**Opening**

Vice Chair Becky Holland welcomed the Health Safety and Environmental Protection Committee (HSEP) and introductions were made.

Committee member Keith Smith noted a correction related to censorship of a worker and trainer on page two of the October HSEP meeting summary. The committee approved the October meeting summary with this one change.

Representatives of both the HSEP and Tank Waste Committee (TWC) determined that gas buildup in double-shell tanks (DSTs) is a topic that HSEP and TWC would be interested in holding as a joint topic on the January HSEP agenda. The HSEP and TWC committee members also decided to discuss effects of radiation on critical concrete structures during a January meeting as a joint topic with the TWC and River and Plateau (RAP) committees, to be scheduled on HSEP’s agenda.

* Please see Attachment 1 – Transcribed Flip Chart Notes for key points/follow up actions recorded during the committee discussion.
DOE-ORP’s Response to HAB Advice #258 (Safety at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant [WTP]) – Joint with Tank Waste Committee

The committee thanked Steve Pfaff, U.S. Department of Energy - Office of River Protection (DOE-ORP) for DOE’s fast response (Attachment 2) and noted appreciation for the point-by-point response structure. To continue the discussion, the committee went through each advice point to make sure the responses were clear and understood. Steve provided most of the agency perspective during this discussion.

Advice Point 1

Q: This advice point asked DOE to augment the current technical staff. Can DOE comment on this response?

R: [DOE] Funding has been cut for DOE hiring for this program for several years. Available funding has been put towards tank farm activities. Headquarters has been scrutinizing every person added to staff. Several people have taken voluntary early retirement. DOE actually does need to hire more technical staff and has been working hard to fill needed positions. DOE recently received permission to hire more people for the WTP project, which allows for the ability to bring in technical experts from outside the organization. Part of the Safety Culture Improvement Plan is to define roles and responsibilities and to define improvement actions. Two engineers will be hired. Job vacancies are posted, and DOE is taking applications.

Advice Point 2

C: The authoritative piece was emphasized to drive safety at the WTP. There was a shortcoming in the response to this advice point. DOE has been driving the project and self-regulating for a long time.

R: [DOE] DOE receives weekly status reports on safety culture, health, safety, and security. As DOE is not doing this work for profit, being fined does not accomplish much except use up cleanup funding. Personnel feel the impact of the Defense Board actions. The Defense Board is qualified to provide the oversight needed to keep DOE on track. The shared goal is for WTP to work safely. This means considering safety culture in both the design of the plant and in the construction activities.

Advice Point 3

Q: DOE’s response refers to several different issues. The Secretary of Energy is looking at the black cells. It sounds like the value is understood, but where is DOE addressing the other issues in this advice point?

R: [DOE] Secretary Chu is putting together a team of experts to look at the black cell issue and the associated technical issues. DOE expects to receive a briefing in the near future on the plan.
ahead. DOE has been conducting regular briefings to the Defense Board to ensure DOE has achieved everything DOE has committed to. A next step for DOE is to revise the implementation plan with a different direction for these actions and different deadlines. The Defense Board has not been satisfied with what DOE has produced to date. The implementation plan has not yet been made public. Testing programs are being developed simultaneously with the implementation plan.

Q: Who is involved in developing the implementation plan?

R: [DOE] Some people on DOE staff are also part of Secretary Chu’s expert team. It is likely the teams are coordinating so the implementation plan and testing programs are coordinated. Secretary Chu’s team is responsible for whole effort and includes experts from outside of Hanford Site.

C: Secretary Chu’s assemblage of independent experts does not fit the committee’s definition of “independents”. DOE has technical experts to ask questions. This is different than having a team that takes a full systems analysis look. Using an objective set of outside eyes provides a different perspective.

Advice Point 4

Q: DOE is requiring managers to assess the manager process. What are DOE’s and the regulators roles in being a part of the assessment process?

R: [DOE] Manager assessments can be a misnomer because managers are not involved in the assessment process. The qualitative assurance plans include self-assessments. Management assessments can be interpreted as self-assessments. This response was crafted to show that DOE has a comprehensive assessment process across everything DOE does. Each year DOE produces an integrated assessment schedule to apply assessment across the organization. This includes safety culture self-assessments at sites. There is a declarations process each year that details the integrated safety management system is up to speed. Safety conscious work environments will also need to be submitted this year as an additional part of the self-assessment process.

