were identified in an assessment of the 3716 Building. No specific Cultural Resources Review was conducted for the proposed action because no ground disturbance or facility modifications are planned as part of the proposed action. Additional information regarding the cultural resources on the Hanford Site can be found in PNNL-6415.

4.2 PORTSMOUTH SITE

The Portsmouth Site is located approximately 36 kilometers (22 miles) northeast of Portsmouth in Pike County, Ohio. The site occupies an area of approximately 15 square kilometers (6 square miles). The region of influence for the Portsmouth Site includes both Pike County, where the facility is located, and Scioto County, which includes Portsmouth, the nearest city. The population of the two counties, per 1996 data, is approximately 108,000. There is roadway access via major arteries connecting the area with interstates, as well as air, bus, and rail service.

Construction of the site began in late 1952 and ended in 1956, 1 year after the start of uranium enrichment processing on the site. On July 1, 1993, DOE leased portions of the site to the United States Enrichment Corporation for the purpose of managing and operating the uranium enrichment enterprise. DOE retains responsibility for the non-leased portions of the site, which consist primarily of environmental restoration and waste management activities.

Building 744-G, one of the receipt locations at the Portsmouth Site under consideration, has been upgraded to receive the Fernald uranium, and space is available within that facility to receive the surplus Hanford Site material should this receipt location be selected. The facility, a steel-framed building with a concrete floor, has standard electrical service, sanitary water, dry-pipe sprinkler systems, and radiation alarm clusters. The facility is expected to house a total of approximately 5,900 MTU (13,000,000 pounds) of uranium materials. Additional details regarding the environment pertaining to the Portsmouth Site can be found in DOE/EA-1299.

4.3 TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS

Proposed transportation corridors are shown in Figures 8 (overland truck) and 9 (rail). The potential routes would be predominantly established interstate highways or railways, traversing a variety of terrains. Diverse populations (in metropolitan, urban, and rural settings) would be along the approximately 4,000 kilometers (2,400 miles).

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

The following sections present quantitative information on those potential environmental impacts that have been identified as a result of activities being proposed for the packaging of uranium materials on the Hanford Site, and subsequent transport of the material to the Portsmouth Site for storage, or to the Hanford Site 200 West Area for disposal. Both routine operations (incident-free packaging and transportation) and accident scenarios are analyzed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.

The proposed action is not expected to result in radiological or hazardous material releases to the environment. All activities would comply with current DOE Orders and state and federal regulations.

The low level of radioactivity associated with the uranium materials makes the risks associated with the handling and transportation of the uranium materials small. There would be low radiation exposure associated with packaging the uranium materials. A toxicological hazard exists because of the potential for an accidental release of the material in particulate form to the environment. However, the uranium materials currently are packaged appropriately for the respective forms [e.g., billets (large, solid metal masses stored in wooden boxes) or uranium oxide powder (stored in T-hoppers)]. These storage configurations would not release particulates³ readily to create a potential health hazard.

It is expected that potential personnel exposure to both radiation and hazardous materials during routine handling and offloading operations at the Portsmouth Site, and subsequent storage activities, would be no greater than existing conditions at those locations. Appropriate methods would be in place to ensure minimum exposure to radiation and hazardous materials [in keeping with as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles] and to ensure maximum personnel and public safety. Potential impacts associated with both routine operations and accidents would be expected to be bounded by those described in the following sections for activities on the Hanford Site and for interstate transportation. This is especially true for the transportation analysis, which also includes transport of fuel elements (as presented in the November 1999 Draft EA).

5.1 PROPOSED ACTION: IMPACTS FROM ROUTINE OPERATIONS

Impacts from routine operations are described in the following sections.

5.1.1 Uranium Materials Packaging and Loading at Hanford Site Locations, and Offloading/Storage at the Portsmouth Site

The potential for release of uranium during packaging and loading/offloading exists. However, appropriate controls would be in place to maintain occupational radiation exposure well below DOE regulations of 5,000 millirem per year (10 CFR 835), in keeping with ALARA principles. Additionally, appropriate methods and administrative controls (e.g., personnel training and a radiation work permit) would be in place before any proposed activities. Also, radiation and hazardous chemical personnel exposure levels would be monitored during the proposed action (i.e., personal dosimeters and continuous air monitors, as required).

