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Building Number/Name: |
327 |
PAST OPERATIONS
Description of beryllium activities: The 327 Building, then known as the Radiometallurgy Building, opened in 1953 to house the examining and testing of irradiated materials, particularly fuel elements and fuel cladding materials. It was renamed the Postirradiation Testing Laboratory (PTL) about 1980. Its missions in the 1950s included the metalography of canning and corrosion. Missions in the late 1950s and early 1960s included the establishment of specifications for the N-Reactor fuel rods and process tubes. Destructive and nondestructive analysis of fuel rods were performed during the 1960s through the 1980s. Destructive analyses of the fuel rods involved drilling a pinhole in the fuel rod to collect a fission gas sample. The element was then sawed open and a metallurgical sample was ground and polished for analysis. The irradiated fines were swept up and treated as solid waste. Powdery dusts left behind clogged the air filters, sifted through the canyon, or were flushed into the RLS as liquid wastes. According to a retired manager, grinding, cutting, and polishing of beryllium were performed in a low level lab (Room 13 or the adjacent machine shop) on non-irradiated samples. End cap samples were from components from N-Reactor and likely contained a beryllium brazed layer. Polishing, grinding, and cutting additionally occurred in the hot cells and beryllium contamination in the vicinity of these cells was likely.
Building monitoring data summary: Five swipes were collected in 1976 from the lathe area. All sample results were at/or below detection limits of the time, ranging from 0.01 to 0.08 mg/in2(or approximately 0.16 to 1.28 mg/100 cm2).
Personnel monitoring data summary: None identified.
Specify Engineering/Administrative controls used during operations: Respirators worn for radiation protection. Beryllium exposure was not considered.
Maximum Estimated Past Be exposure: LOW
CURRENT OPERATIONS
Building still present: YES
Beryllium present: NO
Current building occupancy/activity: This building is being cleaned for deactivation and decommissioning activities.
1999 Study Results: Four ambient air samples were collected on 7/12/99 in building 327. Sample locations were: the alcove outside the southeast corner of the women's change room; the hallway outside the west wall of Office No. 10 above a file cabinet; by the north wall of the Canyon directly north of "F" cell; and in the center of Room 15. A personal air sample was also collected on 7/12/99 in the breathing zone of a technician while wipe sampling surfaces for beryllium. Results reported for the air samples were below the Method Detection Limit (MDL) of 0.004 and 0.010 µg/m3, for the ambient and personal samples, respectively. Surface samples were collected from 88 sites throughout the building on 7/12/99. Results reported for these samples were below the MDL of 0.5 mg/100 cm2. Areas that were not sampled but should be considered as potentially contaminated with beryllium include the interiors of the exhaust ducts servicing Room 15 and the Machine Shop, Hot Cells, and Canyon, as well as the interiors of the Hot Cells, the lab hood exhaust in Room 15, interiors of metalworking equipment in the Machine Shop, and the filtration units servicing the Canyon. (See subsequent data below).
Sampling Results Following the 1999 Study: Sampling for beryllium in the 327 Facility continues today in support of work activities within the facility. Since the 1999 Study, 68 surface wipe samples, 10 ambient air samples, and 5 breathing zone samples have been taken. A total of 10 surface wipe samples and 2 ambient air have been taken in room 15 (to include a wipe sample in the exhaust from the low-level lab hood. A total of 24 surface wipe samples have been taken in the machine shop, to include exhaust duct interiors serving the mill, the small lathe, the drill press, the large lathe, and the cut-off saw. The sampling/monitoring results have all been below the Minimum Detection Limit for the analytical methods available. (Note: These samples were all run at the previous 0.5 ug/100 cm2 limit of detection.) On 7-11-02 and 11-26-02 a total of 4 additional surface wipe samples were taken in support of current work being planned, resulting in levels < the new 0.2 ug/100 cm2 detection limit.
Operational Controls: Work activities are planned and reviewed with consideration given to the potential for beryllium exposure. Controls are prescribed when the work activity may potentially enter or disturb an area not yet characterized through beryllium sampling or monitoring. Based on beryllium sampling performed and historical knowledge of beryllium presence in the building, it is believed there is no risk of beryllium exposure, above normal environmental background, from routine work activities that have been reviewed in the AJHA process. Other non-routine work and work involving uncharacterized areas of the facility (e.g., interiors of exhaust ducts serving room 15, the machine shop, hot cells, etc.) is carefully planned with IH/IS professional support to help assure potential exposure risks are characterized and minimized through the use of appropriate controls and additional sampling/monitoring.
Maximum Estimated Current Be Exposure from Routine Activities: NONE
Basis for above information: Stone and Webster report and publication WHC-MR-0388; FDH beryllium assessment report.
Comments, including any additional information needed (specify): The only recorded beryllium surveillance activity in this building was the 1976 monitoring results identified in the Stone and Webster report.
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