C: The committee has yet to see an integrated safety management schedule that addresses a design function. This has been seen at facilities where there are ongoing operations. There is concern that DOE would build the facility and then need to rebuild it if the design did not meet safety standards. DOE needs to forecast future implementation and startup issues.

Advice Point 5
Q: Headquarters has used a contractor group to create the definition for safety culture. The definition was based off of industry standards at Chernobyl. The committee is interested in having the design begin with safety. When the plant is operating, what would the ISM checklist look like?

R: [DOE] Design reviews are built into DOE’s integrated safety management (ISM) schedule. DOE can take this information back to management. DOE needs to make it more obvious that it is doing this type of review. DOE began designing it with a different nuclear safety construct. Standards have changed for doing nuclear safety analysis. Analysis needs to show that DOE is meeting standards and controls. This has been a major part of actions DOE oversees to bring processes up to standards. DOE, locally and at headquarters, is trying to make sure there is oversight before approving the new safety implementation plan. Nuclear safety analysis is up to speed, and it describes the facilities, what kinds of accidents can happen, and what to do when accidents happen.

C: It is important that the different departments work together. From the workers’ perspective, it seems like the departments do not coordinate with each other and that there is no communication. Getting teams together to coordinate is an approach to that problem.

Q: Would DOE consider the proposed new definition of safety culture?

R: [DOE] DOE would have to change their mind on the current definition of safety culture, and ORP would need to adopt the new definition. The Defense Board is holding DOE to this definition throughout the complex. The DOE presentation to management the week of November 12, 2012 will include the proposed new definition for discussion. The proposed definition makes the individual’s role more obvious.

C: It is recommended that DOE speak with headquarters about the industry standards that come out of Chernobyl. The current definition is derived from those, and it is unclear.

Advice Point 6

C: The response indicates DOE will be using the Integrated Safety Management System (ISM) guide (DOE G 450.4-1C) to institutionalize behaviors. The ISM guide does not accomplish this. Institutionalization of behaviors comes out of conversations, enforcement, and encouragement of certain behaviors. It is recommended that DOE talk about this and rethink the response.

R: [DOE] DOE understand that putting up posters with safety messages does not mean a lot in terms of behavior change. DOE is looking at the safety cultural improvement plan and nine near-term actions to be completed in the first year. The issue management system is designed as a transparent system that anyone can submit issues into at any time, and is designed to keep issues from being ignored. Employees have been trained, and a screening committee has been
established to deal with new issues that come into the system. It is a good system that will only work if management treats it correctly.

Q: What has DOE done when it is obvious that behavior is not changing?

R: [DOE] takes the issue back to the management team and gives an update on safety culture. The next round of presentations at the end of the month will be changed to talk about details and allow management to provide immediate feedback. Management’s effort to conduct a first round of briefings was not very effective. Video teleconferencing limited the conversation.

C: There seems to be a disconnect between workers and management. Management’s role needs to be transparent to the workers.

R: [DOE] DOE wants people to understand safety culture without being cynical about what is not changing. Management needs to take the lead because if management is not setting an example, it will not make an impact for the workers. DOE needs to declare to the Defense Board that the nine near-term actions are completed. The effort cannot stop there. DOE will completely change the team working on this after the next few months in order to make the organization more safety literate. With a new team, DOE will figure out the next set of actions for the following year.

The committee decided to follow-up on this advice point and to continue to request briefings with DOE on the topic. The committee also expressed interest in seeing DOE’s tracking system for monitoring behavioral change.

Advice Point 7

C: DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) conducts assessment and investigations and writes reports. Increasing HSS enforcement would be helpful.

R: HSS has site representatives at major sites. HSS representatives have been seen on site more frequently and are increasing their routine presence with a focus on safety culture and other aspects of safety programs. DOE self-assessments are due at the end of February, and HSS will come out with a review at the end of May to assess if DOE has made progress on safety culture.