Most of the potential radiological exposure would be expected for the workers involved in the proposed packaging. The maximum expected whole body total dose for an estimated workforce of 5 workers (for any particular type of surplus material) would be a small fraction of the average annual exposure to radiation by Hanford Site/Portsmouth personnel from ongoing activities at these sites.

For example, uranium billets are stored in the 300 Area on the Hanford Site. Average occupational external whole-body exposure to personnel in the 300 Area due to routine operations in calendar year 1998 was 83 millirem per year; the 1998 annual average external background dose rate (measured in communities considered distant from the Hanford Site) was approximately 70 millirem per year (PNNL-12088). This is substantially less than the maximum DOE regulatory standard of 5,000 millirem per year. Based on a dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4.0 x 10-4 (onsite) latent cancer fatalities (LCF) per person-rem (56 FR 23363), no LCFs would be expected.⁴ Exposures to noninvolved workers could result from air emissions during packaging activities, but the collective doses would be much smaller than those for directly involved workers because such emissions would be small.

No public exposure to radiation above that currently experienced from routine Hanford Site operations is anticipated as a result of these actions. As reported in PNNL-12088, the potential dose to the maximally exposed individual during calendar year 1998 from Hanford Site operations was 0.02 millirem. The 1998 average dose to the population was 0.0005 millirem per person. Collectively, the potential dose to the local population of 380,000 persons from 1997 operations was 0.2 person-rem. The current DOE radiation limit for an individual member of the public is 100 millirem per year, and the national average dose from natural sources is 300 millirem per year. The low doses associated with the total inventory of uranium billets in the 300 Area would not contribute to offsite public exposure. With no additional offsite exposure involved with the packaging and loading of the uranium billets, no adverse health effects to the public are expected. Similar expectations would hold true for the other forms of Hanford Site surplus uranium.

No toxicological exposure to workers or the general public is expected to occur as a result of routine handling of the uranium materials, either during packaging, loading, or offloading activities. The materials would be handled in a manner consistent with packaging and transportation of radioactive solid materials. Hanford Site and Portsmouth personnel routinely handle these types of materials daily. Routine methods (e.g., use of personnel protective clothing), specific training, and equipment safeguards are in place, and are adequate to ensure the safe packaging and handling of this material.

Small quantities of hazardous materials (e.g., solvents, cleaning agents) that might be generated during the proposed action at the present storage locations would be managed and disposed in accordance with applicable federal and state regulations. Radioactive material, radioactively contaminated equipment, and mixed waste at the storage locations would continue to be appropriately packaged, stored, and/or disposed at existing facilities on the Hanford Site. The wooden shipping containers, if no longer needed, would be disposed as low-level solid waste in existing Hanford Site waste disposal facilities.

The proposed action is not expected to impact the flora and fauna, air or water quality, land use, or to have socioeconomics effects. Noise levels would be comparable to existing conditions on the Hanford Site and at the Portsmouth site. No cultural resources would be impacted because no ground disturbance or permanent facility modifications are planned as part of the proposed action. The amount of equipment and materials to be used, such as fuel for transportation, represents a minor commitment of nonrenewable resources.

5.1.2 Transportation

This section addresses the impacts of incident-free truck transport of uranium materials in the continental United States from the Hanford Site to the Portsmouth Site in Ohio. These data are based on computer analyses (RADTRAN) conducted specifically for these materials (ENG-RCAL-028, Transportation Risk Assessment for the Shipment of Uranium Billets and UO3 Powder from Hanford to Portsmouth, Ohio). Rail transport of the T-hoppers is a viable consideration; therefore, the rail transport for uranium oxide was included in the analysis.

Additionally, the aforementioned impact analyses included transportation of finished and unfinished unirradiated fuel assemblies. DOE no longer considers this category of material to be an asset, and proposes to disposition the material onsite. Therefore, the following discussion regarding potential transportation impacts, which was presented in the Draft EA, is conservative, and also would bound transportation impacts associated with onsite disposition of fuel.

