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Hanford Facility Beryllium Fact Sheet


Building Number/Name:
Date prepared:
Responsible Contractor:
Contact:

324
February 23, 2004
FH-RCP
Ken Jaten


PAST OPERATIONS
Beryllium brought in facility: YES
Form of beryllium: SOLID
Period of beryllium operations (dates): Start: 1976 End: Early 1980s
Location(s) in facility that contained beryllium materials: Low Level Canyon Room 146 (lab hood), Manipulator Shop Room 147, sodium laboratory in basement. No currently marked beryllium hazard areas were identified.

Description of beryllium activities: The 324 Building was completed in 1966 and called the Fuel Recycle Pilot Plant and later known as the Chemical Materials Engineering Laboratory. Waste vitrification work was conducted in the building through the 1980s. A 1976 memo noted that a beryllium pellet was transferred from a plastic bag into a stainless steel holder in the lab hood in Room 146. A beryllium material may have been temporarily stored in Room 147, but was reportedly never opened. In 1977-1981, beryllium metal was cut in the east hall of the 324 basement, behind the shielded glove box as part of an experimental program supporting the fusion material irradiation test facility. Operations included cutting of beryllium samples within a fume hood to put into test systems. No other beryllium activities were identified.

Building monitoring data summary: Two swipe samples were collected during the 1976 activity with a maximum beryllium concentration of 0.025 mg/in2 (<0.4 mg/100 cm2).

Personnel monitoring data summary: None identified.

Specify Engineering/Administrative controls used during operations: The beryllium pellet transfer was conducted in a ventilated lab hood.

Maximum Estimated Past Be exposure: NONE


CURRENT OPERATIONS
Building still present: YES
Beryllium present: Unlikely

Current building occupancy/activity: This building is preparing for decommissioning with hot cell clean-out work underway. If beryllium contamination exists in this facility, the most likely locations would be within the Room 146 hood where beryllium was reportedly transferred and/or exhaust ventilation systems downstream from this hood. These areas have no routine personnel access.

1999 Study Results: Ambient air samples were collected on 7/19/99 in the southeast corner of Room 137 just south of the entrance to Room 146, and on the second floor at the junction of Corridors 21 and 22 outside Room 218. A personal air sample was also collected on 7/19/99 in the breathing zone of a technician while wipe sampling surfaces for beryllium. Results reported for these samples were below the Method Detection Limit (MDL) of 0.004 and 0.008 µg/m3 for the ambient and personal samples, respectively. Surface samples were collected from 29 sites throughout the building on 7/19/99. Results reported for all but one surface sample were below the MDL of 0.5 mg/100 cm2. The surface sample that tested positive for beryllium had a beryllium concentration of 1.1 mg/100 cm2 and was collected from a fluorescent light fixture in Room 309. Areas that were unable to be sampled but should be considered as potentially contaminated with beryllium include the interiors of the exhaust ducts servicing the hoods and gloveboxes in Rooms 146 and 147, as well as the interiors of and exhaust ducts servicing the hot cells. Past process knowledge does not indicate that these areas should be contaminated, however.

Sampling Results Following the 1999 Study: Sampling for beryllium in 324 Building continues in support of work activities within the building. From 1999 through 2001, 109 swipe samples, 10 personal breathing zone samples, and 6 ambient air samples were collected and analyzed. All were found to be below the MDL's of 0.5 mg/100 cm2, 0.008 µg/m3, and 0.004 µg/m3 for swipe, breathing zone, and ambient air samples respectively. Of these samples, 9 swipe, one breathing zone, and 4 ambient air samples were collected in Room 309 in an effort to locate beryllium in this area and possibly identify the source of the one positive swipe sample (1.1 mg/100 cm2) collected from 324 in the 1999 Study. As previously noted, all samples were negative for detectable beryllium.

2002/2003: Since the laboratory detection limit has been reduced to the public release limit of 0.2 micrograms / 100 cm2, numerous surface wipe samples have been taken. Out of 45 surface wipe samples taken, one has been above the minimum detection limit of 0.2 micrograms. The one sample within the detectible range @ 0.37 was taken on the High Bay Crane pick up shoe. 5 follow-up surface wipe samples were taken, and personal breathing zone monitoring was conducted during the follow-up sampling. All results for the follow-up were below the limit of detection of 0.2 micrograms / 100 cm2, and 0.005 micrograms, respectively.

Operational Controls: Work activities are planned and reviewed with consideration given to the potential for beryllium exposure. Controls are prescribed when the work activity may potentially enter or disturb an area not yet characterized through beryllium sampling or monitoring. Based on beryllium sampling performed and historical knowledge of beryllium presence in the building, it is believed there is no risk of beryllium exposure, above normal environmental background, from routine work activities within 324 Building. Non-routine work and work involving uncharacterized areas of the building (e.g., exhaust ventilation systems, certain hoods and gloveboxes in Rooms 146 and 147) is carefully planned with IH/IS professional support to help assure potential exposure risks are minimized and characterized through the use of appropriate controls and additional sampling/monitoring.

Maximum Estimated Current Be Exposure from Routine Activities: NONE

Basis for above information: Stone and Webster report and publication WHC-MR-0388; FDH beryllium assessment report, and sampling/analysis data collected from the 1999 Study to the present.

Comments, including any additional information needed (specify): The lack of documented significant past usage of beryllium in the building and the radiological access restrictions for the hot cells effectively reduce potential past beryllium exposure. The detection of beryllium on one swipe sample from an area with no documented beryllium usage suggested the need for more detailed investigation of current and historical beryllium usage on the third floor of Building 324. This was done including several additional samples collected and analyzed (as noted above). No conclusive source of the beryllium on the original swipe sample could be identified or reconstructed.


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