Advice Point 8

C: Until workers see a concrete example of protecting employees, this will not be meaningful. It is encouraged that asking questions and pushing back become an institutionalized part of business. The action that is taken in response to Gary Brunson’s letter is a good example. Workers can look at the
situation and see what would happen to them if they acted in the same way. It is important to build an arena of trust to show that a worker will not experience retaliation.

R: [DOE] Gary Brunson is still employed and functioning in a WTP engineering group. There are examples where DOE took an action and some employees disagreed. It is encouraging that there is now a process in place to go back and look at the situation and examine where in the process the workers position was not heard.

C: The response to Advice Point 8 does not address the issue. The key words at the heart of the issue are “Welcomes worker input” and “and is protective and inspires trust.” The response does not address worker input or protecting employees. More specificity is needed in the future

R. [DOE] These are DOE’s goals for safety culture as well. It will be a while before measured progress can be demonstrated.

C: There is no mention of independent help. In other pieces of advice, there is mention of using independent help to “welcome worker input” and be “protective and inspire trust.” Independent help will be a mechanism to achieve this advice.

C: It is important to look forward in the way contracts structured at test sites. Contractors look beyond safety incentives in order to meet deadlines.

The committee decided to continue discussing HAB Advice #258 point by point beginning with Advice Point 9 at the next committee meeting so as to allow enough time to go through each response and associated concerns with DOE.

Tutorial on Documented Safety Analysis – Joint with Tank Waste Committee

Agency Presentation

Mark Jackson, Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL), team lead for the Nuclear Safety Group in Richland, provided a presentation (Attachment 3) on documented safety analysis (DSA). Vic Callahan, DOE-ORP, was present to answer questions related to ORP, specifically the Waste Treatment Plant. The presentation discussed what goes into the DSA and provided a foundational understanding of how the DSA takes a global approach to safety. The safety basis defines safety equipment procedures and processes, outlines how to identify and evaluate hazards, and examines controls to those hazards to protect the public, the workers, and the environment. Mark noted that the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are regulated by DOE and used as a high level of control. TSRs are more critical than DSA, as TSRs identify that these are the right controls to safely operate the facility. Mark added that Section 202 is the safety basis and looks similar to the ISM. DOE-HSS has to approve
the safety basis to allow the contractor to operate the facility, which is what constitutes the license to operate.

Committee Questions and Response

Note: This section reflects individual questions, comments, and agency responses, as well as a synthesis where there were similar questions or comments.

Q: Is DOE’s approval and granting license to operate through document exchange?

R: [DOE] The contractor submits the DSA and TSR documents. DSA does not contain details of each accident and hazard. DOE-RL submits comments back to the contractor to resolve. DOE-RL approval is contingent upon resolution of the comments. Natural phenomena outside of the facility need also to be taken into account. For example, evaluation needs to include the effect of a seismic event on the facility. DOE uses a graded approach to DSA based on the level of hazards presented. The higher the hazard category, the more detail there is in the DSA and TSR. There is a Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) for the WTP. When facility operation changes, this process must take place in order to maintain configuration control within the facility.

C: The DSA and TSR processes do a great job of identifying the vast majority of potential safety hazards, but hazards do slip through the cracks. For example, it went unrealized that high gamma dose could destroy the integrity of concrete. It is important to look at chemical hazards and other chemistries that DOE would normally not look at. It is also important to be careful of how on-site and off-site are defined so all areas for potential hazard are captured in the analysis. Reactor areas are shown to be on-site where they are not. There is a trade-off in the definition of on- and off-site. Design-base decisions have not been resolved, and a process is needed to be able to regularly challenge them.

R: These facilities are old and were not designed with the same criteria buildings are designed with today. The DSA process was developed in the late 1980s, and it is still evolving.

Q: How many people are on DOE staff to review safety?

R: [DOE] Six individuals on DOE-RL staff review safety for nuclear facilities and transportation and packaging at Hanford Site. DOE-RL has the ability to bring in additional Government Services Support Contractors (GSSC) as needed. In the past DOE-RL brought in three people from GSSC. Eight DOE-ORP nuclear safety specialists are split between Hanford Site tank farms and ORP facilities.