For analysis, it conservatively was assumed that the dose rate at 1 meter (3 feet) from the surface of the shipping container was 1 millirem per hour. [NOTE: Measurements of the container during the 1992 campaign for transport of uranium billets to the United Kingdom indicated the actual dose rate was less than 0.5 millirem per hour at 1 meter (3 feet)]. A similar dose rate [i.e., 0.5 millirem per hour at 1 meter (3 feet)] is anticipated to be representative of the current inventory of uranium materials, per shipping container, associated with the proposed action.

5.1.2.1 RADTRAN 4

The RADTRAN 4 computer code yields conservative estimates of radiological exposure to workers and the public (SAND89-2370). Additional conservatism inherently comes from the assumptions that are made in selecting data in the program itself; for example, in the absence of actual measurements, the highest allowable external radiation level for a package (under transportation regulations) was used. In practice, packaging arrangements reduce this below the assumed level by a factor of 10.

5.1.2.2 Potential Impacts

The shipment characteristics necessary to calculate the radiological impacts of transport include the type of transportation packaging, the number of shipments, and the quantity of radioactive material within the package (referred to as the 'inventory'). These parameters are presented in the RADTRAN analysis for the transportation packaging considered in this EA. Some of the information also is used in the analysis of transportation accidents, which is provided in Section 5.2.

Radiological impacts during normal transport involve dose to the public from radiation emitted by radioactive material packages as the shipment passes by, and to transport workers who are in the general vicinity of a radioactive material shipment. Even though radiation shields are incorporated into packaging designs, some radiation penetrates the package and exposes the nearby population at extremely low dose rates. After the shipment has passed, no further exposure occurs. No toxicological impacts would occur during normal transport. The groups exposed to radiation while the shipments are in-transit include truck drivers and rail crews, those who directly handle radioactive shipments while in route, and the general public (e.g., bystanders at truck/rail stops, persons living or working along a route, and nearby travelers (moving in the same and opposite directions). The RADTRAN 4 computer code (SAND89-2370) was used to calculate exposures during transport to these population groups.

The potential impacts associated with incident-free transport of uranium billets and uranium oxide powder (for analyses, the bounding inventories) via truck/rail are provided in Table 2. The total dose to truck crews (workers) would amount to 0.08 person-rem for shipments of uranium billets from the Hanford Site to Portsmouth, Ohio. Transport of uranium oxide powder by truck would result in 0.37 person-rem to workers (transport via rail would provide a reduction in dose to workers to 0.09 person-rem). Total public doses were calculated to be 0.09 person-rem (billets), 0.35 person-rem (uranium oxide via truck transport), and 0.43 person-rem (uranium oxide via rail). The public doses would result predominantly from exposures received during stops enroute. There were no excess LCFs predicted. Specifics such as number of workers (2), persons exposed during stops (50), and average exposure during stops (0.5 millirem per hour at 1 meter from the cask) are provided in ENG-RCAL-028.

Circumstances that could affect the selected route (e.g., road closures, detours, unanticipated inclement weather) are not expected to result in increased risk to the worker or public during transportation of the uranium materials.

5.1.3 Potential Interim Onsite Consolidated Storage of Unirradiated Fuel

It would be expected that potential impacts associated with consolidated onsite storage of unirradiated fuel would be similar to those impacts present today. As discussed in Section 5.1.1, potential worker exposure during loading/offloading operations would be low. Once in consolidated storage, minimal radiological exposure would be expected due to any necessary surveillance activities (which are conducted for the material in its current storage configuration). No public exposure to radiation above that currently experienced from routine Hanford Site operations would be anticipated as a result of this action.

5.1.4 Potential Disposition of Uranium Materials as Waste

Appendix A provides a discussion of potential impacts associated with disposal of unsalable Hanford Site uranium materials onsite. As stated in the Appendix, disposal of up to 140 MTU of uranium materials would be conducted in existing facilities in the 200 Areas of the Hanford SiteSuch disposal would result in less than 400 cubic meters (14,000 cubic feet) of waste, and would not be expected to substantially increase impacts from Hanford Site waste disposal operations.