Q: What is defense-in-depth?
R: [DOE] Defense-in-depth is a concept (not a control) that is recognized in safety space. It is cascading controls, not relying on just one control to address a hazard. It adds a layer of defense but is not a credited control regarded as safety significance or safety class. DOE does not credit defense-in-depth for decreasing doses. It is taken into consideration because it might help increase safety on site. A recognized hazard, for example, will go through the accident and hazards analysis. If it does not fall in safety class but it is high enough, it will fall into safety consequence. A control will need to be identified to mitigate the hazard. A control can be added that will not reduce the consequence but will aid in the defense.

C: There is another process that also exists called process safety analysis. If a piece of equipment is replaced or a large maintenance activity is undertaken, the contractor must establish and implement an Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQ) process. The safety analysis contributes to safety culture because it brings people from engineering, operations, and safety into the same room to talk. This drives the USQ process.

R: [DOE] Existing facilities like tank farms will go through the USQ process if there is a new retrieval and a new hole needs to be cut into the tank and new equipment needs to be installed. The structural analysis and design changes go through the project USQ process to evaluate changes. The contractor also accepts some risk with long project. DOE is involved in the process hazard analysis, which must be completed before coming to the final decisions put forth in the USQ. The process hazard analysis is applied to tank farms project USQ.

C: The following is an example of an unreviewed safety question. Plutonium oxide was discovered after a team reviewed plutonium in the tanks. If plutonium oxide is introduced to WTP facilities, there could be potential to have settling and a criticality configuration.

The committee determined that it would be helpful to tie future HSEP discussions back to DSA to solidify an understanding of the process and how it fits into the larger context of cleanup. The committee is also interested in pursuing a discussion of the PDSA for the WTP.

**DOE’s Response to HAB Advice #255 (Employee Concerns Program)**

Becky introduced the topic and Liz Mattson (Hanford Challenge) led the discussion on behalf of Tom Carpenter (Hanford Challenge). The committee discussed the advice response (Attachment 4) on a point-by-point basis. Brian Harkins (DOE-ORP) and Stan Branch (DOE-RL) provided agency perspectives throughout the discussion. Liz thanked DOE for the timely nature of their responses and noted appreciation for the point-by-point response structure.

*Advice Point 1*
C: Advice Point 1 deals with the idea of including non-management personnel, users of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP), in the program improvement process. Roger Gordon, DOE-RL, recently was identified to focus on these issues. He will be working on implementing the plan to improve the program. It would be helpful if Roger could come to HSEP to discuss how ECP could be better implemented. Users of the system must be included in the process in addition to program leaders. Other committees may also be interested in providing input.

Advice Point 2

C: This point relates to the idea of using best practices to increase confidence in the system. The committee is disappointed that there is not a plan for ORP to have a separate ECP. There are also issues with the contractor investigation process.

R: [DOE] DOE does not see a differentiation between the RL and ORP ECPs. Historically the site has always been combined as one program. ORP decided start a separate ORP program in 2005. Shortly thereafter, a Defense Board review concluded it was in the best interest of the program to consolidate them back together. Currently ORP assists in investigating ORP concerns, and RL assists in investigating RL concerns. It is DOE’s perspective that having two programs uses twice the amount of resources to accomplish the same thing.

Advice Point 3

C: When it comes to safety, actions are louder than words. This is something the committee has brought up in the past. There is little evidence of clear communication and resulting action. There is a problem with cases being referred back to the contractor, especially when investigating their own issues. DOE-ORP should have its own employee concerns program. Employees that work for ORP do not feel there is someone to advocate for them.

R: [DOE] DOE put together a number of improvement initiatives to enhance the program. Roger Gordon, senior DOE employee, was tasked to lead the effort to develop and implement an improved ECP program. In this role, he is working with DOE, employees, unions, contractor ECP and other groups. For example, each contractor has an employee concerns process. DOE is looking at these processes to see how they may compare to the best business practice. Meetings take place on a weekly and bi-weekly basis to develop a plan for the site-es and possibly for the DOE complex as a whole. After this meeting, Roger will be informed that Hanford Advisory Board (HAB) members would like to sit down and talk about the procedures for improving the process. Roger is currently looking into the recommendations and findings from overall reviews conducted by HSS and Defense Board staff.