5.2 PROPOSED ACTION: IMPACTS FROM ACCIDENTS

Impacts from accidents are discussed in the following sections.

5.2.1 Packaging of Uranium Materials on the Hanford Site

Postulated accidents associated with the repackaging of the uranium materials on the Hanford Site have been considered, and are believed to be bounded by those potential events associated with transportation accidents (Section 5.2.2). The environmental effects of accidents related to the repackaging are limited to those associated with most routine industrial activities. There are no specific initiators related directly to the proposed action that would cause a criticality or a fire. For example, the minimal dose rate (8 millirem per hour on contact) from the uranium billets would not pose an acute or chronic hazard in the event of a drop of a container of uranium billets.

Personnel injuries, such as back strains or minor abrasions, would receive appropriate medical treatment. Administrative controls, proper training, and specification of detailed procedures used in handling the materials would be in place, all of which would minimize the potential of any effects of such an accident.

5.2.2 Transportation

Potential accidents associated with the transportation of uranium materials from the Hanford Site to the Portsmouth Site have been analyzed (ENG-RCAL-028). The following discussion includes the potential impacts associated with transport of finished and unfinished unirradiated fuel assemblies. While these are no longer under consideration for offsite shipment and storage, the analysis bounds the potential impact associated with onsite movement of the fuel.

The severity of consequences depends on the degree to which the materials would be converted to airborne particulates, the extent of exposure to such a release, and the specific location of the affected individual(s). Material safety data sheets provide information regarding hazards of uranium. Symptoms of exposure to uranium particulates or powder could include burning sensation, coughing, wheezing, laryngitis, shortness of breath, headache, nausea and vomiting. Uranium particulates or powder are extremely destructive to tissue of the mucous membranes and upper respiratory tract, eyes, and skin.

The analyses herein consider the affected public and the drivers/rail crews directly associated with uranium shipments. Fatalities as a result of vehicular/rail impact are not analyzed specifically within the scope of this document; it would be expected that potential fatalities would be a small fraction of transportation fatalities that occur in the United States annually. For perspective, fatalities involving the shipment of radioactive materials were surveyed for 1971 through 1993 using the Radioactive Material Incident Report database. For 1971 through 1993, 21 vehicular accidents involving 36 fatalities occurred. These fatalities resulted from vehicular accidents and were not associated with the radioactive nature of the cargo; no radiological fatalities because of transportation accidents have ever occurred in the United States. During the same period of time, over 1,100,000 persons were killed in vehicular accidents in the United States (DOE/EIS-0283-D).

Specific environmental impacts to surface water, groundwater, soils, and/or sediments along the transportation corridors as a result of an accidental release of materials are not quantified in this document. It would be expected that drivers/rail crews immediately would take appropriate measures to limit the spread of any contamination, and would support first responder actions.

The actual mileage associated with aquatic crossings is a very small fraction of the interstate distance associated with the proposed action. Therefore, bounding consequences are presented as inhalation pathways to the nearest receptors.

However, it is recognized that uranium that would be released from primary and secondary containment under an accident scenario could be deposited on surface soils, and be subject to movement with soil water through the vadose zone into groundwater. The material also could be deposited directly into water bodies or move from the surface soil overland into water bodies. On deposition of uranium entrained in the media, the fate and transport of the uranium would be a function of the environmental site characteristics and the physical/chemical properties of uranium. Such properties would include solubility in water, the tendency of uranium to transform or degrade, and chemical affinity for solids or organic matter.

Uranium can be transformed to other oxidation states in soil, further reducing its mobility. The mobility of uranium deposited onto water depends upon the type of complex (cationic or anionic) formed as a result of the physical processes acting on the uranium. Cationic species tend to sorb to soil, and anionic species tend to move with water. Uranium released in a fire would be oxidized (be cationic) and would tend to sorb to the soil particles entrained in the water. As with uranium deposited upon the soil, the doses to a receptor in contact with uranium in water or associated sediment would be less than those of the receptor exposed to the initial plume.