DOE has enhanced the contractors’ ECP programs. The goal is to ensure there are processes in place to deal with employee concerns. The DOE order is clear to allow employees to resolve
issues at the lowest level and to give the companies the opportunity to resolve the issues. DOE transfers issues back to the contractor for issues that are employer-employee-specific.

DOE is typically involved in the process of referral of concerns from beginning to end. Some changes have been incorporated into the process to make sure issues are captured correctly. For example, DOE asks that individuals provide concerns in writing and sits down with individuals to discuss issues before proceeding to closure. DOE does not have the authority to tell contractors who to hire and fire, and DOE does not investigate 100% of everything that comes in. DOE has closure authority on closure concerns.

ORP provides resources to help with staffing needs. If there is an issue with an individual in ORP, DOE can pull staff from RL to investigate. There is a funding mechanism in place to make sure the office is staffed from personnel from both offices because this is a joint program.

Q: How many issues does DOE typically receive through ECP?

R: [DOE] Historically DOE receives an average of 120 or more concerns annually between ORP and RL. The contractor employee concern level has additional concerns that may not go up to the ORP and RL level. When DOE conducts annual assessments of a contractor’s program, DOE does a cursory review of the contractors’ cases to see if they were adequately addressed and closed out. Of the 120 cases, about 15-20% are duplicated in the system. Duplications occur when an employee goes to their employee concerns office and files a grievance with the union. If the contractor has already investigated, depending on the severity of the investigation, DOE will let them continue. If the issue is also filed with a DOE employee concerns office and relates to hiring, firing, or pay, DOE will let the employee know that DOE will give the issue back to the contractor.

Q: After HSS review, DOE decided to combine offices. Was that just because of resources, or was there a reason besides having one programmatic way to do business at Hanford Site?

R: [DOE] The HSS determined that the ORP ECP office was not as effective as it should have been, which is why it was decided it would be the best use of resources and management to fold it under the RL program.

C: With a huge effort to develop a safety-conscious work environment, DOE is going to have to establish trust within the workforce and engage workers. There is no one place to point employees with concerns to speak with. This process is about relationships. The average worker is not going to file an employee concern. DOE wants issues resolved at the lowest level, which translates into a worker’s immediate manager or supervisor. Not all workers have a strong rapport with their immediate managers. If an employee cannot resolve issues with the person they have a rapport with, the issue will not get resolved. The workers in the trench need to have someone at ORP to talk to or the ECP will miss issues. Not
everyone is going to go to a DOE representative. It may not be clear to workers who the representatives are.

R: **[DOE]** *With a strong safety culture established, it should not matter where concerns are voiced as long as the issues are voiced to someone in the company or to DOE. DOE understands that voicing employee concerns to an employee’s immediate supervisor is not always the desired starting point. ECP representatives are on site to help resolve concerns that are raised.*

Q: How often does the committee to improve ECP meet?

R: *The committee meets about every two weeks. DOE has developed teams to work on investigations and help sort out how ECP processes and procedures should be working. DOE will send HSEP a list of team members.*

C: It would be helpful to put signs up of who and where to report employee concerns near employee time card stations and places employees frequent on a daily basis to ensure the information is in plain sight.

R: *Posters are posted throughout the building. Detailed ECP information, including contact information, is also on the website.*

C: HSEP needs to understand the path forward on this issue. It would be worthwhile if Becky could attend a committee meeting to establish an HSEP presence. It would also be helpful to request that Roger Gordon visit HSEP to discuss the ECP.

R: **[DOE]** *HAMTC has representation on this group, but it is not Becky.*

As an aside, Becky noted that she has been the issue manager for a number of HSEP issues and has presented committee questions to DOE for discussion. Becky noted that, each time, the committee’s questions have gone to her supervisor and represented as her personal concerns, even though they were presented as the committee’s concerns.

The committee decided to request that Roger Gordon meet with HSEP to discuss ECP improvements. The committee requested that Mark Reavis (Central Washington Building Trades Council) and Becky meet with or attend meetings of the DOE ECP improvement committee.