In the event that an individual could not evacuate the immediate vicinity of a potential accident scene, the individual might or might not be directly exposed to material. The effects to an individual as a result of exposure to any chemical are a result of time of exposure, concentration, and distance. The specific exposure to an individual who is unable to evacuate would depend on the extent of a spill (i.e., the amount of material released), their proximity to the spill, and the meteorological conditions. For distances less than 100 meters (330 feet), it is assumed that the direct physical injuries due to the vehicular accident itself would be the principle hazard; otherwise, the individual would be able to evacuate the area and minimize their exposure. Additionally, the initial response by the crews and/or the emergency response personnel would reduce the risk and exposure of individuals unable to evacuate the accident scene.

Should the crew(s) be unable to take protective action, such as exiting the vehicle and moving out of any irritating plume (upwind) to a distance of at least 100 meters (330 feet), it is possible that they might be exposed to concentrations of materials, including airborne uranium (in the event of a fire) and fuel vapors that could cause destruction to tissue of the mucous membranes and upper respiratory tract, eyes, and skin. However, proper emergency response (e.g., flushing affected external areas with water while removing contaminated clothing) would minimize the amount of permanent physical damage to the individual(s). As discussed in the following, potential accidents could result in minimal impact to worker and public health and safety.

States and tribes having jurisdiction over areas through which these shipments would pass have the primary responsibility for protecting the public and the environment, and for establishing incident command should there be an emergency involving the shipments. DOE would provide technical advice and assistance to authorities and carriers when requested. The selected carrier for these shipments has the primary responsibility for providing emergency response assistance and recovery/restoration actions if required.

In the event of a highway incident, where the transport container is involved, the driver/first responder would notify the appropriate state control, the carrier's central dispatch facility, and the shipper. In the event of an accidental release of the uranium, the carrier is required to notify the National Response Center per DOT (49 CFR 171, General Information, Regulations, and Definitions, and 49 CFR 172.600, Emergency Response Information) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (40 CFR 302, Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification) regulations. The National Response Center would provide appropriate response in support of recovery/restoration.

Emergency response guides accompany each shipment. These guides are attached to the bill of lading. The driver would be in control of these documents at all times during shipment. These guides address the potential toxicological and radiological hazards associated with the material. The guides also include a telephone number, staffed 24-hours a day, that could be called for emergency assistance. In the event that the paperwork was inaccessible (e.g., a fire in the transporter cab), a first responder could contact the chosen carrier, which would provide emergency response information.

The container would be marked and placarded in accordance with DOT regulations. Placards indicating the radioactive nature of the shipment would be permanently attached to the transport containers. These visual warnings would provide information to first responders and the general public regarding the hazards and appropriate emergency response.

Specific details regarding emergency preparedness, notifications, and emergency response would be found in the transportation plan, currently being prepared for the shipment of the uranium materials.

The impacts associated with potential transportation accidents are expressed as risk. For this analysis, risk is defined as the product of the probability of occurrence of an accident involving uranium materials and the consequences of an accident (ENG-RCAL-028). Consequences are expressed in terms of the health effects from a release of uranium from the packaging.

Probability categories for accidents range from anticipated to incredible events (WHC-CM-4-46). That is, an anticipated event is one where the annual frequency ranges from 1 to 1 x 10^-2 (one chance in one hundred). An unlikely event has an annual frequency range from 1 x 10^-2 (one chance in one hundred) to 1 x 10^-4 (one chance in ten thousand). An extremely unlikely event has an annual frequency range from 1 x 10^-4 (one chance in ten thousand) to 1 x 10^-6 (one chance in one million). Incredible events have a frequency of less than 1 x 10^-6 (one chance in one million).

The maximum credible accident associated with the shipping container was analyzed for the shipment of Hanford Site surplus materials to Portsmouth, Ohio. The accident consisted of a collision, which engulfs the entire shipment of uranium material in a fire, thus providing the maximum radiological release to the public (and is presented as the bounding consequence scenario). Should an accident involving uranium materials during shipment occur, a release of material could occur only if the transport packaging were to become breached. The RADTRAN 4 computer code was used to calculate the potential radiological impacts of such an event. Details of the analysis are provided in ENG-RCAL-028.