**Site-wide Safety Culture Survey**

*Agency Presentation*
Julie Goeckner (DOE-HQ) provided a presentation (Attachment 5) on the Organizational Climate and Safety Conscious Work Environment survey and oriented the committee on how to access survey reports. Ed Parsons, DOE-RL, also provided DOE’s perspectives.

Julie explained the survey’s objective to evaluate the current state of Hanford Site’s organizational climate, safety culture, and Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). Julie noted that the Integrated Safety Management (ISM) guide (DOE G 450.4-1C) establishes a baseline and describes what behaviors should be if managers are promoting a healthy safety culture. The secretary of Energy has established an expectation to train all senior and middle managers, which is one of DOE’s goals. DOE developed a survey instrument that ties back to this document with the goal to establish the baseline for measuring the guideline and to know where to focus continuous improvement efforts. Julie noted that the survey is not something that could result in corrective action measures, because this is about behavior. Corrective actions cannot be taken on behavioral issues. Julie added that employee best practices indicate that if employees will not raise a safety concern, they will not raise any concern.

Q: How does the survey differentiate between DOE and the contractors?

R: [DOE] RL and ORP are developing their own corrective actions. DOE is encouraging the contractors to look at the findings and engage in conversations within their organizations to develop actions. Some actions carry more weight than others. Actual improvement in culture and behavior must be modeled on leadership models. DOE is not imposing any strict structure on how behavior change will occur. The focus is identifying those behaviors that are preventing higher-level achievement, change and trust. This is a systematic approach to health safety and environment and the mechanisms to obtain constructive behaviors that support a safety conscious work environment.

Q: How is ORP integrated with the contractor?

R: [DOE] The surveys are being factored into the self-assessment process. Exactly what contractors will do with the results is not determined; DOE does not mandate what ORP does with the surveys. At this point in the process, DOE is focusing on getting through the data.

Q: Will DOE look at different contractors’ survey results and identify issues that need to be dealt with, or will the organizations deal with issues themselves?

R: [DOE] It is up to leadership at each organization to make improvements based on the survey results. Best industry practices indicate that DOE cannot dictate a change in organizational culture. DOE can only define expectations for how to proceed. Each organization will individually report to DOE on the organization’s next steps, and that information will become part of a series of performance measures and expectations. Behaviors are being pushed to change at a department level, and departments report back to headquarters as a way of
monitoring behavior change. This is a long-term process, and it is still developing. The commercial nuclear industry has been implementing behavior change for 25 years. The interactions between employees and first-line supervisors are more important than anything.

Q: What do the asterisks next to survey scores indicate?

R: [DOE] Those are the scores that received the lowest rating.

Q: How do RL and ORP survey results compare? How do Hanford Site survey results compare with survey results from organizations outside of Hanford Site?

R: [DOE] There may be some correlations. In addition to evaluation, there were six norm questions on the survey that were evaluated to three engineering and construction norms, companies in transition norm, and a U.S. national norm. Results will show comparison with other industries. For the most part, the results indicated that the norms were statistically significantly higher than Hanford Site results.

Q: How do Hanford Site results compare with construction norms?

R: [DOE] The survey identified opportunities for improvement. Results look good at face value. This process is about continuous improvement, and DOE will always strive to improve.

C: One question that needs to be included is how many managers an employee actually has. A given employee might have up to ten people they believe are their manager.

R: [DOE] The survey includes a definition of a manager and a leader in the front to address this feedback, which DOE has received in the past.

Q: Continuous improvement takes years. How does DOE address the curve of contract changes, and how is this addressed on the construction side? Do these requirements trickle down to the construction force?

R: [DOE] The requirements are in every DOE contract. The safety culture expectation goes to everyone regardless of where or what type of work they are involved with. From a DOE Headquarters perspective, everyone, including subcontractors, is held to the same standards for safety culture.

Q: Headquarters indicated that they would be asking for employees’ help to develop an improvement plan after receiving the results from the survey. Two committee members (Hanford Site workers) indicated that they did not receive an invitation to participate in the groups to become involved in improvement plan development. Contractors sent out invitations indicating there was limited space in the auditorium venue where the survey rollout meetings were held. Employees feel they were not invited to participate
in the employee meeting. There appears to be a “target” audience for participation in the groups. How does it happen that those individuals who are particularly involved (such as members of this committee) are not included in the group process?

R: [DOE] Steve Pfaff (DOE) will follow up regarding working meetings and communications on survey results. The companies have to be creative and comprehensive with communication. This is a learning process, and this is the first program of its kind at Hanford Site. Leadership will continue to learn based on feedback received.

Susan Hayman showed the committee the website where the survey results can be found. The website shows the summary results and includes a link to a PowerPoint that summarizes the results. The website is: http://www.hanford.gov/page/cfm/SpeakUpResults.

The committee will continue to track this topic through its issue managers. Contractor self-assessments and approval actions are due to DOE Headquarters by the end of February and will then be transmitted to the Defense Board by the end of March.

**DOE-RL Contractor Metrics on Safety**

*Agency Presentation*

Ray Corey, Assistant Manager for Safety and Environment at DOE-RL provided a presentation (Attachment 5) on the Contractor Assurance System (CAS). Ray explained that CAS is a management tool and a mechanism to fulfill the requirements of DOE order 226.1B, *Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy*. CAS serves as a metrics and trending system to look at performance of major safety, quality, security, and emergency planning to communicate trends to employees and contractor management. Contractors decide what they want to measure. Terry Vaughn, Vice President for Safety, Health, Security, and Quality for CH2MHill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), also presented on CHPRC CAS (Attachment 7). Terry discussed the CHPRC performance dashboard. Terry noted that these metrics provide a way to track and improve the ISM program.

Q: Is there a way to know how many injuries there are based on who reports them?

R: [CHPRC] If workers do not report injuries, they do not receive Workers’ Compensation. So there is no incentive for contractors not to report injuries. DOE wants contractors to report injuries and have instituted incentives for doing so. DOE has allowed each project to develop safety challenges to reduce injuries and incentives to report injuries. Incentives include hockey ticket giveaways, for example.
Q: Can metrics be compared across contractors to view metrics for the whole site? It would be helpful to pull data together where overlap exists.

R: [DOE] The contractors have control of what metrics they want to report on to DOE. Contractors choose metrics to track based on what is important to them. Some metrics (big categories) are similar across contractors, but they are not identical because they have different scopes of work. Because contractors’ metric subcategories differ, metrics cannot be compared across contractors. Even though metrics cannot be compared across contractors, the metrics are helpful to DOE to determine how to provide the best type of oversight. If an issue is identified, DOE can shift gears towards that issue, focusing energy and attention where the problem exists. This system aids in efficiency for how DOE conducts business and how DOE supplies resources to management.

Q: What happens when a problem is identified? Is more training provided?

R: [DOE] If DOE determines that more training is required, it will be provided. Often work is stopped in the field to enable workers to step back and identify that a different tool is needed to complete the job. Metrics allow an improved communication flow between workers and management. This allows for a good stop-work mechanism. If workers are uncomfortable taking initiative to stop work, technical safety representatives stationed in the field will bring the issue up with management. It is difficult for contractors to hide behind statistics and data. DOE also generates its own data and compares it to the contractor’s for differences.

Q: Do all employees see these metrics?

R: [DOE] The metrics are on the website and available to everyone. They are not sent out. The results are presented at the President and Employee Zero Accident Committees. RL attends these meetings, and any HSEP committee member is welcome to attend.

Q: It would be useful to share lessons learned between contractors and between RL and ORP. Where is the feedback mechanism?

R: [DOE] Yes. There is a lot of sharing of information and benchmarking. A lot of work goes into comparing and designing metrics. RL shares with ORP. It is up to the contractors to decide how they want to use this information.

The committee decided the next steps for this issue are for issue managers to follow up with ORP and find out how they are tracking metrics. Committee members agreed that this issue is not time sensitive.

Committee Business

Final Meeting Summary
Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection Committee November 8, 2012
Review follow up items

Susan reviewed the follow up items collected throughout the meeting. The committee will continue the Advice #258 response discussion from advice point 9 through 13 and continue to discuss Process Hazard/Safety Analysis. Steve Pfaff will follow up with HAB member Laura Hanses regarding worker meetings and survey results communications.