The results (Table 3) indicate that the total calculated dose from a maximum credible accident during continental United States (overland truck) uranium billet shipments to Portsmouth, Ohio, conservatively was estimated to be 0.10 person-rem. This equates to 0.00005 LCFs. Similarly, the total risk for uranium oxide powder (accident scenario) was 0.03 person-rem (0.00002 LCFs) via rail and 0.06 person-rem (0.0003 LCFs) via truck. The total risk for fuel assemblies (accident scenario) was 0.1 person-rem (0.00007 LCFs) via truck.

Nonradiological consequences of the transportation of uranium materials also were evaluated (ENG-RCAL-028). For analysis, consequences were due to the chemical toxicity of uranium that could result from an accidental release (in grams per second or total grams, for billets or T-hopper shipments, respectively) during transport of the UO₃ powder and metallic billets. The toxicological consequences (Table 4) are given in terms of the concentrations of airborne uranium particulates (in milligrams per cubic meter) at various receptor locations (meters from the event). The calculated concentrations are compared to various exposure limits to evaluate the effects of the release on the public.

^a Temporary emergency exposure limits.
^b The 'rare case' refers to worst-case meteorological conditions of wind speed (1 meter per second) and atmospheric turbulence (Pasquill stability class F) that cause a maximum concentration. These conditions tend to disperse the released material very slowly, resulting in the highest possible downwind concentrations. However, these conditions rarely are encountered, except perhaps for night conditions, and tend to overstate the actual impacts (ENG-RCAL-028).

As discussed in ENG-RCAL-028, the results in Table 4 can be compared with temporary emergency exposure limits (TEELs) for uranium established by the DOE Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and Protective Actions, and the DOE Emergency Management Guide calls for the use of TEELs when emergency response planning guidelines (ERPGs) are not available. Although ERPGs are the standard community exposure limits approved by the American Industrial Hygiene Association, less than 100 chemicals have been assigned ERPGs, and none of those include compounds of uranium. The definitions of the TEEL limits are as follows.

• TEEL-0: The threshold concentration below which most people will experience no appreciable risk of health effects. The TEEL-0 for both uranium metal and uranium oxide (insoluble compound) is 0.05 milligrams per cubic meter.

• TEEL-1: The maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing other than mild transient health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor. The TEEL-1 for both uranium metal and uranium oxide is 0.6 milligrams per cubic meter.

• TEEL-2: The maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action. The TEEL-2 for uranium metal is 2 milligrams per cubic meter and for uranium oxide is 0.6 milligrams per cubic meter.

• TEEL-3: The maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects. The TEEL-3 for both uranium metal and uranium oxide is 10 milligrams per cubic meter.

Based on Table 4 and the definitions of the TEEL limits, the airborne concentration of uranium as a result of the maximum credible accident is about an order of magnitude less for the billets payload than for the powder payload. At distances of 200 meters (656 feet) and greater from an accident involving either payload, the results are either mild transient health effects or nothing at all. At a distance of 100 meters (328 feet), an accident involving powder results in airborne concentration less than TEEL-3. For the billets, the concentration is less than TEEL-1. Only for the very rare weather conditions at 100 meters (328 feet) is the TEEL-3 value exceeded for powder.

Risks associated with offloading activities are similar to those associated with handling any commercially available, bulk solid uranium materials. In the event of an accidental release, potential exposures to the public would be expected to be below those levels that would cause serious health effects.

5.2.3 Storage of Uranium Materials at the Portsmouth Site

Postulated accidents associated with storage of uranium materials at the Portsmouth Site have been addressed in DOE/EA-1299. As stated therein (Section 4.4.2, “Accidents”): “Various accident scenarios are calculated for both the public, facility worker, and the co-located worker at PGDP. Doses to the facility worker, co-located worker, and the public associated with general handling accidents, storage area fires, and seismic events are summarized in Table C.8 in Appendix C. The highest radiological risk to the public (0.63 rem dose) is from a storage area fire and to the co-located worker (0.84 rem) is from an earthquake with aerial dispersion of uranium materials. These exposures constitute a low risk and are environmentally negligible.”