Update 3 month work plan

The committee decided that they have important and timely topics for a meeting in January. They may choose not to meet in February, since there will be a Board meeting that month. Susan will work with issue managers via email to update the January Potential Meeting Topics Table. The committee decided to have a call in December to confirm next steps for joint committee topics with the River and Plateau Committee (RAP) and Tank Waste Committee (TWC).

Attachments

Attachment 1: Transcribed Flip Chart Notes
Attachment 2: DOE-ORP’s response to HAB Advice #258 (Safety at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant)
Attachment 3: Nuclear Safety Management Presentation
Attachment 4: DOE-ORP’s response to HAB Advice #255 (Employee Concerns Program)
Attachment 5: 2012 Hanford Site Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey Presentation
Attachment 6: Contractor Assurance System Presentation (DOE)
Attachment 7: Contractor Assurance System Presentation (CHPRC)

Attendees

Board Members and Alternates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Richard Bloom</th>
<th>John Howieson</th>
<th>Melanie Meyers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Shelley Cimon</td>
<td>Steve Hudson</td>
<td>Mark Reavis</td>
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<td>Dirk Dunning</td>
<td>Bob Legard</td>
<td>Keith Smith (phone)</td>
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<td>Laura Hanses</td>
<td>Liz Mattson</td>
<td>Margery Swint</td>
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<td>Becky Holland</td>
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Others

| Stan Branch, DOE-RL    | Erika Holmes, Ecology | Terry Vaughn, CHPRC |
DSA - Comments

- Very complex process – very thorough – sometimes things still get “missed.”
- Would recommend DOE really pay attention to: chemical hazards, definition of onsite/offside hazards.
- “Process Safety Analysis” – Different from DSA.
- Use this topic to tie back to other discussions in HSEP.

Safety Culture Advice Response

- Follow up on Advice Point 4 response: Are DOE’s assessments identified in the response actually addressing the design issues?
  - DOE will follow up with committee on this. (Savannah River as an Example)
- Follow up on Point 6 – How is DOE doing with this (specific actions), and what are the outcomes?
- Advice point 8 – HAB: “Welcomes input, protective, inspires trust”
  - Want to know how DOE is addressing specifically.
  - Use “independent review” to address this point.
- Generally:
  - Keeping contractors focused and performing on safety.
  - Don’t let incentives outweigh safety performance.
  - Advise 13 – Piggybacks on independent assessment for design.
  - ORP needs to own ECP (But similar with RL)
  - Small business issue – how they are supporting safety culture issues? (more on this at next meeting)
Site-wide Survey Comments

- Generally, ask how many “managers”/people a person “reports” to
  → DOE tried to address this in definitions.
- Next steps:
  - Reports: How did contractors use safety information to identify cont. IMP actions (Jan. 15 – self-assessments to DOE)
  - After March – Briefing on above point.

ECP Program Advice Response

- Advice pt. 3: Need more demonstration of action here.
- Advice pt. 2: Disappointed no intent for separate ORP program.
  - Hard not to hear a direct ORP contract.
- Advice pt. 1: Anxious to meet with Roger Gordon.
- Think ORP should know if there is an issue (e.g. contractor) – weakness in process to always resolve at lowest level.
- Use signage so that workers know who/how to contact ECP.
- Next steps:
  - Have Roger Gordon come to HSEP
  - Request to invite Mark R. and Becky H. to meet with DOE Team.

CAS

- Next steps:
  - Open opportunity for HSEP members to sit in on EZAC/PZAC meetings (let Mike know)

CAS Comments

- Would be useful to share lessons learned between contractors and between RL/ORP
- Next Steps:
  - Follow up with ORP – How are they tracking meetings? Comparable? (IM follow up)
Follow Up

- Continue Advice #258 response discussion – from advice pt. 9 – 13 (include small business issue)
- More on “Process Hazard/ Safety Analysis” (IM = Richard)
- Meet with new ECP program manager, Roger Gordon.
- How do issues get to ECP when they are committee issues?
- Have Roger send Becky information on DOE Team that is meeting r.e. ECP. (Stan)
  - Mark expressed interest in serving on team
- Steve P. – Follow up with Laura regarding worker meetings r.e. survey results communications.
- Add Becky and John as HSEP IMs for TL & WM EIS