The following information, extracted from the aforementioned Table C.8 in DOE/EA-1299, pertains directly to public and worker risks due to accidents at the Portsmouth Site, and shows that potential impacts from accidents would be expected to be small.

5.2.4 Continued Storage of Uranium Materials on the Hanford Site

It would be expected that continued storage of uranium materials at the Hanford Site, in an alternative (i.e., different location) facility, would present similar hazards as in the current configuration. Modifications of existing facility(s) or construction of a new facility would provide engineering features that might be superior to those at existing facilities.

5.2.5 Potential Disposition of Uranium Materials as Waste

Appendix A provides a discussion of potential impacts associated with a future decision to dispose of unsalable Hanford Site uranium materials onsite, should such a decision be forthcoming. As stated in the Appendix, disposal of up to 140 MTU of uranium materials would be conducted in the 200 Areas of the Hanford Site in existing facilities. Potential accident consequences would be similar to those addressed in current safety documentation for the disposal facilities, and would be bounded by those described previously (Section 5.2.2) for transportation of the materials.

5.3 PROPOSED ACTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, directs Federal agencies to identify and address, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of their programs and activities on minority and low-income populations. DOE is in the process of developing official guidance for implementation of the Executive Order. However, the analysis in this EA (Sections 5.1 and 5.2) indicates that there would be minimal impacts to both the offsite population and potential workforce during handling and transportation of the uranium materials, under both routine and accident conditions. Additionally, transportation in the continental United States would involve established, existing highways, minimizing transit time and associated potential exposure. Therefore, it is not expected that there would be any disproportionately high and adverse impacts to any minority or low-income populations.

5.4 PROPOSED ACTION: CUMULATIVE IMPACTS

The risks associated with routine packaging and transportation of the uranium materials are small. The transportation of the uranium materials would not be expected to substantially contribute to existing worker and public exposure from natural background radiation, or the existing toxicological background environment. As discussed in DOE/EA-1005, the average annual radiation dose from natural background radiation to the exposed population between the east coast and the Hanford Site was calculated to be approximately 6,000 person-rem per year. This could be compared with the anticipated calculated additional exposure of less than 10 person-rem associated with the proposed action.

The consolidated storage of Hanford Site uranium materials at Portsmouth Site would be consistent with storage of similar materials. The Portsmouth Site is an active uranium enrichment facility; as such, the total quantity of uranium material fluctuates depending on ongoing enrichment activities. There are approximately 146,000 MTU of uranium materials at the Portsmouth Site.

For perspective, presently there are approximately 1,800 MTU of uranium materials (oxides, fluorides and metal) at the Oak Ridge Operations Uranium Management Center at the Portsmouth Site. The aforementioned inventory of uranium materials was received from DOE’s FEMP Site (refer to Section 2.3.1), with an additional 2,200 MTU of uranium materials projected to be received from the FEMP Site (DOE/EA-1299), for a total of 4,000 MTU from the FEMP Site. Including the Hanford Site material, the Oak Ridge Operations Uranium Management Center Portsmouth Site total would be approximately 5,000 MTU, of which approximately 900 MTU (one-fifth) would be from the Hanford Site.

6.0 PERMITS AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

6.1 FACILITY COMPLIANCE

It is DOE policy to carry out its operations in compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations. For example, facilities on the Hanford Site and Oak Ridge-managed facilities, including those locations presently storing surplus uranium materials, operate in compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Clean Air Act of 1977, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR 61, "National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants"). Hanford Site radioactive stacks have been registered with the WDOH, Office of Radiation Protection under the WAC 246-247, “Radiation Protection, Air Emissions.” Operations at Portsmouth Site facilities are conducted under applicable Ohio air emission standards regulations. No air emission permits would be expected to be required for the proposed action.

All generated solid wastes would be handled in a manner compliant with applicable federal and state regulations and DOE Orders. For example, requirements include WAC 173-303 and DOE Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management”^*.

6.2 TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

The loading and transportation of the uranium materials will comply with the applicable regulations, orders, and guidance promulgated by agencies such as the DOE, DOT, and International Atomic Energy Agency. These agencies have developed comprehensive regulations covering the performance of the shipping packaging, vehicle safety, routing of shipments, and physical protection. Specific examples include:

• 49 CFR 107, "Hazardous Materials Program Procedures"
• 49 CFR 171, "General Information, Regulations, and Definitions"
• 49 CFR 172, "Hazardous Materials Table and Hazardous Materials Communications Regulations"
• 49 CFR 173, "Shippers-General Requirements for Shipments and Packaging"
• 49 CFR 177, "Carriage by Public Highway"
• 49 CFR 178, "Shipping Container Specifications"
• 49 U.S.C. 1801 et seq, "Hazardous Materials Transportation Act".

7.0 AGENCIES CONSULTED

The Yakama Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Wanapum Band, the Nez Perce Tribe, the States of Washington, Oregon, Ohio and Tennessee, the Western Governors’ Association, the Council of States Governments Midwestern Office, and other stakeholders in Washington State, Tennessee, Ohio and corridor states were notified regarding the proposed action. Copies of the draft EA were distributed to these entities for a 30-day review period.

During the public review period, the State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency requested, and was granted, an extension until February 22, 2000. A public meeting was held in Piketon, Ohio on

January 27, 2000, which included the draft EA on the agenda. The State of Washington Department of Ecology and DOE discussed uranium disposition issues (including the draft EA) in a March 2, 2000, meeting. The Hanford Advisory Board Environmental Committee was given a status by DOE in March 2000. Meetings were held with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 10, the State of Washington Department of Ecology and DOE in April 2000 and May 2000 to discuss uranium issues. The State of Oregon Department of Energy attended the May 2000 meeting. In early June 2000, the Hanford Advisory Board Health, Safety, and Waste Management Committee was given the status of Hanford Site uranium disposition by DOE.

Comments received on the draft EA are provided in Appendix B. Specific responses to those comments also are provided in Appendix B.

8.0 REFERENCES

10 CFR 110, 1993, "Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

40 CFR 302, 1993, "Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

40 CFR 1500, "Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

46 CFR 64, 1993, "Marine Portable Tanks and Cargo Handling Systems," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

49 CFR 107, 1999, "Hazardous Materials Program Procedures," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

49 CFR 171, 1993, "General Information, Regulations, and Definitions," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

49 CFR 172, 1993, "Hazardous Materials Tables and Hazardous Materials Communications Regulations," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

49 CFR 173, 1993, "Shippers - General Requirements for Shipments and Packagings," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

49 CFR 177, 1993, "Carriage by Public Highway," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

49 CFR 178, 1993, "Shipping Container Specification," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

50 CFR 17, 1992, "Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

56 FR 23363, 1991, "Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Preamble to Standards for Protection Against Radiation," Federal Register, May 21.

DOE/EA-0787, Environmental Assessment for the Shipment of Low Enriched Uranium Billets to the United Kingdom from the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE/EA-1005, Environmental Assessment, Disposition and Transportation of Surplus Radioactive Low Specific Activity Nitric Acid, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland, Washington.

DOE/EA-1123, Environmental Assessment, Transfer of Normal and Low-Enriched Uranium Billets to the United Kingdom, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland, Washington.

DOE/EA-1299, Final Environmental Assessment for the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Receipt and Storage of Uranium Materials from the Fernald Environmental Management Project Site, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

DOE/EH-0575, DOE Occupational Radiation Exposure, 1997 Report, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE/EIS-0200, Office of Environmental Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE/EIS-0283-D, Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE/EIS-0286, Hanford Site Solid Waste (Radioactive and Hazardous) Program EIS, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE/RL-96-92, Hanford Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington.

DOT-VNTSC-RSP A-92-1, National Transportation Statistics, Annual Report for 1992, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.

Ecology, EPA, and DOE-RL, 1999, Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, Washington State Department of Ecology, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Olympia, Washi